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Preface
Competition policy is one of the key elements of transition towards a
market economy. Non-competitive market structures, especially the
monopolies typical of the communist inheritance, within the framework
of a market economy (with minimal government intervention and private
property), generate very undesirable effects on social welfare. Therefore,
fundamental reform in this area, first of all the formulation of an appro-
priate competition policy and the establishment of effective competition
institutions, is a precondition for the establishment of an effective market
mechanism, and an increase in economic efficiency.
However, in many transitional countries, the public is unaware of the
need for the establishment and implementation of a competition policy.
While the reasons for privatisation and enterprise restructuring, monetary
stability and convertibility of the currency, a liberal regime of foreign trade
and similar policies are more or less clear to everyone (which does not
necessarily mean that everyone agrees with them), competition policy
somehow always remains in the shadow of spectacular reforms of the
institutional framework. Such ignorance related to competition policy is
not specific to the countries undergoing transition at the end of the last
and the beginning of the current century. Competition policy existed in
hardly any European country for a large part of the last century. It was the
major historical changes that resulted in a substantial increase in
American influence on the Continent, which led to the establishment of
consistent competition policy and appropriate competition institutions in
Europe. Such circumstances provoked cynics to refer to competition poli-
cy as an imported commodity. In the last century, the import came from
America to Europe; nowadays the economically and institutionally devel-
oped West exports competition policy to countries in transition. In other
words, countries in transition reform, i.e. establish their own competition
policy, not because there is a widely accepted autonomous political con-
sensus in favour of it (this would require an understanding of the signifi-
cance of competition policy), but because of specific international pres-
sure, i.e. the suggestions that the international community makes to the
leaders of political reform in countries in transition.
Serbia and FR of Yugoslavia were spared from even considering these
ideas for a long time. There was no transition in the country; even reforms
that everyone would have understood (such as privatisation) did not take
place and the pressure exerted on our country by the international com-
munity was wholly unrelated to competition policy. Consequently we
are now starting from scratch. In its regular report on transition, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) gave
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competition policy in Serbia /FR Yugoslavia the lowest possible mark.
This, surely, will come as no surprise at all, at least to those who are famil-
iar with the current state of domestic competition policy. However, it is
interesting to ask how many people are worried by this negative opinion.
An even more interesting question is why are they worried? Is it because of
the bad domestic competition policy as such, i.e. its negative effects on
social welfare, or is it perhaps only the unfavourable perception of an
important international financial institution that causes concern? The
answer to this question is important since it provides a basis for an answer
to the following question; does Serbia/FR Yugoslavia need to reform the
existing competition policy, that is, establish an entirely new competition
policy, because we consider it necessary, or simply in order to satisfy the
requests of the international community? Will competition policy, once
again, prove to be a wholly imported product?
The aim of this report is to demonstrate and explain to the general pub-
lic that the country needs an entirely new, effective and efficient competi-
tion policy and new institutions for its effective implementation.
Serbia/FR Yugoslavia needs this in order to speed up and complete the
development of the new market economic system, and to increase the eco-
nomic efficiency that will enhance social welfare. The arguments that this
study offers are related to analysis of the existing market structures and the
existing competition institutions. Therefore we will start from the begin-
ning, making an effort to create a sound foundation for reforms of eco-
nomic policies and the development of new institutions through analysis
of existing circumstances. In this manner a new competition policy can be
formulated and new competition institutions can be developed because it
is in our best national interest. Fortunately, we do have the support of the
international community in this.
The support for this project came from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) via the program to strengthen the
environment for the growth of private enterprise in the FR
Yugoslavia/Serbia, also known as the USAID Commercial Law Project,
implemented by the local branch of Booz Allen Hamilton. We are grateful
to all those who helped in the realization of this study.
Belgrade, 31st May 2002
Boris Begoviæ
Boko Mijatoviæ
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Executive Summary
1. Competition policy should deal with the protection and fostering of
market competition that will, by its invisible hand, i.e. the struggle
between competitors and their rivalry, produce economically efficient
outcomes. Accordingly, competition policy should be directed at cre-
ating competitive market structures that will enable increased eco-
nomic efficiency, and consequently improved social welfare.
Competition policy should definitely not be directed towards attempts
to control the resource allocation process by, for example, administra-
tive price control.
2. The character of market structures, i.e. the degree to which they are
competitive is characterised by the number of buyers and sellers, the
market price character (whether it is parametrical from the point of
view of buyers and sellers) and conditions of entry and exit from the
industry, i.e. if there are barriers to entry and exit. The perfectly com-
petitive market, i.e. perfect competition, is characterized by a large
number of decision makers (buyers and sellers), parametrical price
character and absolutely free entry and exit from the industry. The
perfectly competitive market enables efficient allocation of resources,
i.e. maximised social welfare. In other words, the unconstrained deci-
sions of private entrepreneurs on such a market (invisible hand)
lead to maximal social welfare.
3. There are various forms of non-competitive market structure; the
extreme form of non-competitive market structure is monopoly, a sit-
uation in which there is only one producer  only one firm on the sup-
ply side. Non-competitive market structures result from the tendency
of private entrepreneurs to maximize their profit. Since monopolistic
profit is the highest profit that can be appropriated, the elimination of
competition/competitors and the creation of a monopoly is only a
vehicle for profit maximisation. Each non-competitive market struc-
ture generates economic profit  that is profit above the normal
appropriated according to the normal profit rate. The normal profit
rate is the one appropriated on the perfectly competitive market. It
equals the cost of capital, i.e. the cost incurred when purchasing the
capital on the capital market. Accordingly, profit appropriated
according to that rate is indicated as zero economic profit, and cost of
capital is included in total production costs.
4. In conditions of perfect competition, i.e. conditions of zero econom-
ic profit, product price is equal to the marginal costs of production.
If the marginal costs deviate from the price, i.e. if the price exceeds
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marginal costs, market power appears. market power is indicated by
the existence of economic profit. Market power is the consequence
of non-competitive market structures, so it is a reliable and undis-
putable indicator of such market structures. The biggest market
power, i.e. the largest deviation of the price from the marginal costs,
is recorded in the case of monopoly and extremely non-competitive
market structures.
5. The existence of non-competitive market structures has a very adverse
impact on economic efficiency, and therefore social welfare. Modern
economic analysis identifies various welfare effects of non-competitive
market structures. Allocative inefficiency (dead-weight loss) arises
from the deviation of product market prices from marginal costs, and
leads to decreased equilibrium supply and increased equilibrium
price, compared to the perfect market competitive equilibrium. The
dead-weight loss (allocative welfare loss) that occurs represents the
fragment of consumer welfare (consumers surplus) that is not re-dis-
tributed to the producer, i.e. that is appropriated by producers as eco-
nomic profit. Therefore, aside from the loss of social welfare (dead-
weight loss), allocative inefficiency leads directly to the redistribution
of welfare from consumers to producers.
6. Non-competitive market structures have significant consequences for
production efficiency (factors productivity) as well, and in that way
effects social welfare. The effects of non-competitive market structures
can be contradictory. On the one hand, the absence of competition
removes incentives for the monopolist to increase short-term produc-
tion efficiency, i.e. there are no incentives to reduce so called X-ineffi-
ciency). Furthermore, without incentives for investment in research
and development, long-term production is not increased either,
viewed as long-term reductions in unit cost. A quiet life is the sweet-
est of all monopolistic profits. On the other hand, the goal of every
profit-making enterprise is to obtain the most advantageous position
on the market, achieving advantage compared to competitors and,
ultimately, eliminating all competitors and establishing a monopoly,
in order to maximise profit. The prospect for establishing a non-com-
petitive market structure (monopolies, if possible) creates incentives
for firms to invest in research and development, to create new prod-
ucts and reduce the production costs of existing ones, i.e. it creates
incentives for substantial increases in production efficiency. In short,
non-competitive market structures can have contradictory effects on
productive efficiency and social welfare.
7. Some changes in market structures can have contradictory effects on
various types of economic efficiency. For example, if there is an econ-
omy of scale, the horizontal merger of two companies (the merger of
two firms that are competitors on the same market) can lead to the
establishment of a non-competitive market structure (market power)
and allocative inefficiency, i.e. dead-weight loss of social welfare.
However, such a merger may also lead to the creation of an economy
of scale, reducing unit production costs and increasing production
efficiency, thus producing increments in social welfare on that
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account. Obviously, evaluation of each specific merger and the conse-
quent modification the of market structure, involves paying special
attention to the relative value of allocative and production efficiency
changes.
8. Obviously, the economic efficiency and welfare effects of market
structures and their changes are very complex. It is possible that some
of those changes, although prima facie they may not seem desirable, in
fact lead to economic efficiency and social welfare increases. Especially
if a time dimension is taken into account, and therefore the long-term
changes of economic efficiency are considered as well. Taking all this
into account, a good competition policy has to be well balanced and
flexible. On the one hand, if the competition policy is too lose, market
power and the abuse of the monopolistic position will be easily achiev-
able, so that allocative inefficiency will lead to a dead-weight loss of
social welfare. On the other hand, if the competition policy is too
stringent, constraints for private entrepreneurship will be created and
incentives for economic (production) efficiency will be removed, par-
ticularly incentives for increasing long-term production efficiency,
like investments in research and development. 
9. Empirical research on the competitiveness of market structures
should encompass answers to questions of the character of concentra-
tion supply on a specific market and conditions of entry and exit, i.e.
barriers to entry or exit from the industry. As for supply concentra-
tion, apart from supply from domestic producers, it is necessary to
include imports into the analysis as well, i.e. supply which foreign pro-
ducers generate. In addition a key question of such an analysis is how
to specify the market for which the analysis is provided  the issue of
the relevant market. The relevant market is the market on which an
individual producer perceives competitive pressure form the other
producers (competitors). The relevant market should encompass cat-
egories of geographical market (taking into account the significance of
transport costs for total supply costs) and to encompass competitions
from substitutes, i.e. these products that can easily replace the prod-
ucts of the observed market (high cross-elasticity of demand).
10. Empirical research of market structures in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia started
with analysis of supply concentration using data about firms total
turnover. The Hefrindahl-Hirschmann Index was used as an indicator
of supply concentration (HHI, minimum value 0, maximum value for
monopoly 10,000). The analysis was performed at the sub-sector level,
therefore at the lowest aggregation level. The implicit assumption of this
analysis is that the sub-sector level represents the relevant market for
each product, although there is an element of doubt about this such a
market can, in many cases, be larger than the relevant market, especially
when considering substitutes. In those industries in which transport
costs are high, it is relatively easy to spot situations in which the real rel-
evant market is much smaller than the relative market estimated in the
way described. The analysis demonstrated a relatively high degree of
supply concentration. In almost 44% of sub-sectors an extremely high
degree of supply concentration (HHI higher then 2,600) was revealed.
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11. The highest supply concentrations occur in the energy sector and
heavy industrial sector, although the inclusion of sub-sectors even in
these industries reveals  significant variations of supply concentration
from one sub-sector to another. Non-manufacturing businesses, with
the exception of transportation industries and industries that are legal
monopolies, show a somewhat lower level of supply concentration.
Still, in some non-manufacturing sectors and sub-sectors extremely
high levels of supply concentration were indicated.
12. Civil engineering proved to be one of the industries with the lowest
level of supply concentration. Such a result was to be expected, consid-
ering the nature of the industry but the very fast growth of new entries,
i.e. the growth of new firms during the 1990s is also a key factor in
explaining the low levels of concentration supply. Therefore, low bar-
riers to entry represent a key factor not only of potential, but also of
actual competition.
13. Analysis of supply concentration on the basis of the quantity of supply
of particular products was conducted on the basis of data on the num-
ber of actual articles of a particular type produced in the country. In
this analysis the relevant market was defined as only the market for the
particular product in question. It can be assumed that such a defini-
tion of the relevant market is too restrictive, baring in mind that not
all substitutes of the product are taken into account. The results of this
analysis indicate an even higher level of supply concentration, which
was fully to be expected, considering the narrow definition of the rele-
vant market.
14. Generally speaking, analysis of domestic market structures indicated
extremely high supply concentration in most of the observed cases
(products and/or sub-sectors). Such results were to be expected, tak-
ing into account the size of the domestic market and the breaking of
economic links with companies from former the Yugoslav republics.
Nevertheless, a decrease in the level of supply concentration dynamic
is apparent over time. While the share of the markets (sub-sectors)
with low supply concentration accounted for only 18% in the year
1992, eight years later that share increased to 28%. Almost symmetri-
cally to this change, the share of markets with high and extremely high
supply concentration decreased as well. The most fundamental cause
of this decrease in supply concentration was new entries, i.e. an
increase in the number of firms. In the year 2000, the number of oper-
ational firms in Serbia was almost seven times greater than in 1990,
even though the year 2000, unlike 1990, does not include companies
from Kosovo.
15. The crucial factor of market structure is conditions of entry and exit
from the industry. The results already mentioned confirm that even in
Serbia, supply concentration depends heavily on the number of new
entries. Furthermore, the sheer possibility of free entry and exit from
an industry creates incentives for existing firms to become economi-
cally efficient  potential competition creates the same incentives as
real competition. These are incentives for economic efficiency, i.e.
incentives for the efficient allocation of resources and social welfare
12 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
maximisation. The analysis has also demonstrated that in the case of
Serbia/FR Yugoslavia significant barriers to entry exist, of a political,
economic and institutional nature.
16. Political (non-commercial) risk generates a substantial barrier to new
entries, especially in the case of foreign direct investments (FDIs), but
also in the case of domestic private entrepreneurs and investors. It has
been demonstrated that, in spite of the drastic decrease in political risk
during the year 2000, political conditions in the country nevertheless,
still generate substantial risks. A few typical risks should be mentioned
initially; political instability due to the weak coalition in power, politi-
cal pressure for new elections and constant international pressure on
the political affairs of the country ( most importantly the ICTY 
Hague criminal tribunal); the future of the joint state of Serbia and
Montenegro and the important economic consequences of a possible
collapse of the existing country, the future international legal status of
Kosovo and uncertainty about the countrys ability to meet the finan-
cial obligations which it has taken over (repayment of the old debt).
17. Economic barriers to entry are the most resistant of all barriers to
entry, since they are generated by factors which are, at least in the
short-term, very hard to eliminate or even substantially change. One
of the most significant barriers is the economy of scale, which requires
a certain threshold market size as a prerequisite for investment with a
minimal efficient quantity of production. This type of the entry barri-
er is particularly significant for small countries like Serbia and can
only be overcome by developing export markets. Furthermore, the
undeveloped capital market in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia, both in terms of
financial and real capital, generates high costs of exit and entry to vir-
tually all industries and constitutes one of the crucial economic barri-
ers to entry.
18. Institutional barriers to entry are, technically speaking, easy to
remove. However it requires a strong political will. Institutional barri-
ers in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia are very high for the time being. Although
they have been reduced slightly over the last two years, they are still
substantial. These barriers are related to, for example, the firm and/or
business registration process, the issuing of work permits by various
agencies, the acquisition of urban land for development, the issue of
development and construction permits according to town planning
regulations, the definition of industrial relations and collective con-
tracts (bargaining) and the activities of the state and local authority
inspection services.
19. For a small open economy such as Serbia/FR Yugoslavia, with a small
domestic market, it is crucial to understand the influence of interna-
tional trade on the character of domestic market structure, especial-
ly concerning imports as a source of competition on the domestic
market. If the liberalisation of imports were to lead to a considerable
reduction of supply concentration, thus compelling domestic mar-
ket structures to become more competitive, it could even be consid-
ered a replacement for a conventional competition policy. At the
least, such liberalisation might constitute a crucial lever of a small
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country competition policy. Therefore, it is necessary to eliminate or
decrease all existing and potential barriers to imports.
20. The analysis of import barriers to Serbia/FR Yugoslavia and their
effects on market structures are related to the year 2000, since it was
the last year with available data. It was shown that substantial barriers
to import existed: tariff protection (high and dispersed tariff rates),
non-tariff barriers (import licences and quotas), import procedure
barriers (compulsory application for each foreign trade transaction),
technical barriers (antidumping, technical standards, sanitary and
phyto-sanitary measures etc.), barriers which derive from the poor
condition of the transportation infrastructure etc. It has also been
demonstrated that the foreign trade reforms which were introduced at
the end of 2000 and mid 2001 led to the abolition of non-tariff barri-
ers, the reduction and simplification of custom tariff rates and consid-
erable reductions in import procedure barriers. However, substantial
barriers to import still exist, primarily tariff and technical barriers.
Naturally, these barriers vary from product to product, the highest
barriers to entry being recorded in the case of agricultural products,
consumer goods and durables.
21. The existing barriers to import and their reform should be viewed
within the context of joining the World Trade Organization and the
obligation to conclude the agreements on Free Trade Zones. The
process of joining the WTO imposes obligations regarding swift and
irreversible foreign trade liberalization, in both areas of tariff and non-
tariff barriers. The process of negotiating and concluding new agree-
ments on free trade zones, including already concluded and ratified
agreements, effectively reduces barriers to imports while increasing
the possibility for export of domestic products to countries with which
agreements have been ratified.
22. Introducing the competition generated by imports into the analysis of
the domestic market structure significantly decreased supply concen-
tration - it has been demonstrated that the character of the domestic
market becomes substantially more competitive when import supply
(competition) is included. On average (using a 300 product sample)
the HH index decreased by approximately 68%. From an HH index
value of 7,025, introducing import competition led to an HH index of
2,248. The most significant reduction of supply concentration was
recorded in the case of durable consumer goods and capital goods.
23. Regression analysis demonstrated that both the new (post-import)
level of supply concentration, and the magnitude of the supply con-
centration change, was dependent to a statistically significant degree
on import barriers (tariff and non-tariff protection of domestic pro-
duction) and transport costs. Therefore, apart from the expected sig-
nificant influence of import barriers such as tariff and non-tariff pro-
tection, it has been demonstrated that transport costs play a substan-
tial role in creating domestic market structures.
24. The highest HH index values, that is the lowest level of competitive
market structure even after the introduction of imports as a source of
competition are recorded in industries which produce aluminium,
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ceramics, glass, paper and iron products, construction materials, as
well as products of the basic chemical industry. This only confirms the
outcome that even after the introduction of imports as a source of
competition, the most non-competitive markets are the markets for
raw materials and inputs & components. It is obvious that high trans-
port costs are one of the key reasons for such results, although the
effects of some other factors should not be excluded. It is fundamen-
tally important to perceive that tariff and non-tariff protection in the
case of these products was somewhat low. In other words, further lib-
eralization of the foreign trade regime will most probably not increase
competitive market structures in these industries.
25. The situation described above can be very dangerous. The non-com-
petitive market structure or raw material and inputs & components
markets increases the price of those products, which further on
inevitably increases the costs of consumer goods made by domestic
producers that use those inputs. Such cost increases are passed on to
the the consumer, which means increased prices of consumer goods,
no matter what their market structure character. There is a hidden
danger in this, considering that increased costs and hence prices will
occur on perfectly competitive markets. Accordingly, raw material and
inputs & components markets should be under strict competition pol-
icy control, much more stringent than the markets of consumer goods
and durables. 
26. Since the research was conducted on the basis of data for 2000, under
conditions of high protectionism, it is necessary to follow-up this
research on data for the year 2001 (foreign trade liberalisation was
inaugurated in June of that year) and the current year (with operations
fully within the new, liberal foreign trade regime). A Follow-up to this
research will provide new information on import elasticity to changes
in the international trade regime, that is the information on the basis
of which it will be possible to make a reliable estimate of the impact of
foreign trade flow on the character of the domestic market structure.
27. Domestic competition regulation is codified in a Federal Competition
Law, but there is also a whole string of laws and decrees regulating
competition, some provisions of which are contradictory to the
Competition Law. There are also a number or regulations that have a
contrary effect, i.e. regulations which create monopolies.
28. The competition legislation is not concerned with monopolistic, that
is dominant position as such, but exclusively with abuse of that posi-
tion, i.e. monopolistic behaviour. In other words, the Federal Law is
exclusively concerned with the consequences of non-competitive
market structures, not with those structures themselves, that is, with
the process of their initiation. As a result, it does not halt any of the
acts that lead to the creation of these structures. In relation to this, the
Law does not provide for merger control (neither vertical or horizon-
tal), so that implementation of the Law does not prevent mergers that
create non-competitive market structures. Since it does not provide a
merger control, the Law does not differentiate horizontal mergers
(merging of companies in the same industry, i.e. competitors) from
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vertical mergers (merging of companies where one company is sup-
plier and the other a buyer).
29. The Law does not recognise barriers to entry and exit from the indus-
try, meaning that the tools to block activities that would create addi-
tional barriers to entry does not exist, which further complicates entry
for new competitors. Although it was demonstrated, even in the case
of Serbia/FR Yugoslavia, that free entry and exit represents a key pre-
condition for the establishment of competitive market structures,
attempts to prevent such entries go unpunished under the current leg-
islation. 
30. The law only makes criminal monopolistic behaviour,  that is the
practice of the companies that, due to the existence of a non-competi-
tive market structure, reduce their output and increase the price of
their products causing  allocative inefficiency (dead-weight loss).
However, it  has become apparent that other consequences of non-
competitive market structures exist as well, primarily those  connected
with production inefficiency. since the Law does not deal with the cre-
ation of non-competitive market structures, its implementation does
nothing to eliminate the  consequences described.
31. The companys dominant market position is not clearly defined by the
Law neither is this required by any additional legislation. In addition
large powers of discretion are left to the authorized institution to
decide quite arbitrarily whether a company has a dominant position,
or whether it is abusing this. As a result the level of uncertainty
increases for all companies, especially for those that, through good
business practice, substantially improve their own position on the
market.
32. The Law does not incorporate the concept of the relevant market and
therefore consistently insists on a single market, which does not make
much sense, considering that the relevant market it the one to which
market power relates to. Firms that do not have market power on a
single market can have very significant market power on their relevant
markets. Since there is no relevant market category, the Law does not
provide guidance for determining competition policy practice. 
33. The Law punishes monopolistic (cartel) agreement, although such
agreement is not a violation of the Law per se. Namely, there is a provi-
sion of the Law that allows for certain agreements to be refused official
sanction,  and for their consequences to be re-examined. Such agree-
ments are therefore permitted if it has been estimated that their conse-
quences are beneficial. By this provision all agreements are made sub-
ject to reasonable discretional assessment (the rule of reason). 
34. The Law does not recognize the difference between horizontal and
vertical agreements. Such a decision cannot be judged favourable.
While horizontal agreements eliminate competition and have adverse
effects for social welfare, vertical agreements can very often lead to
increases in economic efficiency, and sometimes even to development
of competition. That can especially be the case with contracts on the
exclusive distribution of foreign producers, which, through import
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promotion, develop domestic market competition. It would be very
beneficial to differentiate between horizontal and vertical agreements,
so horizontal agreements per se should be in contravention to the law . 
35. Situations that the Law describes as abuse of monopolistic, or domi-
nant position could in fact be perfectly legitimate and desirable busi-
ness practice. The text of the Law insists specifically on price increases
which are higher than the average price increase, which by itself does
not have to imply any monopolistic behaviour whatsoever, at least not
until information on the costs and their changes is provided.
36. The domestic competition legislation is flawed by inconsistent codifi-
cation. Not only has competition regulation remained dispersed
through other Laws, but an over complicated system of relations has
grown up between legal institutions and the body responsible for
implementing anti-monopolistic legislation. Thus we must conclude
that the system is incomplete and also repressive, rather than regula-
tive in character.
37. The central competition institution is the Federal Antimonopoly
Commission, which was established by Federal Government Decree.
The Commission is not independent, or even autonomous; it is mere-
ly a department of the Federal Ministry of Economy and Internal
Trade. Members of the Commission (commissioners) are appointed
and dismissed by the Federal Government, on the suggestion of the
authorized ministry. The Decree does not specify a procedure of the
appointment and dismissal of commissionaires, the grounds for dis-
missal or the duration of their mandate. This enables the Government,
that is the authorized ministry to influence directly the work of
Commission, and its decisions. 
38. The President and members of the Commission are appointed from
the ranks of eminent experts, scientists and businessmen. This
grounds for conflict of interest, since eminent businessmen are by
nature interested in eliminating competitors in their industry.
Membership of the Commission gives them the opportunity to
arrange this by means of state intervention.
39. The Decree does not oblige the Commission to elaborate in detail the
procedure and criteria for decision-making, nor to publish such crite-
ria. The Commission produced an internal document which gives
some guidelines for reaching a decision, although it is more in the
nature of a study than an operational document. This document is
unavailable to the public, so that economic decision-makers are not
familiar with the decision-making criteria and procedure of the
Commission, information which can be vital to such firms. 
40. Generally speaking, the current legislation and accompanying institu-
tional solutions do not satisfy the needs of a modern competition pol-
icy. Obviously the existing legislation was made without a clearly
defined competition policy concept, and in the absence of such con-
cept, certain conceptual solutions were used from the period of self-
management socialism. Consequently it is not possible to reform the
existing legislation; it must be replaced in its entirety. The foundation
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for such new legislation should be a clearly defined and widely accept-
ed concept of a new competition policy that meets the needs of
Serbia/FR Yugoslavia. 
41. The Introduction of new regulations from this sector (a new
Competition Law and numerous additional acts) should be accompa-
nied by the construction of a new competition institution, primarily a
Competition Commission. This should start with the clear specifica-
tion of the Commissions legal position, guarantees of its independ-
ence/autonomy, a clear account of its powers and the accountability of
the commissionaires, that is the grounds for their appointment and
dismissal. Next this implies constant training of Commission mem-
bers and, especially, their professional support staff. The building of
new institutions is a long-term process that yields results only in the
long term, so it is an activity that requires commitment and patience.
42. A consistent competition policy implemented consistently has an
extensive influence on all economic decision-makers. Therefore pow-
erful political and lobbyist pressures can be expected at the stage of
making and implementing competition policy. Bearing this in mind, a
key precondition for the successful formulation of a new competition
policy and institutional reforms which succeed is firmly expressed
political support in this project, i.e. political will for establishing a con-
temporary competition policy in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia.
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I  Competition Policy: An Introduction
1. PERFECT COMPETITION AND ITS VIOLATION
1.1. Assumptions of perfect competition
The basic considerations of microeconomic theory are based on the
assumption of the perfect market, i.e. perfect market competition.1
Perfect competition is founded on a few assumptions:
 A large number of sellers (producers) and buyers;
 Parametrical price character;
 Free entry or exit from the industry.
A large number of sellers (producers) is a precondition for dispersed
supply, and in the case of buyers it is a precondition for dispersed demand
as well. Within theoretical models of perfect competition, the assumption
of dispersed supply means that the number of firms tends to be infinite.
Implicitly, it is assumed that the total output of one firm in terms of total
market supply is infinitely small (tends to zero). However, contemporary
contributions to microeconomic theory often skip the assumption of per-
fect competition in terms of the  number of firms and focus the analysis on
the next two assumptions.
Parametrical price character means that a market price is exogenous for
each competitor on the market, i.e. for each producer (firm). In other
words, no single firm can,  by its own actions, independently of other
firms actions, affect the (equilibrium) market price of its product. Of
course, if an infinitely large number of producers exists, i.e. if the industri-
al output of a single firm is infinitely small, it is to be expected that the
equilibrium market price for each individual firm is exogenous. However,
the parametrical (exogenous) character of the market price does not nec-
essarily require that the assumptions of the number of firms or their out-
put be fulfilled. The market price becomes exogenous (parametric) for
individual firms even when there is a smaller number of firms, depending
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1 In some recent contributions to microeconomic theory the term perfect competi-
tion implies perfect market. In this paper, however, perfect competition
describes a smaller set of assumptions, primarily the assumptions regarding the rela-
tions between decision makers on the supply side. According to this approach, accept-
ed in this paper, the existence of perfect competition does not necessarily imply the
existence of a perfect market. Accordingly, perfect competition is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for the perfect market. 
on the next assumption of perfect competition: the assumption on free
entry and exit from the industry.  
Finally, the main assumption of perfect market competition is free
entry or exit from the industry, which means that there are no barriers to
entry or exit. Free entry/exit allows a favourable business environment in
an industry (if growth in demand is greater than supply, for example, fol-
lowed by the creation of economical profit, i.e. rent) to attract new entries
to the industry. The new entries create additional output, they expand the
total (aggregate) supply and in that way clear the way for a new competi-
tive equilibrium in the industry (partial equilibrium). Likewise, if the
business environment deteriorates in an industry (decline of aggregate
demand below aggregate supply, for example, creating financial losses for
the incumbent firms), free exit allows reallocation of resources used in this
industry to another, more prosperous one, and hence economic efficiency
of resource utilisation is increased. As a side effect, a new competitive
equilibrium is achieved in the industry these firms left, since the conse-
quence of their exit is to reduce total (aggregate) supply.
Free exit and entry is the crucial precondition and mechanism for estab-
lishing equilibrium on a competitive market. In addition, exit barriers,
although specific, represent nothing but a special case of entry barriers. The
entrepreneur, i.e. investor who faces barriers to exit, does not want to
invest in (enter) the industry, since his resources (capital) will remain
trapped  in that industry in the case of poor financial results. This is why
barriers to exit are often treated only as very specific barriers to entry. 
If every market in the real world were actually characterized by the
described features (assumptions), i.e. if the real world markets were actu-
ally always perfectly competitive, there would be no need for any kind of
competition policy. Unfortunately, competition deteriorations and fail-
ures, i.e. departures from the perfect competition model, are rather fre-
quent in the real world  non-competitive market structures are rather
frequently found in real-world contemporary industries. In order to
understand the rationale for introducing competition policy in the case of
such market conditions, it is essential to understand the equilibrium
mechanism, (both in the case of perfect and imperfect market competi-
tion, i.e. both competitive and non-competitive market structures). It is
also essential to understand the welfare consequences of the violation of a
perfectly competitive market, i.e. the consequences of non-competitive
market structures. This is the only way to grasp the rationale behind the
formulation and enforcement of a competition policy.
1.2. Market equilibrium mechanism
The market equilibrium mechanism will be considered within the
framework of the simple partial equilibrium model, which is described in
the  following, simple diagram (Picture 1.). The following analysis
assumes production characterized by constant returns, i.e. constant aver-
age and marginal costs, so the supply curve is represented by the curve of
average and marginal costs (average costs are equal to marginal ones for
every output level). Accordingly, the supply curve (SS), matching the mar-
ginal cost curve, is a straight line parallel to the horizontal axis. Its inter-
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section with the vertical axis describes the magnitude of the average/mar-
ginal costs. The (aggregate) demand curve (DD) has a negative slope, due
to the assumption of decreasing marginal utility for every product. As the
consumption quantity of a product goes up, its market price goes down 
consumers are willing to pay less for each extra unit of that product. 
Each producer maximizes his profit by equalizing his marginal revenues
to his marginal costs. In conditions of perfect competition, market price is
a parametrical (exogenous) variable from a firms standpoint; marginal
revenues (revenue obtained by sale of an additional unit of the product)
are equal to the market price. Considering that, within the perfect compe-
tition framework, the producer (firm) cannot affect the equilibrium mar-
ket price by any of its actions, regardless of its output, i.e. its supply to the
market  the equilibrium market price does not change. Accordingly, the
marginal revenue curve matches the aggregate demand curve. The pro-
ducers marginal revenues become equal to marginal costs at the point E,
which leads to the equilibrium price pe and the equilibrium output Qe.
Market equilibrium on the perfectly competitive market has a few
essential features. First of all, market equilibrium price equals marginal
costs  that is the sufficient condition for social welfare maximisation. In
this hypothetical case, social welfare equals the consumers surplus (trian-
gular area ApeE), i.e. social welfare equals consumers welfare. Secondly,
prefect competitive equilibrium leads towards zero economic profit, i.e.
no producer appropriates any economic profit.2 Thirdly, every change in
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Picture 1.1
Market equilibrium in perfect competition
2 This is based on the assumption that all producers use the same technology.
Furthermore marginal and average costs encompass the cost of capital, so the produc-
ers appropriate the amount of profit that is equal to the costs of purchasing the capital. 
aggregate demand leads to an automatic readjustment of the equilibrium
and towards a new equilibrium output of the industry. A key precondition
that permits this readjustment is absolutely free entry to the industry and
exit from it. This is precisely the importance of free entry and exists from
the industry as a crucial mechanism that allows the competitive market
equilibrium to adjust. 
Market equilibrium on a perfectly competitive market leads to the effi-
cient (optimal) allocation of available resources, maximising social wel-
fare. Accordingly, given a perfectly competitive market, there is no need
for government intervention in that market with any form of competition
policy. The situation is quite different, however, if the assumptions of per-
fect competition are relaxed, i.e. if non-competitive market structures are
analysed. The most extreme case of a non-competitive market is pure
monopoly, distinguished from other market structures by three features:
 Only one producer (firm) in the industry;
 High barriers to entry and exit;
 No close substitutes of the product.
These conditions lead to the departure of the marginal revenues curve
and the curve of demand for the monopolistic product. In fact, under pure
monopoly conditions, the aggregate demand curve becomes the individ-
ual demand curve, i.e. the demand curve a monopolist is faced with
inevitably has a negative slope. In other words, the greater the monopo-
lists supply on the market, the lower the market equilibrium price  the
consumers will be willing to pay a lower price in order to enjoy the addi-
tional unit of the product. This is why the marginal revenue of a monopo-
list (revenue from the additional product unit sold) is always lower then
the market price of the product. Accordingly, the marginal revenue curve
(MR) has a steeper slope than the demand curve (DD), and the equilibri-
um is achieved at the intersection point between the marginal revenues
curve and the marginal costs curve (point B, picture 2.1.).
The new monopoly equilibrium price p1 is far higher than the perfect
competitive equilibrium price (p1 > pe), and the new equilibrium supply
is far below the previous one, i.e. the perfect competitive equilibrium sup-
ply (Q1 < Qe). There are a few consequences of this change in the equilib-
rium price and supply. First, the equilibrium price does not equal the
marginal costs, which leads to the conclusion that there was a misalloca-
tion of resources, as well as a social welfare loss. The equilibrium price (p)
is above marginal costs (MC), which leads to the existence of market
power. The index of market power (MP) is the approximation of the wel-
fare loss that can be expected. 
MP = (p  MC)/p
Market power exists in every case of departure of the market price form
the marginal costs, i.e. in every case of departure form the conditions of
perfect competition. If the market power index has a positive value it is
due to non-competitive market structure. Accordingly, every departure
form the perfectly competitive market inevitably leads to a market power
and a welfare loss.
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In order to estimate the social welfare loss that results from establishing
a pure monopoly on the market, it is necessary to observe the magnitude
of changes in consumers surplus alongside the firms (monopolists)
profit. The consumers surplus diminished (Ap1C < ApeE), monopolistic
profit was introduced (area peBCp1). In other words, a part of the con-
sumers surplus partition (area p1peBC) is redistributed to the monopo-
list and appropriated as monopolistic (economic) profit. As to this part of
the social welfare, i.e. consumers surplus, it is the matter of sheer reparti-
tion  there is no social welfare loss. Still, a part of the initial consumers
surplus remains undistributed, and is simply lost for everyone. This part
of consumer excess is outlined by the triangular area CBE (also known as
Habergers triangle), representing dead-weight welfare loss. Therefore, the
introduction of pure monopoly, i.e. market power, inevitably leads to
dead-weight welfare loss.
Dead-weight welfare loss (allocative inefficiency) is inevitable within
any market structure that is a departure from the perfectly competitive
market. Pure monopoly only represents extreme non-competitive market
structure, that is market structure that generates maximal market power
and, subsequently, the highest dead-weight welfare loss, as well as the
biggest feasible amount of economical profit appropriated by the produc-
er. Nevertheless, every non-competitive market structure inevitably intro-
duces market power and, therefore, leads to dead-weight loss of social wel-
fare. For example, in case of oligopoly or monopolistic competition,
departures of the marginal revenues curve from the aggregate demand
curve are more modest than in the case of pure monopoly, so the corre-
sponding marginal income curve (MR) has a slightly less steep slope.
Accordingly, the intersection point between the marginal cost and mar-
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ginal revenue curves moves to the right, which results in a lower equilibri-
um price compared to monopoly and higher equilibrium output.
However, the equilibrium price remains higher than the one achieved on
the perfectly competitive market (p1 > p2 > pe), and the equilibrium out-
put is lower (Q1 < Q2 <Qe). The market power index is lower than is the
case for pure monopoly, but market power still exists.
Although monopoly is replaced with a different, more moderate non-
competitive market structure, dead-weight welfare loss still exists  it is
only slightly smaller in comparison to dead-weight welfare loss in the case
of pure monopoly. Taking all this into account, any departure of the mar-
ginal revenue curve from the aggregate demand curve inevitably leads to
the introduction of market power, which then inevitably leads to dead-
weight welfare loss and economic profit creation and appropriation (prof-
it above the cost of capital). 
Within this framework, the key question is whether any kind of non-
competitive market structure is sustainable. If there is free entry/exit to
the industry, i.e. if there are no barriers to entry and exit, the existence of
market power (economic profit), will attract new entries (competitors)
that will, by virtue of the new entries, increase the number of firms on
the supply side and increase aggregate supply. This will lead to the
decrease and ultimate disappearance of market power, that is to a dissi-
pation of economic profit. Therefore, if there are no barriers to entry or
exit, non-competitive market structures are not sustainable  they
inevitably become competitive structures. This is why barriers to entry
and exit have key significance in evaluation of the character of market
structures. The existence of substantial barriers to entry/exit is a neces-
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sary condition for the  market structure under examination to be judged
non-competitive.
Therefore, all non-competitive market structures lead to dead-weight
welfare loss by the same mechanism, and it is only a magnitude of welfare
loss that depends on the type of non-competitive market structure
(monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition, various forms of domi-
nant firms etc.)  dead-weight welfare loss will occur in all these cases. 
Although the desirability of income/welfare redistribution is not prima-
rily an economic issue, the sheer existence of market power inevitably
leads to welfare redistribution from consumers to producers (monopolists
and others enjoying market power). Such redistribution is not acceptable
for many. For them this welfare redistribution represents an additional
negative consequence of non-competitive market structures.
2. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPETITIVE MARKET STRUCTURES
The already identified allocative inefficiency, i.e. dead-weight welfare
loss (as well as the welfare redistribution) represents only one of the con-
sequences of market power, i.e. the consequences of non-competitive
market structures.
The other consequence of non-competitive market structures, especial-
ly pure monopoly, is static production inefficiency, known as X-ineffi-
ciency. The point is that if there is no competition, this removes the incen-
tives for control and reduction of production costs  the costs increase
without control. The point is that total production cost can be divided
into exogenous (the ones the producer cannot influence) and endogenous
 the ones producer can influence. If there is no competition, there is no
threat of competitors, which leads to uncontrollable endogenous cost
increases, i.e. to total cost increase, which further on leads to production
inefficiency. In this way, in order to produce one production unit, more
resources are used than is necessary  the opportunity cost of utilised
resources increases. All unnecessarily utilised (allocated) resources could
be alternatively used in the production of some other goods, which means
that static production inefficiency inevitably reduces the efficiency of
resource utilisation along with social welfare.
The growth of static production inefficiency, or X- inefficiency, can lead
to reduced dead-weight inefficiency (a decrease in Habergers triangle),
but this allocative inefficiency reduction cannot compensate for produc-
tion inefficiency growth and its overall adverse effect on welfare in this
respect.
There is no unambiguous view of the modern economic theory on X-
inefficiency phenomenon. As an argument against the very existence of
this kind of inefficiency it has been pointed out that, since profit maximi-
sation is the aim of every firm, cost increases will be resisted regardless of
the market structure. Nevertheless, even the most passionate opponents of
the X-inefficiency concept accept some of the arguments for the existence
of productive inefficiency, that is X-inefficiency. If ownership and man-
agement are separated, manager goals are not usually the same as owner
goals, (i.e. profit maximisation) and in asymmetrical information condi-
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tions, the agency problem appears, so that managers can increase costs
and reduce the effort invested in the job they are doing.However, the real
question is weather the agency problem is more significant in pure
monopoly conditions. The answer is unambiguously yes, since in pure
monopoly there is no other (benchmark) firm as a yardstick for cost com-
parison of the monopolistic firm, i.e. no way to establish whether manage-
ment is working efficiently. Therefore, it is evident that non-competitive
market structures, especially pure monopoly, lead to static productive
inefficiency that furthermore leads to social welfare reduction.
Up to this point we have based our non-competitive market analysis
on, among other things, the assumption of constant returns. If this
assumption is replaced with the assumption of increasing returns, i.e.
decreasing costs, the possibility arises that the elimination of the one type
of inefficiency of resource utilisation may lead to the creation of the
another. Increasing returns, i.e. decreasing costs, appear if the growth of
output leads to average cost reduction, i.e. reduction of the unit cost. In
such a situation, a merger between two or more firms leads to greater out-
put and, in this way, average cost reductions materialise  there is an
increase of production efficiency.
Nonetheless, at the same time, such a merger leads to the creation of
market power and allocative inefficiency, i.e. dead-weight loss of social
welfare. Due to the increasing returns, the merger of several firms into
one changes the cost function, and the downward movement of the mar-
ginal/average cost curve describes the change (Picture 1.4.). Initially, on
the perfectly competitive market, there was no dead-weight loss (alloca-
tive inefficiency) and the equilibrium price was p1. The merger moves
the marginal/average cost curve downward (to position SS’), but it also
establishes a non-competitive market structure (let us assume a pure
monopoly). As a result the marginal revenues curve departs from the
aggregate demand curve. This leads to the new market equilibrium char-
acterized by a higher equilibrium price (p2 > p1) and lower equilibrium
output (Q2 < Q1).
The new equilibrium established after the merger produces allocative
inefficiency (dead-weight loss of social welfare, indicated by Habergers
triangle CED). At the same time, the merger leads to increased productive
efficiency, represented on cost reduction, matching the area ABCp1.
Providing the area ABCp1 (production efficiency gain) is larger then the
Habergers triangle area (CED), it can be estimated that the merger has led
to improved resource utilisation, increased economic efficiency and
increased social welfare, even though allocative inefficiency (dead-weight
loss) has occurred. Although the consumers surplus is smaller on this par-
ticular market after the merger, resources gained through increased pro-
duction efficiency can be utilised in some other industry, i.e. for some
other production, which leads to a social welfare increase.
In principle, it is not clear in a situation like this, what kind of welfare
change will occur, weather production efficiency increases will  outweigh
dead-weight loss, i.e. allocative efficiency decreases. Nevertheless, it is evi-
dent that many changes in market structure lead to compensatory move-
ment in other types of economic efficiency. A good competition policy
must take into account all these changes and to establish a well-balanced
26 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
relation towards market structure changes. The hypothetical merger, con-
sidered above led to market power and to dead-weight loss. If the compe-
tition policy were such that it a priori prevented every change that led to
market power introduction, this would open up a whole range of possibly
wrong decisions that might halt significant increases in production effi-
ciency and effectively block increases in net social welfare. Accordingly, a
very stringent competition policy can be counterproductive with a view to
increases in social welfare.
A very extreme case, in which the introduction of non-competitive
market structures represents a precondition for improved production effi-
ciency, is the case of natural monopoly. In this case, as far as social welfare
is considered, it is perfectly legitimate for a single producer to produce
total output sufficient to the market needs completely. Namely, the cost
function is such that the average cost of a single producer within every
output range that can be sold on the market is lower than the average cost
of two or more firms. Natural monopoly is based on specific technologies
and the cost functions they generate, and it is a usual phenomenon in net-
work industries, that is infrastructure and utilities (power, gas, segments
of telecommunications, water supply, railways etc.). Competition policy
should prevent horizontal separation of one firm into several in the case of
natural monopolies. If the natural monopoly argument is just an excuse
for sustaining a non-competitive market structure, the competition policy
should trigger the separation and establishment of competition. In the
case of a true natural monopoly industry, it is necessary to accomplish
both allocative and production efficiency. This however does not belong
to the sphere of competition policy, but rather to the area of economic
regulation. 
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In the long run, as far as social welfare is concerned, it is far more
important to assure dynamical production efficiency rather than the static
alternative. Dynamic production efficiency is related to the increased effi-
ciency of resource utilisation, i.e. the implementation of technological
progress, and it is directly related to research and development of new
technologies. The relationship between non-competitive market struc-
tures (monopoly) and dynamic production efficiency is somewhat con-
troversial. On one hand, any production activity is motivated by profit
and its maximisation, and the profit is at its maximum if a monopoly is
established. Therefore, every company wants to become a monopoly.
Research and development that leads to the implementation of technolog-
ical progress makes this possible, through the issue of patents and granting
of similar protection (at least for limited time). In other words, the sheer
possibility of becoming a monopolist is a very strong incentive for each
producer to improve production efficiency, which leads to dynamic eco-
nomic efficiency and substantial growth in social welfare. 
On the other hand, monopoly as such does not create incentives for
research and development, i.e. incentives for investment in research and
development (technological progress). There is no competitor  to elimi-
nate, so the maximal profit is based on traditional monopolistic behav-
iour. The key to a balanced approach to dynamic production efficiency
could be the duration of the monopoly, or the duration of patent protec-
tion. It is possible, at least in theory, to specify the optimal duration of a
monopoly which is the result of technical progress (patent). This produces
the best incentives for research and development, leading to dynamic pro-
duction efficiency,  while also minimizing the adverse effects of the
monopoly in the form of dynamic production inefficiency  and other
forms of economic inefficiency.
Finally, government intervention is a very common way of introduc-
ing monopolies or other non-competitive market structures. This takes
the form of the introduction of legal/administrative barriers to entry,
usually, direct state prohibition to entry into some industries.
Considering that monopoly generates significant economic profit, all
potential monopolists are prepared to invest a significant amount of
resources to secure legal/administrative barriers to entry (prohibition to
enter) for the industry in which they operate. This ultimately means
securing monopoly profit  once the barriers are introduced, they will be
the only ones remaining on the market. This goal can be attained by
influencing decision-makers, primarily the legislative and executive
branches of government. Influencing the person in charge of decision-
making, i.e. lobbying, assumes the allocation and utilisation of real
resources, hence there are substantial opportunity costs attached to allo-
cating these resources. If the resources are utilised for lobbing, no added
value is gained, it only influences redistribution of existing value, and all
these resources could alternatively be used in creating the new value.
Since, in the case monopoly, as well as other non-competitive market
structures, it is a matter of rent appropriation, the behaviour of the peo-
ple in charge within the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment is known as rent seeking behaviour. It is estimated that a substan-
tial part of monopoly profit is dissipated in that way, i.e. a part of
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monopoly profit supply is spent in covering the real cost of attaining a
legal monopoly position on the market.
Taking all this into account, it is evident that non-competitive market
structures reduce economic efficiency and social welfare. It is exactly these
adverse effects for social welfare that provide the main rationale for com-
petition policy government intervention. Nevertheless, it is evident that
market structure changes in some cases generate the opposite effects 
while one form of economic efficiency increases, the other one decreases.
This is why it is necessary for competition policy to be flexible, so as to
make the maximisation of social welfare feasible. However, flexibility is
not the sole condition for such maximisation. Knowledgeable and compe-
tent people are also badly needed to formulate and enforce competition
policy.
3. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITION POLICY
Contemporary competition policy is a method which enables the mar-
ket to operate efficiently and without constraint, to maximise economic
efficiency social welfare. In other words, economic efficiency is the goal of
competition policy. However, although economic efficiency is an indis-
putable competition policy goal, there is still some dispute as to weather
competition policy should accomplish some other goals as well. 
It is often reiterated that economic efficiency should be the only goal of
competition policy and that this policy should not be burdened with other
goals. Generally speaking, other goals should be achieved through the
implementation of other polices. This position sounds very reasonable,
especially taking into account the suggestion from the theory of govern-
ment intervention that every individual economic goal should be achieved
by means of at least one economic policy. Taking this suggestion into
account leaves room for only one conclusion: the accomplishment/ max-
imisation of economic efficiency should be the sole aim of competition
policy. The relevance of such an approach is most obvious in very compli-
cated cases in which there is a conflict between allocative and production
efficiency. Adding other goals to competition policy would only make the
problem too complex for solution.
Nonetheless, the suggestion that competition policy should have some
other aims aside from achieving economic efficiency is still encountered.
For example, one of the goals of the competition policy of the European
Commission is to prevent the creation of any barriers to trade among the
European Union member states. Such a competition policy goal is very
specific, it is basically oriented toward a political value (a unified market
within the EU, that is economic integration of the Union) and it can
sometimes come into conflict with increasing economic efficiency. 
The protection of small firms and/or the provision of incentives for
small business is sometimes established as competition policy goal. Such a
goal is not appropriate. Leaving aside the issue of whether such a goal is in
the social interest (it remains unclear why the protection of small busi-
nesses should be in the interest of society), it should be born in mind that
competition policy has no instruments for small firm protection and for
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providing incentives for small business. These are the instruments of fiscal
policy (tax exemption or subsidies), and competition policy cannot be
utilised to achieve the mentioned goal. Furthermore, the protection of
small and medium size firms is in conflict with the goal of promoting
competition and economic efficiency. Economic efficiency implies that
inefficient firms, weather small orlarge, go bankrupt and are liquidated.
Hence, small firms protection contradicts the main goal of competition
policy, which is to boost economic efficiency by developing tough market
competition.
Unfortunately, while social justice can be formulated as a competition
policy goal, it is not possible to specify such a goal accurately and precise-
ly. This goal is non-operative by nature and can lead to great confusion
and uncertainty in achieving economic efficiency. Social justice can be for-
mulated as economic equality. In that case accomplishing social justice
directly contradicts economic efficiency. This will inevitably lead to con-
flict between competition policy goals. 
Taking all the arguments into account, there should only be one goal of
competition policy: the promotion of economic efficiency. This is the only
way to accurately define the operating aims of competition policy and
decision-making in complex situations.
Competition policy should protect competition itself, not competitors.
For this reason, the actual process of competition is protected, not the par-
ticipants (decision-makers) in the process. A firms ambition to destroy its
rivals on the market is legitimate and it can do it as long as it uses only
permitted (legal) means. It is precisely this ambition of the participants in
market contest, under the competitive conditions of the free market that
lead to increases in economic efficiency. A companys bankruptcy and liq-
uidation, i.e. its exit from the industry, is nothing but a very effective way
for new, more efficient utilisation of resources once inefficiently used by
this firm.
However, in certain situations, the elimination of competition implies
the elimination of competitors and visa versa the elimination of competi-
tors implies elimination of competition. This is what is termed a specific
competition policy paradox.
Modern competition policy should be well-balanced. On the one hand,
it should be stringent enough and consistent in order to prevent the intro-
duction of non-competitive market structures and preclude allocative effi-
ciency loss, i.e. reduction of social welfare on this basis. On the other hand,
it should not be so stringent and rigid, that it impedes entrepreneurs ini-
tiative focused towards increased economic efficiency and economic prof-
it appropriation based on that. Competition policy should not punish the
enterprising and successful, those who find ways to be more efficient than
others and enjoy the profit due to this efficiency. This is the driving force
of the modern economy. A well-balanced competition policy requires a
great deal of knowledge and feel, in many situations enforcing a well-bal-
anced competition policy is a kind of art form.
In case of small, open economies, such as Serbia/FRY, that is, in the case
of an economy with a small domestic market, as well as the cases of coun-
tries with a relatively low institutional level of development (with regard
to modern economic institutions, again the case of Serbia/FRY), it is ques-
30 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
tionable weather competition policy is needed at all. It is evident that com-
petition on these markets can be introduced by imports, by drastic liberal-
isation of the foreign trade regime, by removing import barriers. The
dilemma is very important, since the suggested liberalisation can be intro-
duced very quickly, while the construction of competitive institutions
takes a considerable amount of time.
It is indisputable that foreign trade liberalisation is a key method in
introducing competition to the domestic market in specified situations,
i.e. a key method for the quick break up of non-competitive market struc-
tures and disciplining firms that enjoy substantial market power.
However, this kind of competition policy on the domestic market struc-
ture has some flaws. Firstly, there are a significant number of products
with high transportation costs, and these costs inevitably reduce the com-
petitiveness of imported products. Secondly, as a consequence of prohibi-
tively high transportation cost, particular products are non-tradables, so
that removal of import barriers simply has no effect on the domestic mar-
ket structure for these products. Thirdly, certain import barriers are not
administrative, but are a consequence of structural factors and therefore
cannot be removed swiftly by the foreign trade course of liberalisation.
Finally, when considering possible radical foreign trade liberalisation,
interest groups which are against this liberalization should be taken into
account too, i.e. domestic firm lobbies that ask for substantial tariff pro-
tection and non-tariff import barriers. Their substantial political power
and good organisation can undermine efforts at foreign trade liberalisa-
tion.
Furthermore, one of the recent suggestions related to competition poli-
cy, especially in countries with a relatively low level of institutional devel-
opment, is to focus on the administrative barriers to entry/exit to the
industry. Elimination of these entry barriers is considered the key element
in the elimination of non-competitive market structures. However, barri-
ers to entry are complex and only some of them that are administrative,
which can be eliminated relatively swiftly. A large number of these barriers
are due to persistent factors and cannot be removed in a short period of
time. This is why it is necessary to observe the number and character of
barriers to entry and exit, so that this segment of competition policy can
be defined. This, of course, does not mean that elimination of all barriers
to entry and exit that could be eliminated relatively easily and quickly
should be delayed. These barriers should be swiftly eliminated.  
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II Analysis of Existing Market Structures
1. INTRODUCTION
The character of market structures depends on two key elements:
 supply concentration;
 conditions of entry and exit from the industry.
Only on the basis of a detailed analysis of both specified elements can
reliable conclusions regarding the character of the given market structure
be provided.
2. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SUPPLY CONCENTRATION
There are two key elements in the analysis of supply concentration:
 supply concentration indicator (measure);
 specifying the relevant market.
As far as supply concentration indicators are concerned, The
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index is the most suitable one (hereafter HHI or
HH index). The HH index is calculated in the following way:
where n stands for the number of producers (firms) in the given industry,
i.e. on the given relevant market, while si stands for share of single pro-
ducer i of the total market supply, i.e.:
where qi stands for production, i.e. supply of the single producer i, where-
as Q stands for total market supply, i.e. total production in the given
industry.
Theoretically speaking, the HH index can produce values between 0
and 10,000. In the case of absolutely dispersed supply, i.e. in the theoreti-
cal case of an infinite number of producers (n→∝), the production of a
single company will tend to zero, and HHI also tends to zero. Contrary to
this, in the case of a monopoly, the existence of only one single producer
whose production equals total market supply, HH value is 10,000.
Q
q
  s ii=
( )∑
=
=
n
1i
2
is100   HHI  
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Measuring supply concentration with the HH index is superior to the
alternative method  concentration supply index Kn. This index measures
the ratio between total (cumulative) supply of a specified number of the
biggest companies in the industry and total market supply. For example,
concentration index K4, signifies the ratio between cumulative supply of
the four biggest companies within the industry and total supply in the
industry. However, this indicator, in contrast to  the HHI, does not yield
any information on the supply ratio among the four biggest producers. In
other words, the very same index concentration can describe significantly
different concentration supply structures, i.e. significantly different mar-
ket structures. Accordingly, concentration index Kn is an inferior indica-
tor of supply concentration and was not used in the analysis. 
The next crucial question is what data is used to calculate the HH index.
The following empirical analysis is based on two types of data:
 data about gross revenues (turnover) of the firms in the industry;
 data about production of a single product specified in physical units
of measurement.1
Defining the relevant market is a very important part for estimating
supply concentration. Two elements should be taken into account: the
existence of close substitutes and the definition of the geographically rele-
vant market (depending on the share of transportation costs). The rule
accepted for this empirical analysis is that the relevant market is a market
of the sub-sector. In the case of concentration analysis based on the
turnover data, this level is the lowest achievable aggregation level, so the
question of the relevant market in the case of the turnover date virtually
did not come up. In the case of concentration analysis that is based on data
on production in physical unit measures, the product market as such is
considered to be the relevant market. In this case the issue of substitutes
comes up, that is the possibility of cross-elasticity of demand between the
two products. Thus it was decided to conduct the empirical analysis at two
levels, first on the subsector level, and then the single product level.
As for the geographical aspect of the relevant market, it  was included
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account specific features of the prod-
uct and / or groups of products. This aspect of the relevant market is
included in analysis in the form of comments on the results of supply con-
centration obtained. 
2.1. Supply concentration analysis based on company turnover
In order to provide an unbiased examination of supply concentration,
i.e. the competitiveness of market structure, it is necessary to modify the
classification of market type according to HH index values. The following
classification had been adopted here:
1 The analysis based on data about turnover refers to the all  industries, while analysis
based on data about production in physical units of measurement refers to the manu-
facturing industries only, since this kind of data is collected only for these industries.
In the both cases the data referred to is from the year 2000.
 non-concentrated (or low concentration of) supply: HHI value lower
than 1,000;
 medium supply concentration: HHI value between 1,000 and 1,800;
 high supply concentration: HHI value between 1,800 and 2,600;
 extremely high supply concentration: HHI value above 2,600 but
lower than 10,000;
 monopoly supply concentration: HHI value equal to 10,000
According to this classification, the distribution of Serbian industrial
sub-sectors according to supply concentration type in the year 2000 is dis-
played on the following table (Table 2.1.).
Considering all the sub-sectors, huge diversities are noticed, regardless
of the generally high degree of concentration. The energy sector (indus-
tries: 0101 power industry, 0102 coal production, 0103 coal processing,
0141 oil and gas and 0105 oil derivative production) even contains three
sub-sectors with a maximum HH index value: 010104 transmission of
electrical energy, 010202 brown coal production and 010410 crude oil
production. The causes of maximum concentration here are variable  as
for the transmission of electrical energy, certainly, the character of the
industry conditions the legal framework  it is a case of a natural monop-
oly. With brown coal natural resources are at issue, whereas in the case of
crude oil production, the integration of oil industry in Serbia was accom-
plished roughly ten years ago by the establishment of the publicly owned
company NIS.
High concentration supply exists in other sub-sectors of this sector 
not in a single case do the HH values drop to the low or even medium con-
centration brackets, although sub-sectors 010105 distribution of electrical
energy and 010500 fuel deviates production are relatively close to the
medium concentration group.2
The level of concentration  is also high in the metallurgy sector (indus-
tries 0106 iron ore extraction, 0107 iron and steel, 0108 non-ferrous metal
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Table  2.1. Classification of Serbian industrial sub-sectors according to HH index
value for the year 2000. 
Type of supply Number of  Percentage
HHI value concentration degree Sub-sectors
Below 1,000 Non-concentrated 48 27.9
From 1,000 up to 1,800 medium concentration 23 13.4
From 1,800 up to 2,600 High concentration 26 15.1
Above 2,600, Extra concentration 60 34.9but lower than 10,000
Equal 10,000 Absolute concentration 15 8.7
2 In the case of power distribution, ten regional monopolies exist, i.e. situation in which
every power distribution company for power distribution has a monopoly in its own
area. In reference to this, a calculated HH index for the single market does not make
any sense.
36 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
extraction, 0109 production of non-ferrous metals). As can be seen in pic-
ture 2.2, the following six sub-sectors showed a maximum HH index value
(010720 production of ferroalloy, 010890 production of remaining metal
ores, 010910 copper production, 010920 lead production, 010930 zinc
production and 010942 aluminium production). Obviously (aside from
ferroalloy production) these are natural monopolies since production is
connected to particular mines. The level of supply concentration is
extremely high in other sub-sectors of this sector as well, apart from sub-
sector 010713 rolled iron production, although even here the HH index
value is above the medium concentration bracket. Generally speaking, in
this sector the lowest level of concentration  is in the sub-sectors of indus-
try 0110 processing of non-ferrous-metals, in which the HH index value
shifts in a range from 3,584  (aluminium processing) to 6,094 (remaining
processing of non-ferrous metals), although obviously, in each of these
sub-sectors the HH index value is extremely high.
Picture 2.3. displays HH index values in the complex of non-ferrous
metal and construction material (industries 0111 non-metal production,
0112 processing of non-metals, 0120 production of stone, gravel and sand
and 0121 production of construction materials. As shown in this complex,
Picture 2.1. HH index values in Serbian energy sector.
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the following four sub-sectors  have a maximum HH index value (011111
asbestos production, 011212 production of glass containers, 012112 gyp-
sum production and 012143 production of bitumen products), and some
extremely high HH index values in other sub-sectors too (primarily,
01119 production of remaining metals).However, this complex contains
sub-sectors with a considerably lower level of concentration. Those with
an HH index value in the medium  bracket: (011219 production of other
salts), those exhibiting a low level of concentration (012001 stone produc-
tion, 012002 sand production, 012130 brick and tile production and
012142 production of pre-fabricated elements). On the whole, the HH
index values for 120 and 121 industries are considerably lower, indicating
to considerably lower level of supply concentration . When interpreting
these values, however, that is when identifying the appropriate market
type sight of the main question should not be lost  what is the relevant
market? The high level of transport costs in these sub-sectors ensures that
the geographical market for these products will be relatively small, much
smaller than the uniform market for which the HH index value was calcu-
lated.
The following graph (picture 2.4.) shows the HH index values for the
metal processing industries (sub-sectors), in which we included industries
0113 metal processing activity, 0114 the engineering industry and 0117
production of electrical machines and appliances, while means of trans-
port production (industries 0115 transportation vehicles and 0116 ship-
building) are presented in picture 2.5. As can be seen, metal processing
industries show low supply concentrations, that is competitive market
structures  in 16 sub-sectors (out of the 30 presented sub-sectors) the HH
index values were  within the low concentration bracket, while the next
six fall within the limits of medium concentration. Therefore, in only eight
sub-sectors from this complex is there a somewhat higher  or considerably
high level of concentration. Absolute concentration is not represented in
any of the sub-sectors (the highest HH index value of 9,688 within this
37Analysis of Existing Market Structures
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Picture 2.3. HH index value in Serbian production of Serbian non-ferrous metal
and construction materials.
complex is in sub-sector 011743 production of washing appliances, and
the next according to  size  are 5,411  in sub-sector 011793. Production of
electric batteries and 4,713  in sub-sector 011412 production of construc-
tion material), In addition to the sub-sectors already mentioned, a high
level of concentration (high HH index value) was observed in sub-sectors
011316 production of bearings, 011730 cable production, 011741 produc-
tion of thermal apparatuses and 011791 production of electrical installa-
tion material, whereas with the second and fourth subsector the HH index
value was below the 2,600 limit which is taken as the boarder between high
and extra high concentration for the purposes of this study.
The HH index values, and therefore the supply concentration level in
the transportation equipment industry are displayed on the following
graph. Generally speaking, the level of supply concentration is consider-
ably higher than in the metal processing industry. Hence, in two out of 13
subsectors absolute supply concentration of production exists: 011524
tractor production and 011525 motorcycle production, while the other
three are very close to this number  011601 marine shipbuilding
(HHI=9,064), 011530 production of aircraft equipment (7,989) and
011523 car production (6,595).Generally, in this industry, medium and
low levels of supply concentration exist in only two subsectors: 011527
production of car components, HHI=466) and 011602 river shipbuilding
(HHI=1,263). Considering technological and other production features,
related to the minimal economically efficient size of a company, there
should not be (too) much insistence on reduction of supply concentra-
tion, but rather import liberalisation, i.e. introduction of import supply as
the main source of the competition on the domestic market.
The level of supply concentration in the chemical industry (industry
0118 production of chemical products and 0119 processing of chemical
products) is shown in the following graph (picture 2.5.). According to the
HH index value this industry can be classified as more competitive. In
only two of these subsectors (011831 production of chemical fibres and
38 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   






















































































































































       
Picture 2.4. HH index value in Serbian metal processing industry
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0118832 production of plastic mass) is an extremely high HH index val-
ueobserved  5,534 and 3,995, while in other subsectors the concentration
level is low (four subsections: 011930 production of paint and varnish,
011941 plastic mass wrapping production and 011990 production of other
chemical products) or medium (three subsections: 011820 production of
chemicals for agriculture, 011910 production of medicines and 011920
production of soaps and cosmetics). Finally, it should be pointed out that
in subsector 011810 the production of chemicals, supply concentration is
close to the limit between medium and high concentration (HHI=1,987).
Overall, in the wood and paper industry (Picture 2.7) there is a relative-
ly low level of concentration, i.e. relatively strong competition. The HH
index values are high only in subsectors 012203 wood impregnation
(HHI=9,832) and 012202 panel production (HHI=2,714), whereas the
39Analysis of Existing Market Structures
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Picture 2.5. HH index value in Serbian transportation equipment industry.

  
  
  
  
  
  


















































       
Picture 2.6. HH index value in Serbian chemical industry.
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next subsector, is obviously below the 2,600 limit set in this study. At the
level of high concentration, but also below this limit and close to medium
concentration is subsector 012429 remaining paper processing
(HHI=2,170). For the remaining subsectors in this sector the level of con-
centration is classified as medium (012324 production of cane objects and
012410 cellulose production and paper) and low for the (remaining six
sub-sectors).
The following sector (textile industry: industry 0125 production of yarn
and textiles and 0126 production of finished textile products) displays
extensive variation in HH index values. For 0125 industries high HH
index values prevail, indicating a high level of concentration. For subsec-
tor 012511 production of hemp fibre, the concentration is monopolistic
(HHI=10,000), and very close to this is the HH index value for sub-sector
012515 production of silk yarn (HHI=9,989). The values for subsectors
0112512 production of cotton yarn, 012516 production of synthetic yarn
and 012523 production of hemp textiles are extremely high. In both
branches of the industry the HH values are somewhat lower in  sub-sec-
tors 012514, production of hemp yarn and 012521, production of cotton
textiles, but both are, nonetheless, at a high level of concentration. Finally,
for subsectors 012513 production of woollen yarn and 012522, production
of woollen textiles, index values are close to, or below the medium con-
centration level. In contrast to branch 0125, industry 0126 exhibits a more
competitive structures are represents  concentration levels are consider-
ably lower. Only sub-section 012691, the production of floor coverings,
shows a high HH index value, while the other subsectors the index value is
either close to the medium concentration limit, or in the low concentra-
tion bracket.
Picture 2.9. displays HH index values for the leather and rubber indus-
tries (industry: 0127 production of leather and fur, 0128 production of
leather footwear and accessories and 0129 latex processing). As can be
seen this industry is also relatively competitive, with low levels of concen-
40 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
Picture 2.7. HH index value for Serbian wood and paper industry.
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tration. Out of the seven sub-sectors present in the Serbian leather and
rubber industry, only one (012901the production of tyres) has a high level
of concentration (HHI=3,745), although even this is considerably lower
than in some other subsectors characterised by a high level of concentra-
tion., The HH index value remained above the 2,600 limit established for
this study in sub-sectors 012703 the production of small hides and furs
(HHI=2,857). It was lower, but still in the high concentration bracket, in
subsection 012701, the production of bulk leather (HHI=2,305). For the
four remaining subsectors the HH index value is below 1,000, or in the
low concentration bracket, therefore exhibiting a highly competitive
structure. The HH index value for 012810, the production of leather
footwear, 012820, the production of accessories, 012830, the production
of leather ready-made clothing and 012909, other latex processing, ranges
from 546 to 937.
41Analysis of Existing Market Structures
Picture 2.8. HH index values in Serbian textile industry.
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Picture 2.9. HH index value for Serbian leather and rubber industry
The level of supply concentration as shown by the HH index value for
the sectors encompassing industries 0130, the production of food prod-
ucts, 0131, drink production, 0132, the production of cattle food and 0133
tobacco production and processing, are presented in picture 2.10.
Generally speaking, a relatively high  degree of competitive structures can
be noticed, that is, a somewhat lower HH index value. The concentration
of supply in the cattle food and food industry is the lowest, while drink
production and tobacco production and processing show high HH index
values. The highest value for this index is in sub-sector 013320, tobacco
processing (HHI=6,673), which, according to the classification adopted
here,  falls within the very high concentration bracket. The HH index val-
ues for the following sub-sectors are somewhat lower, but still very high:
013114, the production of grape distillates (HHI=5,820), 013091 starch
production (HHI=5,320), 013115, fruit-brandy production (HHI=5,047)
013111 alcohol production (HHI=4,975), 013122 mineral water produc-
tion (HHI=4,768). Ascan be seen, amongst these sub-sectors, only one is
from industry 0130- production of food products.  Sub-sectors 013073
biscuit production (HHI=3,257) and 0130074 cake production (HHI=
3,419) are in the zone of extremely high concentration. The zone of high
concentration (HH index value ranging between 1,800 and 2,600) consists
of seven subsectors: 013022 pastry production, 01343 fish processing,
013071 production of cocoa products, 013072 candy production, 013080
production of plant oil, 013119 production of remaining alcohol drinks
and 013121 production of refreshments. The group with medium concen-
tration values (HHI between 1,000 and 1,800) consists of five subsectors
(013042 meat processing, 013050 milk processing, 013060 sugar produc-
tion, 013112 beer production and 013310 production of fermented tobac-
co), and the low concentration group of six (013010 grainmilling, 013021
bread and pastry production, 013030 fruit and vegetables, 013041butcher-
ing, 013099 remaining food production and 013200 cattle food produc-
tion).
42 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
Picture 2.10. HH index value for Serbian food processing industry
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Finally, picture 2.11 displays HH index values for the rest of Serbian
industry (industry 0134 graphic industry, 0135 recycling of raw materials
and 0139 production of various products). As displayed, industries 0134
and 0135 are classified as the ones with lowest concentration in Serbia,
while subsectors in industry 0139 range from low concentration (013909
the remaining industry previously indicated) across medium concentra-
tion (013901 production of teaching appliances and physical training
equipment) to sub-subsectors with a high level of concentration (013902
production of musical instruments) and extremely high concentration
(013903 production of matches and 013904 production of jewelry).
The same market classification according to HHI index values was per-
formed for Serbian non-manufacturing sub-sectors for the year 2000 and
the results are displayed in Table 2.2. Industries from 2 to 11 are included
(therefore, excluding education and culture, health care and social securi-
ty). As shown in the Table, the highest degree of competitiveness
undoubtedly exists in the construction industry, where out of seven sub-
sectors exhibit low market concentration (HH index value below 1,000)
and the remaining sub-sectors fall into the medium concentration brack-
et. In constructing industry (as was seen above with industries such as the
production of stone and sand and construction material) the geographical
factor is inescapable, that is the problem of relevant market, which is con-
siderably smaller than the single product one, meaning that the findings
presented here should be treated with caution.Nevertheless, the sheer
number of companies indicates that low concentration, i.e. a relatively
high level of competitiveness exists, regardless of the relevant market ques-
tion. As picture 2.12. shows, the main factor for the increase in competi-
tiveness within the construction industry was entries of new companies 
in 1998 the number of the companies in this area was more than three
times larger than in 1990, and even if the record of companies from
Kosovo is excluded, which is the reasonfor the decrease in number of
companies in 1999 and 2000, they still number above 3,200.
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Picture 2.11. HH index value in Serbian graphic and remaining other industry.
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As it can be seen from the Table 2.2, competitive market structures, that
is a low level of supply concentration exists in agriculture, fishing, trade
(wholesale and retail), handicrafts and financial and other services, as well
as in the hotel business, whereas in transport and network groups with
high supply concentration an extreme degree prevails (in 9 groups the
level of concentration is at a HHI level of 2,600 and more, and in 5 reach-
es the maximum 10,000: 60101 railway transport, 601002 rail haulage,
60201 marine transport, 60202 sea-ship transport services and 60801 port
reloading). The groups in which the level of supply concentration is low
44 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
Picture 2.12. Number of companies in Serbian construction industry.

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
                                      
    
1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Y E A R
Market type
Non-con- Medium High Extremely Absolute
Area centrated concen- concen- high concen-
tration tration concen- tration
tration
2 Agriculture 
5 3 0 2 0
and fishing
3 Forestry 1 0 0 2 0
4 Water industry 1 0 0 1 0
5 Civil engineering 6 1 0 0 0
6 Transportation 
and telecom 3 3 2 9 5
7 Wholesale and retail 25 3 2 6 1
8 Hotel business 
5 3 0 4 0
and tourism
9 Small handicrafts 13 3 4 3 0
10 Communal-housing
1 7 1 4 0
activities
11 Financial and
12 3 1 7 1
other services
Table 2.2. Classification of non-industrial Serbian subsectors according to HH
index value for the year 2000 (industries 2 to 11)
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are all three subsections from road transport: 60501 passenger road trans-
port, 60502 goods road transport and 60503 road transport services.
Medium level of concentration according to HH index values exists in
public transport (two out of three groups: 60601 transport of passengers
in public transport and 60602 cab car transport) and reloading services
(60803 reloading in railway stations). Considering that passenger trans-
port in public transport, except for Belgrade, is organised as a legal local
monopoly of the local public transport company, competitiveness in this
area is not an issue. Since private companies were introduced into public
transport few years ago in operations and effectiveness of this solution,
reliable evaluations are not possible.
In contrast to agricultural supply concentration, a different kind of
problem exists from earlier on, which is manifested in existence of non-
competitive market structures not on the supply side, but the demand
side. This cannot be seen from the table above. This problem  the prob-
lem of monopsony or similar market structure on the demand side,
requires further and specific analysis, and the undertaking of specific
measures, i.e. very specific solutions in any future competition policy. 
Most markets with non-concentrated supply (25) exist in trade (whole-
sale and retail), but trade has another 9 groups in which the level of concen-
tration is high (HH index value above 1,800), and two groups have an HH
index value between 1,800 and 2,600 (subsections 70113 meat and fish retail
trade and 70125 furniture retail trade), in the six sub-sectors the level is
above 2,600 (subsections 70112 fruit and vegetable retail trade, 70126 glass
retail trade, 70128 book retail trade, 70131 department stores, 70150 fuel
derivatives retail trade and 70222 raw leather wholesale trade), and in one it
reaches the absolute 10,000 (subsection 70210 food wholesale trade).3
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Picture 2.13 Number of firms in Serbian trade (wholesale and retail)
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3 Groups 070120 wholesale food trade is not originally activity subsection, but a section
(code 07012), so that unregistered company actually classifies as one of the subsec-
tions from that activity. Obviously, it is a technical question - this company is not clas-
sified as appropriate activity by ZOP, so that practically one subsection appears artifi-
cially with maximal HH index value. Of course, it was the same case with, regarding
this company during previous years, so that HH index value always appears in formal
accounts.
The low supply concentration in trade (wholesale and retail) is a conse-
quence of the economic characteristic of this activity, but also of a sub-
stantial increase in number of firms as well, i.e. many entries of new com-
panies into this industry during 1990s. Although, starting from 1997, a
decrease in number of companies occurred in this industry, the number of
firms was still considerably high, and barriers to entry and exit were obvi-
ously very low.
As for the other non-manufacturing industries (forestry, water indus-
try, communal and housing industries), they are not relevant for this kind
of analysis  it is certain that they relate to monopolistic market structure.
In the case of communal (local public utilities) and housing activities, it is
obvious that there are, in general, natural monopolies at the level of local
communities (municipalities), so that results displayed at the Table above,
for this area drastically underestimates the level of supply concentration 
it is an issue of a large number of local monopolies . In the case of forestry
and water industry, monopolistic public companies are established by
political decision  Srbijaume and Srbijavode, so that discussions about
supply concentration and competitiveness of the market structures of
these industries do not make much sense for the time being  consumers
are faced with monopoly supply as well.4
Finally, for understandable reasons, the HH index results (values) are
not displayed for areas 12, 13, and 14 of standardised activity classification
(education and culture, healthcare and social security, etc.).
2.2. Supply concentration analysis based on single product output
Previous analysis is based on data from Serbian firms’ income state-
ments for the year 2000 on the level of subsector, six digit standardised
classification of activity. Taking into account already indicated problems
of this classification (unequal degree of aggregation), it is rather clear that
in some subsectors there is an unequal accumulation of companies and
their production activities. Furthermore, it is implicitly assumed that the
entire turnover comes form the core activity of the firms, according to its
registration. Accordingly, it is clear that analysis based on data from the
firms’ income statements has certain hidden generalisations, which to
some extent distort reality. Hence the results of the supply concentration
are biased so the estimates are that the market structure characters are
more competitive that they really are. This is the reason why the analysis
based on the physical output of single product products is truly necessary,
and promises to be less biased and more reliable in the results, hence more
useful for competition policy purposes. 
According to the available data, analysis on the level of products is pos-
sible for manufacturing industry, in which, according to official standard-
ised classification,5 which was valid in the year 2000 (for which the follow-
ing analysis was made), a few thousands of products were included. In the
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4 It is interesting that both indicated public companies are conglomerates, so that aside
from main activity, which is the reason why they have been founded, they are deal in a
ing with line upstring  of various other commercial activities.
5 Classification of industrial products, Slubeni list SFRJ, number 6, 1990.
year 2000 manufacturing industry in the FR of Yugoslavia produced 1,883
of the items listed in the official classification. Out of these products, the
production output of 70 products was negligible, so the actual production
deals with 1,813 products.
From the remaining 1,813 products, the total industrial production was
concentrated within a single company in 737 cases. In those cases HH
index value was, of course, maximum, that is equal to 10,000.6 Hence, in
these cases we can speak of the existence of a (domestic) monopoly on
these markets.
For the remaining 1,076 industrial products some form of (more or less
effective) competition could be spoken about, implying the existence of
duopolies, that is various forms of oligopolies, as well as other non-com-
petitive market structures. The total number of products (markets) where
only two producers generate total supply was 352. Those cases could be
either classic duopolies (if two existing producers are roughly equal) or
about quasi monopoly (hidden monopoly, or as it is commonly termed
partial monopoly). Various conditions in this group are clearly indicated
by the HH index rage  its minimum value within the group framework
was 5,000 (which is the theoretical minimum in case of two producers),
and maximum value of 9,995 (which is very close to the maximum HH
index value of 10,000). The average HH index value for this group of
products is 7,115, which testifies to an extremely high supply concentra-
tion too , therefore concentration that does not indicate the overcoming of
a classical duopoly situation, but  a situation characteristic of some forms
of partial monopoly, that is the domination of a single producer.
The next step of the analysis was based on the clear identification of
these markets with three domestic suppliers (including the markets where
a larger number of producers are registered, but the participation of  the
forth and further producers is practically negligible). Such situations exist-
ed in the year 2000 in a total of 193 markets. Average HH index value for
this group of products was 5,682, while minimal and maximal values were
3,344 and 9,983. Obviously, big differences among production market
conditions (structures) for certain products existed here too, that is some
of these products could justifiably be classified as some other form of hid-
den (quasi or partial) monopoly, whereas for some others  a form of equal
participation of three producers could be verified, which is not explored in
detail  in economic theory, but is simply classified as oligopoly situation.
The remaining products, a total of 531, had four or more (effective)
producers, and in this some degree of competitive structure could be said
to exist (including various forms of oligopoly, dominant forms, as well as
other forms of non-competitive markets). 
Generally speaking, a higher level of supply concentration is noticed in
comparison to the one obtained through analysis on the level of sub-sec-
tors, and according to the data from income statements. Obviously this is
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6 Products (approximately 8% of the mentioned number) where production is
achieved not within the framework of one producer, but two and more, whereas par-
ticipation of second (or succeeding) producer was negligible (less thaen basic produc-
tion unit) existed within the framework of these 737. In these cases it is accepted that
entire production was realized within the framework of single producer, that is pro-
duction monopoly existed factually.
a case of insufficient Standardised classification disaggregating level, i.e. a
wide range of production activities are grouped as one at the most disag-
gregated level of activity.In some sub-sectors, groups of ten products are
represented, regardless of the fact that those products are often rather sim-
ilar to each other. The companies that are involved in the sub-sector most
often do not produce all of these products, nor even the majority of them,
so by using the income statement data the empirical results are biased,
underestimating the real level of supply concentration. The General classi-
fication of the markets of single products in relation to the previously
accepted classification according to HH index value (see Picture 2.14.)
already indicates to what extent the results were skewed  towards an
underestimation of supply concentration. Out of a total 1, 813 industrial
products, over 40% (737 products) had an HH index value that amounted
to 10,000, while in almost 49% of cases the value varied between 2,600 and
10,000 (that is for 883 products). The remaining types of the supply con-
centration (low and medium concentrated and highly concentrated, but
below HH index value of 2,600) totalled just above 10% of the total num-
ber of products (24, 75 and 94 single products respectively, that is total of
193 products in all).
Industry by industry, this classification of various supply concentration
types are displayed in the following table (Table 2.3.). As can be seen the
distribution is very asymmetrical  in basic industries, products with low
or even medium concentration level are almost non-existent. There are
somewhat more in the some processing industries, but not in all.
Furthermore, there are surprising characteristics of the market structures
in the metal processing industry, especially in production of electrical
machines and appliances, in which a high concentration was noticed for
almost all products. Somewhat more competitive structures, i.e. low sup-
ply concentration, occur in construction (building) material production
(of course, always bearing in mind the geographical element in defining
the relevant market). Also, a certain number of products with relatively
low levels of supply concentration appear in some other processing indus-
tries  production of finished wood products, production of finished tex-
tile products, production of leather footwear and accessories, drink pro-
duction. Finally, the biggest by far (absolutely and relatively) share of
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Picture 2.14. Classification of products according to HH index value.
HH < 1000
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1080 < HH < 2600
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1,3
40,7
48,7
4,1
5,2
lower concentration degree is in production of food industry, production
of cattle fodder and graphical industry, which are at least at this level of
analysis, the most competitive industries. 
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Table 2.3. Supply concentration forms according to industries in accordance with
HH index value.
HH index value
Sub- Product Less Between Between Between 10,000
Industry sectors number then 1,000 1,800  2,600 and
number 10,000 and 1,800 and 2,600 10,000
Electrical energy
production
2 11 1 1 2 5 2
Coal production 3 28 0 0 0 18 10
Coal processing       
Production of oil  
2 8 0 0 0 5 3and gas
Production of fuel 
1 31 0 0 0 14 17derivatives
Iron ore  
      extraction
Iron and steel 3 33 0 0 1 4 28
Production of 
4 13 0 0 0 10 3non-ferrous metals
Production of 
6 22 0 0 0 5 17non-ferrous extraction
Processing of 
4 32 0 0 0 8 24non-ferrous metals
Production of 
4 27 0 0 0 7 20non-metal minerals
Processing of 
non-metal minerals 11 61 0 0 0 17 44
Metal processing  
9 154 0 4 7 90 53activity
Machine engineering 7 153 0 1 1 67 84
Vehicles production 8 43 1 1 1 16 24
Shipbuilding 2 13 0 2 1 4 6
Production of machines
16 166 0 0 0 75 91and electrical appliances
Production of basic
4 110 0 0 2 44 64chemical products
Processing of 
6 153 0 3 14 98 38chemical products
Production of stone, 
3 30 0 2 2 18 8gravel and sand
Production of
5 49 2 6 4 21 16construction materials
Production of cut  
construction 3 38 1 2 3 22 10
material and panels
Production of finished
5 93 0 4 5 61 23wood products
A somewhat more detailed examination of the basic findings on level of
concentration  in single manufacturing products will be displayed accord-
ing to industrial sub-sectors, making possible a comparison with the
results obtained through analysis of data from company income state-
ments for the year 2000. Due to the quantity of information, it will require
mostly table display of the results, where aside from number of products
within the each subsector, only basic data is displayed, that is values: HH
index value, its standard deviation within the examined group (subsec-
tor), as well as maximum and minimum value.7
The following table (Table 2.4.) displays the relevant results for the
energy sector, in which industries 101, 102, 103, 104 and 105, with total of
8 sub-sectors (activity subsections), therefore the same number as in
analysis based on final accounts, but nonetheless with different content.
Sub-sector 010104 transfer of electrical energy and 010105 distribution of
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HH index value
Sub- Product Less Between Between Between 10,000
Industry sectors number then 1,000 1,800  2,600 and
number 10,000 and 1,800 and 2,600 10,000
Paper production 
3 44 0 0 2 17 25and processing
Production of textile 
9 60 0 1 5 31 23yarn and textiles
Production of ready 
11 79 0 5 9 45 20made textiles
Leather and fur
3 19 0 0 1 6 12production
Production of footwear
3 37 0 5 2 20 10and accessories
Latex processing 2 48 0 0 1 26 21
Production of
16 181 14 28 25 88 26food products
Drink production 8 18 0 2 4 11 1
Production of
1 13 3 1 1 8 0cattle food
Production and
2 6 0 1 0 1 4processing of tobacco
Graphic industry 1 11 2 5 0 3 1
Recycling of raw 
materials 1 14 0 1 1 10 2
Production of 
3 15 0 0 0 8 7various products
Total 171 1813 24 75 94 883 737
7 Average HH index value within the framework of subsector is accounted for as non-
weighted average of related HH index values for singular products. In this manner one
part of important information is surely lost, especially with subsectors which large
number of products, especially in subsectors where along with basic side products are
produced. However, product weighting, by which this loss would lessen, isnt possible
on this level of analysis, due to existence of different unit measures in which produc-
tion of related products is signified.
electrical energy are, naturally, not represented here, instead two new sub-
sectors appear: 010201 production of stone coal and 010420 production of
natural gas. In this way, both analyses could to a certain extent be examined
as mutually complementary. Significant differences are apparent between
sub-sectors that appear in both analyses which makes the above conclu-
sions to a large extent relative. The production of hydro-electrical energy,
which is represented with two products, here obtained an HH index value
considerably larger than that shown in picture 2.1., although it is in the
same group according to the adopted classification (extremely high supply
concentration). Production of thermal electrical energy, with nine prod-
ucts, has somewhat larger (average) index value here, and it is also in the
same group as in picture 2.2. Significant differences did not exist for pro-
duction and hydrating of lignite (subsector 010203). In the following three
subsectors that are represented in both analyses, however, the difference is
more significant. Hence for the production of brown coal which showed a
maximum HH index value (Picture 2.2.)   here shows an average value of
5,614. Crude oil also showed the maximum value (Picture 2.1.) but in this
analysis the index is 4,273. Although average HH index value is in both
cases still in the zone of very high concentration, the difference is still sig-
nificant. The most extensive difference is recorded for fuel derivative prod-
ucts (subsector 010500), for which graph HH index value was approxi-
mately 2,000, while the average value obtained here was 8,757.
The metallurgy sector (industries 0107, 0108, 0109 and 0110) is repre-
sented by 17 subsectors, two more than in the analysis based on income
statement. New subsectors are 010711, the production of raw iron,
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Table 2.4.  Basic indicator for the energy sector
HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximum Minimum 
number deviation value value
Production of 
hydro electrical 2 6,288 0.5 10,000 2,576
energy
Production of 
thermal-electrical 9 4,480 0.3 10,000 406
energy
Production of
6 5,865 0.1 6,955 4,014stone coal
Production of
7 5,613 0.3 10,000 3,067dark coal
Production and 
15 8,548 0.2 10,000 4,376hydrating of lignite
Production of
2 4,273 0.2 5,719 2,827sirove nafte
Production of
6 7,080 0.3 10,000 3,140raw oil
Production of
31 8,756 0.2 10,000 4,954oil derivatives
010830, bauxite production and 010941, production of hydrated alumna,
while 010720 production of ferroalloy dropped out. All in all, a high
level of concentration within this complex is confirmed. For even eight
subsectors maximum HH index value is obtained, while for the following
seven subsectors that value is above 8,000. Relatively low HH index values
were recorded only in the case of lead concentrates and zinc production
(subsector 010820), with sum of 5,000 (which is considerably lower than
the value displayed at the picture 2.2.) and also in mining and production
of copper concentrates (subsector 010810) with sum of 6,627, which is still
not much different from picture 2.2. related value. The remaining sub-
sectors from picture 2.2 had slightly lower HH index values, the values
obtained here were, however, considerably higher. This means that at the
level of sub-sectors, the estimate HH index value underestimates the real
level of supply concentration.
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HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production 
3 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000of raw iron
Production of raw steel 7 8,097 0.3 10,000 2,163
Production of 
rolled and forged steel 23 9,873 0.1 10,000 7,105
Production of 
mine and copper 3 6,627 0.1 7,551 5,024
concentrates
Production of mine
and zinc and lead 7 4,999 0.1 6,536 3,611
concentrates
Production of bauxite 2 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
Production of mine and
remaining non-ferrous 1 10,000  10,000 10,000
metal concentrates
Production of copper 6 8,552 0.3 10,000 3,856
Production of lead 1 10,000  10,000 10,000
Production of zinc 4 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
Production of 
1 10,000  10,000 10,000hydrated alumni
Production of
3 8,740 0.2 10,000 6,221aluminium
Production of 
7 9,296 0.1 10,000 7,535non-ferrous metals
Aluminium processing 15 9,533 0.1 10,000 5,318
Copper and copper
15 8,525 0.2 10,000 4,729alloy processing
Lead processing 1 10,000  10,000 10,000
Processing or remaining
1 10,000  10,000 10,000non-ferrous metals
Table 2.5. Basic indictor for metallurgy sector
The results for metal processing and construction material are dis-
played in Table 2.6.  A total of 23 subsectors are represented, as in Picture
2.3. In general, significantly higher (average) HH index values were
obtained here, which indicates realistically higher levels of supply (pro-
duction) concentration than was indicated by income statements data.
This especially relates to production and processing of non-ferrous metals
(industries 0111 and 01112). Within production of construction material
(industries 0120 and 0121), however, somewhat lower HH index values
were obtained every now and then, (subsectors 012143 production of
bitumen products, for which a maximum HH index value was obtained in
picture 2.3., here has a value of 7,480). Still it is significant, that the (aver-
age) HH index value is closer to the limit of 1,800 in only one sub-sector
(012002 production of gravel and sand where average HH index value was
1,897, therefore still in the zone of high concentration), while for four sub-
sectors of this industry low production concentration was indicated in
picture 2.3. In these industries, the level of concentration obtained
through analysis of companies’ income statements is therefore significant-
ly underestimated.
Metal processing industries (excluding transportation equipment
industry), which is represented in Table 2.7., includes all three industries
(0113, 0114 and 0117), with 32 subsectors in total. This industry com-
plex, i.e. the subsectors it is comprised of, according to data from picture
2.4, can be classified as relatively competitive. According to those results,
16 subsectors were even classified as low, and the following six as medium
according to the level of supply concentration  and there is no subsector
that recorded  a maximum HH index value. However, the results from
the Table 2.7. demonstrate that no subsector of that industry can be clas-
sified as in the low or medium supply concentration brackets.
Furthermore, for only one subsector (011798 Installation of electrical
machines and appliances, with factually only one product, that is service)
the HH index value was close to the top limit of 2,600 (more precisely
2,882), but still in the zone of high concentration. In this and remaining
sub-sectors the average HH index value was (considerably) higher, and in
one subsector (011742 production of cooling appliances and equipment,
with the four products sub-sector is comprised of) it was maximum
10,000. In this way, considering that each subsector in this industry con-
tains a large number of products (in some subsectors up to 10 and more
products), it is confirmed once again that results obtained through analy-
sis of company income statements significantly underestimates the real
level of supply concentration.
Ten sub-sectors are represented in the transportation equipment indus-
try (0115 and 0116 industries), three less than in the analysis based on
company income statement data.  In general, quite a high concentration
degree for all examined subsectors is obtained here, even for those that
were, according to results from Picture 2.5. in a zone of low or medium
concentration (001527 production of vehicle components and 011602
river shipbuilding, which, in this analysis, had an average HH index value
of 6,338 and 5,270, respectively). On the other hand, two sub-sectors with
the maximal HH index value were obtained here as well, but those are now
subsectors 011526 bicycle production and 011601 sea shipbuilding.
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HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production of 
asbestos 5 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
Production of
5 7,008 0.3 10,000 3,411magnesia and clay
Production of
4 6,159 0.3 10,000 3,363quartz sand
Production of
remaining non-metal 13 9,520 0.2 10,000 3,770
minerals
Production of
1 7,899  7,899 7,899sea salt
Production of
3 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000remaining salts
Production of
5 8,780 0.3 10,000 3,902plane glass
Production of
1 9,940  9,940 9,940glass containers
Production of 
12 9,236 0.2 10,000 4,919remaining glass
Production of 
fireproof material 11 8,466 0.2 10,000 3,637
Production of
ceramics and porcelain 2 8,875 0.2 10,000 7,750
or domestic use
Production of
construction-technical
ceramics and porcelain
1 28,510 0.3 10,000 3,517
Production of 
asbestos products 9 9,109 0.2 10,000 5,277
Production of,
coal-graphite 1 10,000  10,000 10,000
products
Remaining 
processing of 4 8,780 0.2 10,000 5,122
non-metal minerals
Production of and 
27 5,702 0.3 10,000 1,409processing of stone
Production of
gravel and sand 2 1,897 0.0 2,165 1,629
Production of 
1 10,000  10,000 10,000raw gypsum
Production of lime 3 2,688 0.1 3,279 2,153
Production of cement 3 4,371 0.1 5,913 3,580
Production of
13 3,904 0.3 10,000 735brick and tile
Production of,
prefabricated 19 7,243 0.4 10,000 1,135
building elements
Production of
bitumen material 11 7,480 0.3 10,000 2,359
for roads and roofs
Table 2.6. Production of non-ferrous metal and construction material
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HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production of cast,
forged and 17 5,776 0.3 10,000 1,294
pressed products
Production of metal
installation material 18 6,649 0.2 10,000 2,887
Production of tools 22 6,756 0.3 10,000 1,674
Production of
6 7,102 0.2 10,000 5,088metal containers
Production of nails. 
rivets. screws and 25 7,973 0.3 10,000 2,968
other wire
Production of
olling beds 2 4,322 0.0 4,480 4,164
Production of 
remaining metal 6 6,710 0.2 10,000 5,395
reproduction material
Production of
metal and other 24 5,551 0.3 10,000 1,835
construction material
Production of 
consumer goods 34 8,582 0.2 10,000 3,376
and the rest
Production of fuel 
machines
7 8,291 0.2 10,000 4,146and equipment
Production of 
construction and 12 7,422 0.3 10,000 3,594
mining machines
Production of  
machines for wood 20 8,719 0.2 10,000 2,692
and metal processing
Production of 
remaining machines 51 7,914 0.2 10,000 2,503
and equipment
Production of
agricultural machines 41 7,808 0.3 10,000 1,630
Production of 
equipment for 21 9,140 0.2 10,000 3,461
professional and
scientific purposes
Installation of mashie-
1 5,488  5,488 5,488-engineering products
Production ofelectrical 
machines and 29 8,344 0.3 10,000 3,039
equipment
Production of
installation elements 18 8,900 0.2 10,000 5,124
for electrical apparatus
Production of radio
6 9,277 0.2 10,000 5,667and TV receivers
Production of com-
9 8,268 0.3 10,000 3,378munication apparatus
and equipment
Table 2.7. Metal processing industry  (excluding transport equipment industry)
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HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production of
measuring and 
16 8,340 0.2 10,000 5,547regulating equipment
Production of other
11 8,800 0.2 10,000 5,246electrical apparatus
Production of cables 
30 7,840 0.2 10,000 2,939and transformations
Production of
11 6,386 0.2 10,000 2,715thermal apparatus
Production of cooling
appliances and 41 0,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
equipment
Production of 
apparatus and 
equipment for cleaning 4 7,861 0.3 10,000 4,063
and showering
Production of
remaining household 8 8,844 0.2 10,000 5,200
appliances
Production of electro
7 6,276 0.3 10,000 3,329installation material
Production of electric
bulbs and 5 9,968 0.0 10,000 9,84 4
luminescent rods
Production of
2 9,328 0.1 10,000 8,657battery chargers
Installation of
1 2,882  2,882 2,882electrical machines
and appliances
Production of
unmentioned electro- 5 6,389 0.3 10,000 2,730
-technical products
Table 2.8. Transportation equipment industry
HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production of 
rail vehicles 4 8,445 0.3 10,000 3,.780
Mending of rail vehicles 1 3,107  3,107 3,.107
Production of motors 6 8,418 0.3 10,000 1,769
Production of trucks
and special vehicles
2 07,903 0.3 10,000 2,419
Production of
passengers cars 3 9,564 0.1 10,000 8,692
Production of tractors 3 8,473 0.2 10,000 6,603
Production of bicycles 2 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
Production of 
elements and tools for 4 6,338 0.4 10,000 892
motor vehicles
Sea shipbuilding 3 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
River shipbuilding 10 5,270 0.4 10,000 1,496
The chemical industry sector encompasses two industries: 0118 and
0019 with 10 subsectors in total. The results displayed in Table 2.9. indi-
cate a significantly high degree of supply concentration in all ten subsec-
tors, which is considerably different to results displayed in Picture 2.6.,
which, on the contrary, suggested the existence of very competitive struc-
tures in the chemical industry. If a larger number of products for each
subsector is taken into account, as well as the fact that in each out of ten
subsectors the maximum HH index value was 10,000 (therefore, theoreti-
cally maximum value), the picture obtained on the basis of income state-
ments data substantially underestimated the real level of supply concen-
tration in this sector.
In the wood and paper industry (industries 012, 0123 and 0124) eleven
subsectors are represented. For this industry the results obtained on the
firms’ income statements data (see picture 2.7.) suggested the existence of
considerably competitive structures, with extremely high levels of supply
concentration in only subsector 012203, wood impregnation, and with only
two more subsectors with HH index value between 2,000 and 3,000 (012201
panel production and 012429 remaining paper processing). Contrary to
57Analysis of Existing Market Structures
HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production of 
chemicals (except 44 8,348 0.2 10,000 2,399
for agriculture)
Production of 
chemicals 26 7,249 0.3 10,000 2,355
for agriculture
Production of
artificial and 6 9,175 0.2 10,000 5,052
synthetic fibre
Production of
plastic mass
34 9,104 0.2 10,000 3,812
Production of
medicines and 36 7,187 0.3 10,000 2,903pharmaceutical
chemicals
Production of 
equipment for cleaning
and cosmetic
37 4,909 0.3 10,000 1,702
preparation
Production of
coating equipment
24 6,390 0.2 10,000 2,492
Production of plastic
material wrapping
9 5,985 0.4 10,000 2,216
Remaining plastic
mass processing
19 6,453 0.3 10,000 1,817
Production of
remaining
chemical products
28 8,015 0.3 10,000 1,793
Table 2.9.  Chemical industry
this, the results displayed in Table 2.10 indicate very high concentration in
all subsectors of the wood and paper industry, whereas the lowest HH index
value is obtained in subsector 012421 production of wrapping paper
(3,161), and the sub-sector 012324 production of cane products the maxi-
mum HH index value is obtained (10,000).  Along with this, only in two out
of eleven examined subsectors was the maximum HH index value within
the subsector not 10,000, but at a level slightly above 5,000 (already indicat-
ed subsector 012203 wood impregnation, with only one product and with
an HH index value of 5,155, and also the already mentioned production of
paper wrappings, with six products in the subsector).
The textile industry is represented by two industries (0125 and 0126)
with a total of 20 subsectors. According to results based on the firms’
income statements (Picture 2.8.), a high level of supply concentration was
recorded in subsectors from the industry 0125 (production of textile yarn
and textiles), and considerably more competitive structures in industry
0126 (production of final textile products), whereas in a few subsectors
(five) from this industry a low level of production concentration was
recorded. The relative proportion between subsectors from these two
industries remained the same and on the basis of concentration analysis
made at the product level (Table 2.11), but on the whole, the recorded
level of concentration is considerably higher. According to data from this
Table, the average HH index value in all subsectors is in the high concen-
tration bracket, where the lowest (average) HH index value is achieved in
subsector 012623 production of domestic linen (3,776).
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Table 2.10  Wood and paper industry
HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production of cut
construction material
22 5,361 0.3 10,000 603
Production of 
veneer and plates
15 7,269 0.2 10,000 2,593
Wood impregnation 1 5,155  5,155 5,155
Production of
wooden furniture
43 6,593 0.3 10,000 1,104
Production of 
wooden wrappings
9 6,523 0.3 10,000 1,273
Production of wooden
construction materials
31 6,245 0.3 10,000 1,197
Production of wood
and cork accessories
6 8,067 0.2 10,000 4,785
Production of 
rod objects
4 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
Production of 
cellulose and paper
26 8,958 0.2 10,000 2,763
Production of 
paper wrapping
6 3,161 0.1 5,256 2,064
Remaining paper 
processing
12 7,297 0.3 10,000 3,016
In leather and rubber industry (industries 0127, 0128 and 0129), eight
subsectors are represented, that is one more in comparison to the analysis
based on company income statements data (Picture 2.9.); the new sub-
sector is 012702 production of pig skin. As opposed to the results repre-
sented in Picture 2.9., according to results represented on the Table 2.12.,
all the subsectors from this sector had very high levels of concentration
(based on results from the income statements analysis it appeared that in
four subsectors from this sector the level of concentration was even in the
low concentration bracket, whereas the maximum HH index value was
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Table 2.11.  Textile industry
HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production of hemp
and linen fibre
3 10,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
Production of yarn 
and cotton type thread
8 6,422 0.3 10,000 2,272
Proizvodwa prediva 
woollen yarn type
11 5,943 0.4 10,000 1,441
Production of yarn 
andcords made of 7 7,755 0.3 10,000 2,896
hard yarn
Production of synthetic
yarn and thread
6 9,065 0.1 10,000 6,789
Proizvodwa 
pamuŁnih tkanina
9 6,900 0.3 10,000 2,788
Production of 
woollen textile
8 6,348 0.3 10,000 2,237
Production of textile 
from hard yarn
4 8,481 0.3 10,000 3,925
Production of 
silk textile
4 7,166 0.3 10,000 4,543
Production of 
knitted textiles
4 6,815 0.2 10,000 5,432
Production of 
knitted underwear
2 5,272 0.2 6,632 3,911
Production of 
knitted clothing
3 4,827 0.4 9,541 1,216
Production of socks 9 5,291 0.2 10,000 2,489
Miscellaneous 
production 
8 6,874 0.3 10,000 2,685
Production of 
underwear 6 5,025 0.3 10,000 2,487
Production of cloths 24 4,969 0.3 10,000 1,585
Production of 
domestic linen
5 3,775 0.1 5,248 2,502
Production of heavy 
ready made cloths
1 5,034  5,034 5,034
Production of 
floor covers
4 7,083 0.2 8,302 5,026
Production of the other
textile products
13 9,017 0.2 10,000 5,039
just above 3,500, in subsectors 012901 production of tyres). The results
from the Table 2.12, indicate considerably higher HH index values in all
subsectors. The, minimum average value of this index is achieved in sub-
sector 012820 production of leather accessories (4,718-an extremely high
level of supply concentration).
The food processing industry (0130 industry, production of food prod-
ucts, 0131 drink production, 0132 cattle food production and 0133 tobac-
co production and processing) is represented in this analysis with 27 sub-
sectors. A large number of subsectors, as well as a large number of individ-
ual products within almost every subsector suggested at the very begin-
ning, that in this case as well, the results will be (significantly) different
from the results based on company income statements. Some differences
in relation to data displayed in Picture 2.10 are evident. Still, relatively
lower HH index values are recorded in relation to the other industries.
Regardless of this, it is interesting that even in this industry that has a
rather competitive market structure for the domestic manufacturing (and
even the economy), only two subsectors have a medium level of concen-
tration (013060 production of sugar and 013073 production of biscuits
and related products), whereas another one is rather close to that zone
(013041 slaughtering of cattle). In all other subsectors (excluding subsec-
tors 013121 production of refreshments), the HH index value is even
above the previously defined limit of 2,600 (the limit of high and extreme-
ly high product concentration). Accordingly, even in this industry there is
a substantial supply concentration, regardless of the fact that it is one of
the few industries in which no subsector has the maximum average HH
index value. Even in subsector/sector 013200 production of fodder, which
is the one of the most competitive ones, the average HH index value is
above the limit of 2,600 (3,292).
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Table 2.12.  Leather and rubber industry
HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Production of 
bulk leather
6 7,665 0.4 10,000 2,928
Production of 
pig skin
4 9,186 0.2 10,000 6,745
Production of 
petty skin and fur
9 7,225 0.3 10,000 1,968
Production of 
leather footwear
23 6,483 0.3 10,000 1,367
Production of 
leather accessories
6 4,718 0.3 9,814 2,114
Production of 
leather and fur 8 5,869 0.4 10,000 1,356
ready made cloths
Production of tires 18 7,779 0.3 10,000 2,912
Other latex products 30 7,353 0.3 10,000 2,097
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Table 2.13.  Food processing industry
HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Grinding and peeling
of grains
12 4,081 0.3 10,000 256
Production of bread 
and baked goods
10 3,090 0.3 8,594 322
Production of pastries 3 4,809 0.1 5,348 3,900
Processing and 
conservation 56 4,974 0.3 10,000 1,265
of fruit and vegetables
Cattle slaughtering 13 1,963 0.1 5,267 579
Processing and 
conservation of meet
19 4,133 0.3 10,000 720
Processing and
conservation of fish
1 9,427  9,427 9,427
Processing and
conservation of milk
20 4,654 0.3 10,000 1,108
Production of sugar 3 1,508 0.0 1,624 1,377
Production of 
cacao products
6 5,362 0.4 10,000 2,136
Production of 
candies and sweets
3 5,372 0.4 10,000 2,815
Production of biscuits
and related products
2 1,329 0.0 1,465 1,194
Production of 
industrial cakes
3 5,714 0.4 10,000 3,544
Production of 
vegetable oil and fats
11 5,173 0.3 10,000 1,747
Production of starch 
and processed 
starch products
8 7,199 0.2 10,000 4,272
Production of 
spices and the rest
11 4,793 0.2 6,782 2,022
Production of plant 
originated alcohol
3 4,738 0.3 8,324 2,424
Production of beer 3 2,900 0.1 3,821 1,591
Production of wine 3 4,677 0.5 10,000 1,678
Production of wine 
distillates. and brandies
2 3,559 0.1 4,591 2,527
Production of 
fruit brandy
2 3,716 0.1 4,135 3,297
Production of remaining
alcohol drinks
3 3,988 0.1 5,591 2,624
Production of 
refreshments
1 2,184  2,184 2,184
Production of 
mineral water
1 3,613  3,613 3,613
Production of fodder 13 3,291 0.2 6,941 492
Production of 
fermented tobacco
2 5,640 0.6 10,000 1,281
Tobacco processing 4 8,842 0.2 10,000 5,370
Finally, the last manufacturing sector considered relates to industries
0134, 0135 and 0139, with a total of five subsectors, which is two subsec-
tors less than with analysis based on company income statement data. In
this analysis, subsectors 013902 production of musical instruments and
013903 production of matches are missing. The lowest concentration
degree is recorded in the graphical industry (industry 0134), although
average HH index value is above the limit of 2,600. In recycling of raw
materials (industry 0135) and subsector 013909 other industry, the level of
supply concentration interpreted in HH index value is somewhat below
6,000; while in the remaining two sub-sectors it is extremely high (in sub-
sector 013904 production of jewellery 9,277, and in subsector 013901 pro-
duction of teaching appliances and sports equipment up to the maximum
10,000).
2.3. General evaluation of the existing supply concentration
All indicated results speak in favour of the statement that an extremely
high level of supply concentration exists on domestic markets, i.e. non-
competitive market structures often occur (if the market structure is con-
sidered only by supply concentration). The High HH index values
obtained are not surprising, considering that there is a small domestic
market in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia. In order to get more a reliable picture of
the character of the market structures in the country, it is necessary to
examine the dynamic of supply concentration and the character of barri-
ers to entry on all the markets examined in our country.
3. THE DYNAMIC OF SUPPLY CONCENTRATION
Examination of supply concentration dynamics is of great importance 
whether the character of market structures is improving or getting worse.
On the basis of available data, the results of supply concentration for some
recent years are compared (only for the manufacturing industries) in the
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HH index
Subsector Product Average Standard Maximal Minimal
number deviation value value
Graphic activity 11 2,896 0.3 10,000 724
Recycling of raw 
materials
14 5,536 0.3 10,000 1,146
Production of learning 
appliances and physical 51 0,000 0.0 10,000 10,000
culture equipment
Production of jewelry 6 9,276 0.1 10,000 7,764
Remaining 
unmentioned
industry
4 5,851 0.0 6,250 5,461
Table 2.14  Graphic and remaining industry
following Table 2.15. The first one is the year 1992, as it is the first year of
the new state, established on the territory considerably smaller than the
previous one. The results of this concentration degree analysis interpreted
through HH index, are displayed on the basis of standard classification in
accordance with the level of supply concentration.
Even this superficial display of HH index values for Serbia/FR
Yugoslavia manufacturing industries, given on the basis of turnover data
indicates that the level of concentration has declined considerably. Along
with this, one should bear in mind the fact, that in data for the year 2000
Kosovo companies are not included, which causes problems in real com-
parison of the supply concentration change over time. Still, regardless of
the indicated imperfection, it is certain that the trend towards supply con-
centration decrease exists. The main reason for supply concentration
decline is new entries, i.e. entry of new companies, illustrated in Picture
2.15. (the number of active companies, i.e. the number of companies
which submitted income statements and balance sheets). It should be
63Analysis of Existing Market Structures
1992 1996 2000
HHI value Subsector % Subsector % Subsector %
number number number
Below 1,000
(non-concentrated
markets) 31 17.9 40 23.0 48 27.9
From 1,000 to 1,800
(medium
concentrated) 28 16.2 29 16.7 23 13.4
Above 1,800
(highly
concentrated) 114 65.9 105 60.3 101 58.7
Table 2.15. 
Supply concentration degree in Serbian industrial activities (HH index value)
Picture 2.15 Number of companies in Serbian industry
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noted that the data for the year 1999 and 2000 does not include firms from
Kosovo, so there is a slight increase in the number for these two years.8
Even with evident growth in the number of companies and the increase
in the degree of market structures competitiveness, the fact is that the sup-
ply concentration degree in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia on average is still such
that almost 60% of industrial sub-sectors are at the highly concentrated
market level. However, this analysis indicated the significance of free entry
and exit from the industry, since that is the main precondition for the
change of supply concentration alterations, i.e. the change towards more
competitive market structures. 
4. BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXIT AS MARKET STRUCTURE FACTORS
4.1. Barriers to entry and exit and potential competitiveness
At the beginning of this chapter it was pointed out that two key ele-
ments of market structures were concentration supply and conditions of
(barriers to) exit and entry from the industry. The introductory chapter
examines the mechanism by which free entry and exit from the industry
enables the establishment of competitive market equilibrium and the
maximisation of the social welfare. 
The empirical analysis of supply concentration changes in
Serbian/Yugoslav manufacturing industries has demonstrated that,
although supply concentration depends on a large number of factors, the
most significant amongst them is free/easy entry and exit from the indus-
try. If there are no barriers to entry and exit, i.e. that entry/exit costs are
low, it is more likely that a more competitive market structure will emerge
 the competition will prevail. Simply stated, the easier the entry to the
industry and exit from it, the larger the number of companies there will be
in the industry.9
Generally speaking, a large number of active producers does not have to
be the only way to establish competitive market structures. Even with a
smaller number of active rivals (competitors) in the industry, it is possible
to have competition, in this case potential competition, providing that
there is a credible threat of the new entry to the market. This is the case of
the contestable market, i.e. a market with completely free entry and exit.
Namely, provided that in a market there is a monopoly/oligopoly struc-
ture or any other form of high supply concentration, i.e. one or several
producers have market power, and therefore the firm(s) manage to
increase the prices above the level of marginal costs and therefore increase
profit (appropriate economic profit).  If that is the case, it is in the best
interest of the firms (investors) of this particular industry to enter it, so
that they are in a position to earn economic profit. The arrival of these
new entries certainly increases competition and inevitably introduces
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Yugoslavia. 
9 It has been already explained that barriers to exit from the industry represent only a
special barriers to entry.
performance alteration of the incumbent firms on the market, form
monopoly/oligopoly towards competitive, to the advantage of consumers
and their welfare. Moreover, in order for this mechanism to work, it is not
even necessary to have a real entry of new producers to the industry, it is
usually sufficient that a credible threat to incumbent producers exists for
their performance to become more competitive.10
In order for potential competition is to be effective (i.e. that the threat is
credible), the entry (and exit) costs of a new entry company should not be
high. That especially relates to the sunk costs, i.e. investment of real assets
that are exclusively related to specific production and that cannot be
recovered if the firm exits a given type of production/industry) should not
be significant. In other words, the higher the sunk costs, the more costly
exit from production is; the interest of potential producers for entry into
the industry decreases and the threat of entry is diminished, which weak-
ens potential competition. Conditions of entry to an industry depend on
larger number of factors  political, economic, regulatory/institutional
and others. They will be discussed in this section.
Free entry to the industry is important for its competitive market struc-
ture, but free exit from the industry is equally important, that is leaving
the production when it is opportunistic for the producer, for two reasons.
First, liquidation of a company releases (unlocks) resources that could be
used by some other company, which increases competition on the given or
some other market. When a bad firm exits production, whether because it
was liquidated, or because it decided to change the industry, its market
niche and assets can be taken over by another, better firm, which will use
them in a more efficient way and therefore increase market competitive-
ness, For example, if Zastava was liquidated, someone would, perhaps,
take over the assets and begin more efficient production. Second, if the
exit from the production is related to serious difficulties, firms would
more reluctantly decide to enter them, since they are aware in the case of
business failure, it would be vary costly to restructure the firm and reallo-
cate it to the another industry. 
4.2. Political risks as barriers to entry
Political risks are a significant barrier to entry of capital into produc-
tion, since capital is an anxious animal and it is not prepared to be
engaged unless there is a real possibility that political changes and
upheavals could endanger normal business and profit making operations.
Political uncertainty therefore presents an effective method for deterring
new entries of foreign as well as domestic potential investors. 
The level of political risk in Serbia was considerably reduced with the
change of the regime during the year 2000, but it is still quite high. Problem
of uncertainties regarding the status of the state still exists, since constitu-
tional crisis is still on, i.e. the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro
is still in political and constitutional trouble. Moreover, the new
Constitutional Charter will define the union as provisional, as a set-up for
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a specific period (three years), after which the final decision will be made as
to the existence (and form) of the joint state or its definite abolition. The
possible dismantlement of the federation/union of Serbia & Montenegro
would itself create problems of dividing the assets and international finan-
cial liabilities, and therefore to difficulties related to consolidation with new
independent states. The same applies to Kosovo, whose future status is
uncertain and where the existing problem who is to pay Kosovo’s interna-
tional financial obligations? will be sharpened while defining the status of
this province.
Furthermore, there is a higher political temperature within Serbian
internal political relations that adds its contribution to the political risks in
the country. Conflicts between most power political players and constant
political crisis regarding the Hague Criminal Tribunal (ICTY) create
problems regarding international economic relations and relations with
the International Financial Institutions (the International Monetary
Fund, World Bank etc.). Furthermore, the international (ICTY) compo-
nent of the internal political crisis creates problems and risks regarding the
process of writing off the country’s international dept (Paris Club agree-
ment and London Club negotiations) and the country’s credit rating on
the international capital market. Finally, taking into account that the
Hague tribunal (ICTY) is involved, some forms of economic and financial
sanctions against Serbia should also been taken into account. 
The ongoing political crisis in Serbia does not only produce negative
effects on international economic relations, but results in inevitable neg-
lect of domestic affairs, particularly economic and institutional reform,
rehabilitation of the judicial system, reorganisation of public administra-
tion and similar. Delayed reform inevitably preserves the existing,
unfavourable economic/business environment and adverse market struc-
tures related to it.
4.3. Economic barriers to entry
Economy of scale. Within certain industries, production technology is
such that it leads to scale economy. In such industries economy of scale is
a barrier to entry for new producers, since it is not very likely that a large
number of producers can reach minimal efficient size of production, to be
profitable on the given market.
Economy of scale is usually strong in infrastructure and public utilities,
particularly in network industries. Nonetheless, in a small country, such as
Serbia/Yugoslavia, it can also be a barrier to entry for other industries too.
When the market is small, measured by population and/or purchasing
power, and when production supplies primarily the domestic market, it is
not possible or profitable to have a larger number of producers in some
industries, such as, for example, the automotive and many of the chemical
and electronic industries. Many modern technologies assume capacities
whose size exceeds the markets of small countries, so that unless the orien-
tation is explicitly towards export the production will have no chance of
profitability.
The only way to overcome domestic market limits is a comprehensive
liberalisation of international trade and integration of the country’s econ-
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omy into the World market. Serbia/FR Yugoslavia accepted this solution,
but gradually, through a process of integration into the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), as it strives to moderate the possible shock that
could happen with a rapid opening of the country’s economy. The other
way is the creation of free trade zones with neighbouring and other coun-
tries, so that through this form of partial international integration, the
domestic market expands for domestic producers. to date, agreements
with Russia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are signed and rati-
fied (this matter will be discussed to a greater extend in the next chapter).
The effects of the free trade zones are not yet significant, but it can be
expected that in due time it will have better effects, i.e. that they will in the
long-term manifest virtues of a free trade zone.
Product differentiation becomes a barrier to entry when existing
firms enjoy popularity of their trademark (brands) among consumers,
which represents a barrier for potential rivals to compete in equal
terms considering that it requires huge marketing costs or considerable
price reduction. Still, in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia only a small number of
domestic trademarks enjoy an exceptional reputation so that differen-
tiation in production does not represent a significant barrier to entry,
contrary to numerous foreign trademarks whose reputation is often
indisputable.
Successful innovative activity by incumbent firms could, generally speak-
ing, represent a considerable barrier to entry for new producers. But,
unfortunately, innovations are a forgotten term in Serbia, therefore any
new entry, i.e. new potential rival, weather domestic or foreign, almost
automatically enjoys the advantage regarding innovations over incumbent
firms, which make entry to new producers easier and provides compara-
tive advantage over the incumbent producers.
Availability of natural resources can be a barrier to entry in industries
such as mining, energy and the construction material industry. The
incumbent firms, which already use natural resources in Serbia have a
strategic advantage over potential new producers. This barrier can be
moderated by newly discovered reserves and by the buying out of the
incumbent firms or by the right of new producers to exploit the existing
natural resources.
The availability of capital represents a very serious barrier to entry for
new producers. Namely, if capital scarcity is significant, it is not possible
to use even best business opportunities, except through own savings,
which are usually insufficient. The availability of capital for investment in
Serbia is extremely low. The reasons for this are economic, institutional
and political: low domestic savings due to the low level of economic devel-
opment, devastation of banking sector during the previous regime and
general distrust of banks, including international ones, the unreformed
judicial system which does not protect investors and creditors and increas-
es the risks in that way; high political risk, which prevents the influx of
international credit capital.
Due to the low availability of capital, the uncertain business environ-
ment and rather slow pace of reform, investment activity in Serbia is very
low, which means that the number of new entries is rather modest.
Particularly affected by this is the grass-roots private sector, which for the
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time being has developed its businesses through investments of their own
savings, personal owners assets, which is a serious limitation to develop-
ment. In order to speed up development of this sector and its elevation to
a higher level, external financing is necessary, either from domestic or for-
eign sources. At this moment domestic banks are mostly orientated
towards providing loans for durable consumer goods, and they refrain
from providing loans to firms due to the risks regarding company debt
servicing and untrained personnel for modern banking business (risk esti-
mation and similar). Some foreign banks in Serbia have provided loans to
the firms, but it is usually a matter of dealing on behalf of international
financial institution capital and the loans are small.
Due to the undeveloped capital market, exit from business is more dif-
ficult as well, since it is difficult to sell the securities of a loss-making com-
pany, as well as its real assets. This presents a barrier to entry, since during
examination of a potential venture, investors take into account, as it was
indicated earlier, conditions of exit as a factor while deciding to enter the
business.
Prolongation of economic crisis, and especially continuous fall of indus-
trial production and very bad state of infrastructure in the country also
prevents potential investors from investing. When, for example, in a
country, such as Serbia, there is a real and long-term danger from electric-
ity cuts, (foreign) investors refrain from investing.
The Grey economy is widespread in Serbia and it is not limited to indi-
viduals or small groups only, dealing in retail businesses and crafts, but
encompasses grey business of formally registered firms as well. Economic
agents that operate in the grey economy have significantly lower costs than
firms that operate in the formal economy, due to unpaid taxes and other
charges and avoidance of regulatory expenses. Such unfair competition
presents a barrier to entry and repudiates reputable investors from invest-
ments to the formal sector.
4.4. Institutional barriers to entry 
Since political risks and economical barriers are at least partially out of
government’s control and because institutional barriers to entry are easier
to solve (dismantle) than other forms of barriers (at least in principle),
more attention should be focused to them. It should also be taken into
account that institutional changes present a real area of economic reforms.
New company registration is unnecessary complex and lasts approxi-
mately 50 days, according to G17 institute & CIPE research.11 The reason
for such complicated procedure is the legislator belief that, even during
registration, eventual future fraud should be precluded and that high busi-
ness standards should be maintained. This is a wrong approach, since
numerous laws penalise fraud, so that this kind of prevention is not neces-
sary, considering that it delays and constrains entry and increases unnec-
essary costs. The complexity of registration and the excessive require-
ments  on financing, accounting, construction, sanitation, consumer and
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environmental protection especially effect individuals which intend to
open small firms and deal with small business, and forces them to turn to
the grey economy business.
Urban Land. Urban land is owned by the state in Serbia, which serious-
ly complicates and distresses the starting up of business in cases when an
investor intends to build new business facilities. State property rights over
urban land mean that the building site beneficiary has only partial proper-
ty rights, that is he obtains the right to use the plot for an unspecified peri-
od, but no other property rights. The Urban Land Law even gives the
municipality, that is to the city local authorities, the right to take away the
land from the beneficiary through readjustment of urban planning or by
land rearrangement, which means that even the right to usage is not per-
manent.
The first uncertainty is weather the investor will manage to lease the
land, weather because the decision of the municipality/city is of discre-
tionary nature, or because municipality/city temporarily do not offer a
suitable plot of land for lease, or weather because the price (fee) of the
lease is too high due to the municipality/city decision. The root of this
problem is the fact that private property for urban land does not exist, and
therefore neither do normal relations between supply and demand, along
with market price. Instead of that, the state bureaucrats attempt to stimu-
late market results.
The second uncertainty relates to the shift in rent paid to the munici-
pality/city in time. The developer is charged two fees, one of which is a
lump sum, and the other a monthly fee, payable for all the time of usage.
While the first fee is payable at the moment when the contract is singed,
the real amount of the other one is variable in time, depending on the
policies if the municipally/city. Therefore the predicament of possible
future lease costs is difficult to the point of impossibility.
The third uncertainty is due to business risk; if the investor (developer)
decides not to develop the land, he cannot sell it or sublease it to someone
else. This means that he is facing huge sunk costs. 
The fourth uncertainty relates to possible urban land privatisation in
the future. The user of the urban land may, in that case find himself in the
adverse position of having to pay again for something he has already paid
for, whether to the old landowner, if privatisation is accomplished
through denationalisation, or to the state if the privatisation is accom-
plished by selling the land to the incumbent users. The problem of possi-
ble denationalisation can occur with other real-estate, for example factory
and business premises. 
The procedure for urban land development and building business, and
other facilities in Serbia is very complex and takes a lot of time. There are
three permits. The first one is the urban planning permit, which takes 16
agreements, conditions, analysis etc. The second one is the construction
permit, which takes 18 agreements, projects, assessments, analysis and
similar. For industrial facilities in larger cities it is necessary to obtain
additional agreements from the local public utility companies. The third is
the users permit that is hopefully granted once the facility is completed.
According to G17 Institute and CIPE research, obtaining necessary per-
mits takes approximately 326 days.
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There are two reasons for such long and exhausting procedure. The first
one is an over-regulated procedure, based on the traditional socialist idea
that everything has to be regulated and controlled in detail. In this area,
that means, on one hand, precise urban planning, that is, determining the
use of the land, that is the activity to be developed in the structures,
dimensions of the structures that can be built, and, on the other hand, pre-
cise determination of building demands, technical standards and similar.
The detailed urban planning and technical requests inevitably lead to a
cumbersome and slow procedure. The second reason is the traditional
slowness of the public administration, which is can be somewhat speeded
up with a bribe. It remains to be seen what the impact of the new legalisa-
tion that is currently in preparation will be. 
Business premises lease, especially retail premises, also presents quite a
special undertaking in Serbia. The largest part of business premises in
prime locations are still owned by the state, and are on lease to incumbent
users mainly for an unspecified period, at a rather low price. In this way
the current users are encouraged to retain the premises and utilise them in
an inefficient manner. This significantly constrains on the real-estate mar-
ket and makes it difficult for new firms to acquire the premises. One pos-
sibility for solving this problem is the sublease  but this transaction is
legally forbidden. Although it is illegal, it is very frequent in Serbia these
days. Still, this very restriction presents a substantial barrier for serious
investors, since it creates an additional risk. 
Industrial relations, in spite of the reform of the Labour Law passed into
law at the end of year 2001, this legislation still represents a barrier to busi-
ness activities. Employment of labour has been liberalised and simplified,
but a few difficulties remain. Firstly, until the contraction of new collective
agreements, the old ones, which are very favourable to employees, are still
valid. (it is questionable how much and how effectively they are enforced
in the real life, but for a major investor this is still a problem). Secondly,
according to the Law, trade unions have an extensive role in determining
working conditions, which is not favourable for investors. The trade
unions will use this position to negotiate new collective contracts, and
wages etc. And third, the dismissal of employees, although liberalised, sug-
gest procedural difficulties for employers and the costs in the form of sev-
erance pay.
Generally speaking, labour market is not flexible and it makes busi-
ness adjustments to new circumstances intricate, which presents a barri-
er to normal businesses and investments. An additional difficulty is the
ambiguity of some legal provisions, for example about whether obligato-
ry collective bargaining is obligatory. The minister of Labour has a dis-
cretionary power in that case, which reduces the certainty of the rules of
the game.
The difficult social situation in Serbia, followed by low wages in many
social and state companies or the threat of labour shedding in many com-
panies have induced trade unions, which still, to some extent, retain the
attitudes of self-management, from time to time mange to organise
strikes and demand wage increases and other benefits. The Serbian
Government has displayed some backbone regarding these appeals, but
the widespread atmosphere of discontent and the trade union ambition
70 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
to gain influence amongst employed represent an unfavourable business
and investment environment.12
Efficient contract enforcement is not a common practice in Serbia,
especially in the case of bigger companies. This increases business uncer-
tainty and suppresses investments from investors and new entries.
Contracts that are not enforced are frequent in all areas, but it presents a
special problem for company payments to suppliers for goods delivered
and banks for delivered loans. During previous decades a debt model
(debt paradise) was established, according to which the state through for-
mal and informal methods protects weak debtors from bankruptcy, of
course, at the expense of the creditor. Such a benevolent approach to
debtors and non-enforcement of contracts encouraged further develop-
ment and growth of the debt syndrome (moral hazard). 
For many companies, especially for the bigger ones from the social and
state sector, soft budget constrain was applicable. They failed to pay, not
only other companies and banks, but also taxes the state, health and social
security contributions and various fees. Favoured companies from the pri-
vate sector conducted business in a similar manner. After the political
changes of 2000, financial discipline improved, but it is far from perfect.
The Bankruptcy Law (legislation) is still not enforced in the case of bigger
firms, which means that the judicial branch of the government is still very
tolerant toward debtors.
The existence of soft budget constraints, or non-existence of hard budg-
et constrain for everyone proved to be a barrier to entry for new private
companies. The companies to which soft budget constraints are available
have an advantage on the market, and all other companies are in an
unequal competitive position.
Resolving legal disputes is long and uncertain process, therefore private
property rights and their protection are uncertain. Even when a plaintiff
gets favourable verdict, it is not certain that he will mange to materialise all
the receivables. Therefore many business people prefer to solve disputes in
the informal way (one-to-one) instead of going to court. These difficulties
with resolving commercial disputes increase costs of businesses, and
therefore present a barrier to entry for new companies. 
Corruption is very widespread in Serbia. It is the result of excessive
and wrong state regulation, excessive taxes and weakness of state (gov-
ernment). It has infected numerous areas  from the custom administra-
tion to local administration authorised for urban planning and develop-
ment permits. Corruption sometimes helps to speed up an otherwise
long-winded procedure, but it presents a serious barrier for normal and
sound business.
Numerous regulatory and institutional weaknesses, inherited from the
previous system and still unchanged, present a barrier to entry of new
firms into business. Only a few of them will be mentioned as a kind of
illustration.
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12 Well known is the case of one factory Electric Industry from Ni: as soon as new owner
arrived, a Serb from Diaspora, the trade union organized the strike, whose main
request was payback of suspended wages from the previous period!
According to the current Law on the system of social control of prices it
is possible for the government to control the price of any product if it is
judged necessary. Currently, the government controls the prices of basic
foodstuffs and some public utilities, but it is still not impossible for the
scope of price control to be extended on the basis of the current legisla-
tion. Investors are therefore faced with the possibility that the results of
their business activity depends on government bequest. For example, drug
prices are under government control and production profitability of a sin-
gle medicine depends on the discretionary decision of state officials. 
The Government of Serbia is inclined to effectively change Laws by
decree, which introduces uncertainty for all business. First, decrees are
brought in relatively quickly, without public discussion, which increases
insecurity for investors, since there are no signals of alterations in the
institutional framework and regulations. Second, the decrees made to date
have proved to be arbitrary Government decisions, constituting arbitrary
involvement in businesses, and therefore restrictions of economic free-
doms, which also does not favour investors.
The property register is incomplete, untidy and it does not represent the
real situation.13 For instance, in the existing cadastre records some real
estate is still often registered in the name of the owner before nationalisa-
tion, half a century ago. Especially confusing is the situation with real-
estate within social companies, which is a result of the dominant social
concept of  usage, rather than property. Serbia has yet to reorganise the
property registry, i.e. unify the three existing independent systems: cadas-
tre, land books and the traditional tapial system in south Serbia.
Problems with property registration practically make usage of the mort-
gage a means of security impossible, which means exclusion of potentially
substantial capital for commercial purposes.
The accounting system is partially obsolete and insufficiently corre-
sponds to International accounting standards (IAS). Therefore in day-to-
day operations, the emphasis is on obeying the law, while information
content of accounting statements is usually insufficient.
Bankruptcy legislation is not good, and it is not applied even when
companies are obviously insolvent. The problem is not simply that this
gives wrong incentives to economic actors and wastes resources, but it also
significantly effects the restructuring of markets through repression of exit
of inefficient firms from the business. Those firms with little or no busi-
ness prospects maintain themselves in an artificial, parasitic way, through
implicit and explicit, hidden or open subsidies, and represent a barrier to
the structuring of a normal competitive and efficient market.
Leasing is not defined well by existing legislation. Among other things,
tax is charged twice times (with every instalment and with the sale of the
asset), and an efficient system of security for the leasing company does
not exist.
The work of inspections  financial police, tax administration, market,
sanitary, ecological, foreign currency, safety at work, and other inspections
and police  should provide compliance with the regulations and, generally
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13 Removal of barriers for foreign investments, Ministry for international economic rela-
tions, Republic of Serbia, January 2002.
speaking, regular dealing in the economy. However, problems with work
of inspection and related officials are numerous: the approach is usually
selective, i.e. far more attention is paid to one group of companies (grass
roots private sector) than other (state run and bigger socially owned com-
panies); some of them are considerably corrupted, so they do not provide
regulations enforcement by the business community, but just generate
income for themselves. Their assignments are partly intertwined, and
decisions on the same issues are sometimes different, inspectors are some-
times ignorant of regulations in their authority, which causes damage to
the companies they are auditing etc.
4.5. Conclusion  barriers to entry and exit and market structures
Barriers to entry in business are considerable in Serbia. They are politi-
cal, economic and institutional. The reason for institutional barriers is
usually insufficiently advanced transition, considering that Serbia is at the
beginning of deep economic reforms. Administrative reform has not
reached very far either, so that difficulties occur in enforcing the existing
laws. The barriers, considered all together, discourage investors from
investments and contribute to the maintenance of the old, socialist inher-
ited market structure. Barriers to entry, along with barriers to exit, make
the competitive degree of the markets in numerous industries lower than
they could otherwise have been. 
The strategy for increasing the competitiveness of the existing market
structures in Serbia has to encompass, along with international trade lib-
eralisation and good competition policy, all other areas where barriers to
entry into businesses occurs  from reduction of political risk, across the
judicial reform, to general economic reforms, since the total political,
juridical and economic ambience determine the competitiveness of an
economy.
Serbia possesses certain comparative advantages, which could lead to an
inflow of foreign investments, and removal of existing barriers would cer-
tainly present good encouragement for investment. The goal of all encom-
passing changes, and particularly institutional reforms, should not only be
improvement in relation to the existing situation, but of achievement of
World standards. In a time of global economic integration, the position of
a country is assessed by its position in relation to other countries, in our
case mainly the counties in transition and development, which have, over
the last few years, accomplished considerable progress.
If Serbia does not manage to reduce radically the barriers to entry and
exit to and from production, then huge foreign investments will not mate-
rialise and the country will remain locked in the existing ineffective mar-
ket structures.
5. CONSEQUENCES OF EXISTING MARKET STRUCTURES
The existing, market structures, identified and analysed in this chapter,
represent a sufficiently accurate picture of the Serbian/Yugoslav economy.
High supply concentration, a small number of companies, insufficient
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competition, all these are characteristics of our economy, established ten
years ago. The introduction of imports as a source of competition will cer-
tainly improve the picture of domestic market structures so far examined,
but it will certainly not lead to spectacular results, that is to very competi-
tive market structures. That is why the effect generated by such, non-com-
petitive market structures must be properly understood.
First effect is certainly the existence of market power, which inevitably
leads to reduction of supply and price increases. In other words, allocative
loss (dead-weight loss) of social welfare occurs. Measurement of the devi-
ation of prices with the existence of market power from the ones in condi-
tions of perfect competition is a complex methodological problem for
which no solution could be found, taking into account the data that was
available. It is most likely that subsequent research, especially that which
links market structure changes and price variation, could reveal the effect
which recorded market power has on allocative loss of welfare, that is to
reduction of social welfare.
The discussion within the framework of the introductory chapter
demonstrated that competitive and non-competitive market structure
could have opposite effects on production effectiveness. On one hand, the
existence of monopoly as extremely non-competitive market structure can
cause loss of incentives for both shot-term and long-term production effi-
ciency. On the other hand, the possibility for monopoly to be established
through defeating the competitors represents a motive for many produc-
ers to invest in research and development and, in that way, improve pro-
duction efficiency. Although discussion on this subject, in principle, indi-
cates that the pros and cons are closely balanced, it seems that it is not the
case in the particular case of Serbia/FR Yugoslavia. Considering that, on
our market, it relatively easy to gain and sustain a monopoly, there are no
reasons to invest in research and development, i.e. for development of
productive effectiveness. Extremely low investments in research and
development in our country confirm this. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the existing non-competitive domestic structures remove incentives
for establishing, and increasing production efficiency, while establishing
monopoly does not present a motive for development of long-term pro-
duction efficiency. It is obvious that in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia there are far
more efficient ways to defeat the competition. 
It is very likely that the most powerful monopoly and other non-com-
petitive market structures effects in our country are detected in the rent
seeking area, that is in the allocation of resources to those activities which
create administrative/legal monopolies, that is administrative barriers,
weather barriers to entry or barriers to exit of new competitors. This con-
clusion  is supported by the extensive state interventions that continued
until the end of the year 2000, in which government (first of all executive
authority) by its discretionary decisions gave some companies a privileged
position. These firms are prepared to invest real resources in order to
achieve such a privileged position, that is, to make sure that it will be them
that are treated as privileged by the government. The way in which busi-
nesses were handled until recently in Serbia, the extent and character of
the network which was necessary for successful business results and the
degree of state intervention point to the fact that  the waste of recourses
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due to rent seeking was most likely the most significant negative effect of
non-competitive market structures in Serbia/FR of Yugoslavia. That was
distinctively perceivable in relation to the character and extensiveness of
administrative barriers to import in order to preserve domestic non-com-
petitive market structures and the immense monopoly profit which was
open to the chosen few, those who were ready to share only with those
who, by the adoption of a specific policy made such profits possible.
Non-competitive market structures were very often artificially estab-
lished in industries dominated by inefficient socially owned companies
that recorded huge financial losses. In that way those companies were kept
alive artificially, and workers still had protected jobs accompanied with
minimal, but more or less regular wages. The privatisation of companies
which has begun creates the possibility for the inherited market structure
to recur in combination with new, private owners of similar companies,
which increases the probability of monopoly behaviour. 
6. CONCLUSION
Analysis has demonstrated that domestic market  structures are very
non-competitive, when analysed from the aspect of supply concentration,
and barriers to entry and exit. Unfortunately, such a result was to be
expected. There are a few basic reasons for the result. The first reason for
non-competitive domestic market structures lies in the modest size of the
domestic market  it is less than ten million people with relatively low pur-
chasing power. In those conditions it is inevitable that taking into account
of only domestic supply leads to high concentration supply. In reference
to this, it is necessary to introduce international trade, particularly
imports into the analysis, that is examine imports as a source of competi-
tion on the domestic market. In the following chapter the effects of the
introduction of new relevant variables in the empirical analysis will be
examined.
The next element of non-competitive market structures is the legacy of
the socialist economy. Although many authors have defined the socialist
system in the former Yugoslavia as market socialism (which, by the way, is
a contradiction in terms), it is obvious that it was a market only up to a
point, in which the product market was not sufficiently developed and
which was dominated by non-competitive market structures. The fact that
they were less non-competitive in relation to the markets in some coun-
tries of so-called real socialism (completely planned economies) is not
very comforting. The big companies, conglomerates and the similar firms,
achieved huge market power under conditions of market socialism. The
market power of a large number of firms in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia
increased with the fall of the former Yugoslavia, and with the introduction
of the sanctions of the international community, followed by a drastic
reduction in international trade.
The retention of collective ownership of company capital (socially and
state owned) and insufficient bankruptcy preceding have enabled ineffi-
cient companies to continue trading, rather than exiting the industry,
while the shortage of private capital reduces the possibility of entry for
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new companies, particularly in some industries. This is another of the fea-
tures of the current non-competitive market structures.
The efficiency of the new competition policy will be measured precisely
by its ability to produce changes in the factors that lead to the existing
non-competitive market structures.
76 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
III Market Structures and Foreign Trade
1. INTRODUCTION
In a small open economy the concept of the domestic market can be
seriously misleading in characterising the market structures. The key
question here is how to define a relevant market, that includes all relevant
competitors to domestic supply. From the standpoint of an individual
domestic producer it is irrelevant whether competition comes from
abroad or not; any competition forces him to improve his efficiency. It is
therefore necessary to extend the market structure analysis by including
foreign trade flows, i.e. to analyse the effects of imports on competitive-
ness of domestic market structures.
Extending the analysis to include imports is not only of analytical sig-
nificance (which enables us to reach a balanced analysis of domestic mar-
ket structures) but it is also of great importance for creating an appropri-
ate competition policy for a small open economy in transition. Modern
competition policy stresses the removal of import barriers and barriers to
new entries. It is considered that these simple and easy-to-implement
policies have far greater chances of success as opposed to complicated
competition policies and institutions, the eventual benefits of which can
be determined only in the long term. However, this general statement,
which cannot be rejected at this level of analysis, should be considered
according to the extent by which imports significantly increase competi-
tion in the domestic market. In other words, removing barriers to
imports is not necessarily an appropriate policy; as it is not certain as to
what extent the character of market structures will change after its imple-
mentation. Furthermore, this influence significantly varies from one
product to another and from one market to another. Hence the accurate
determination of the effects of imports on market structures appears to
be of key importance, not only on analytical grounds but also on practical
grounds, which are aimed at formulating an appropriate competition
policy and import liberalization policy as its inclusive element. This
would help to dispel illusions that import liberalization can act as a
panacea against all non-competitive market structures in a small open
economy. 
2. BARRIERS TO IMPORT
Import barriers were always present in the foreign trade policy of the FR
of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia). Those barriers comprised various instruments,
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such as high tariff rates, licences, quotas, contingents, the obligation for
trading companies to report and pay a tax over import/export transac-
tions, etc. However, these measures did not work, partly on account of
corruption in various inspection, public administration and customs serv-
ices, and partly due to multiple exchange rates, with the official exchange
rate being continually heavily appreciated. 
The fundamental characteristics of the foreign trade policy of the FRY,
i.e. Serbia, during the 1990s were: 
1. An extensive use of import and export licences, contingents, import
value and quantity quotas. Licences were used for directly limiting
imports to an approved level, whereas import quota regimes ensured that
all imports above quota (or imports above an individual quota, which was
10% of general quota) accounted for a 2.5 times greater tariff rate than
certified. 
 A large and widening gap between the official and black-market
exchange rates. Tariffs,  and tariff bases, were calculated using the
official exchange rate, which heavily underestimated foreign curren-
cies. Thus an effective tariff rate was much lower than the nominal
rate.
 Relatively high and very varied nominal tariff rates. While the aver-
age nominal tariff rate ranged from 14% to 20% during the second
half of the 1990s, the average effective tariff rate repeatedly remained
below 5% due to an overestimated official Dinar value, which was
applied in calculations.
 Extremely restrictive requirements for the registration and operation
of foreign trade companies.
 Obligatory registration of each foreign trade transaction with the
National Bank of Yugoslavia, and later with the Federal Ministry.
 Obligatory 5% to 10% sale of foreign currency earnings to the
National Bank of Yugoslavia using the official exchange rate, which
resulted in substantial losses for companies, and therefore discour-
aged exports.1
By the autumn of 2001, all obligatory registration forms were aban-
doned and the official exchange rate was harmonized with its black market
value. New laws regulating foreign trade are based on following principles:
 Liberalisation of foreign trade activities aimed at strengthening com-
petition in the domestic market, which would also discourage
monopolies on the domestic market.
 Termination of import quotas and licensing (except for licences
required by international conventions) aimed at speeding up and
simplifying foreign trade transactions and reduction of non-tariff
barriers to imports.
 Tariff rates becoming the only instrument for protecting domestic
production. The customs tariff now consists of only 6 rates (1%, 5%,
10%, 15%, 20% and 30%) instead of the previous 36 rates. This
should also significantly simplify and shorten the entire customs
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1 The analysis shows that limiting exports can present a significant import barrier, espe-
cially if there is no other way to acquire export earnings.
procedure and reduce import expenditure. Tariff basis is calculated
using the official exchange rate.2
2.1. Tariff barriers to imports
Tariff rates are applied to all goods imported into Yugoslavia, i.e.
Serbia.3 An average tariff rate was considerably higher during 1990s, occa-
sionally reaching up to 20%. The average tariff rate was especially high for
consumer goods, agricultural and food products, and sometimes amount-
ed to 25%.
A maximum tariff rate (40%) was usually applied in the case of agricul-
tural products. It is clear that tariff barriers to imports, at least the nomi-
nal ones, were considerably high, especially when taking into account
nominal tariff rates and the Serbian industrial structure. However, tariff
protection was not that effective since the Dinar was heavily appreciated.
During the Q3 of 2000, when the official exchange rate was six Dinars to
one Deutsche Mark, the market exchange rate was 30 Dinars. Since the
tariff basis was calculated using the official exchange rate, effective cus-
toms protection was five times lower. Bearing in mind the substantial dis-
parity between the official and market exchange rates, the government at
the time, in the first half of the year 2000, introduced an exceptional tax
which was charged on imported goods (including imperishable consumer
goods) and which corrected the effective official exchange rate of the
Dinar to 20 Dinars for one German mark. 
Tariff rates ranged from 0% to 40% and were extremely disparate,
which significantly complicated non-transparent tariff and customs
accounting. The customs tariff dynamic within the FR of Yugoslavia is
detailed in the following Table.
It is evident that the most protected industries were, and still are: agri-
culture, food, weapons, textile, clothing, footwear and various ready-made
products, especially imperishable consumer goods, such as cars.
Equipment, chemical products and medicines were also highly protected.
A more detailed analysis reveals that the tariff rate structure has been
greatly altered. Specifically, the structure had been completely random,
other than that there were 36 diverse tariff rate protection levels, ranging
from 0% to 40%. The new system consists of only 6 tariff rates: 1%, 5%,
10%, 15%, 20% and 30%. For the first time an attempt has been made to
follow criteria, as detailed below. The first criterion is the products posi-
tion within the production process. Thus, an import lower in the process-
ing cycle attracts a lower tariff rate. As for repro-material and equipment,
tariff rates range from 1-15%, and rates for finished goods are set up to
30%. From the welfare aspect, there is a very high level of protection. The
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2 The following are the main laws that regulate foreign trade: The Foreign Trade Law,
The Customs Law, The Customs Tariff Law, and the Decision on tariff lines classifica-
tion for imports and exports.
3 The foreign trade policy is under the authority of the Federal administration.
However, the Republic of Montenegro has its own foreign trading policy as well as its
own customs administration. Accordingly, federal policy is implemented in the
Republic of Serbia only. Thus all data on imports and exports refers to the Republic of
Serbia. 
Average tariff rate
No. Segment of customs tariff Until Until Until Until Now
Aug.97 Mar.98 Sep.99 Jun01
1 Live animals,
products of animal origin 16.57 18.06 17.83 25.74 19.71
2 Plant products 14.74 15.64 15.56 24.07 15.82
3 Fats and oil of animal origin
and plant origin and products 15.77 11.83 10.91 4.00 8.65
of their dissemination
4 Food industry products; 
drinks. alcohol and vinegar; 
tobacco and replacing 21.08 21.59 18.62 8.24 22.85
tobacco products
5 Mineral products 11.35 6.30 6.01 5.89 2.99
6 Chemical industry products
and similar industries 13.33 8.49 7.61 7.27 3.43
7 Plastic and plastic products;
latex and latex rubber products 19.98 14.80 13.70 12.63 7.86
8 Raw bulk and scrap leather;
tended leather. fur 17.45 12.49 11.07 11.07 9.11
and fur products
9 Wood and wood products;
wooden coal; 15.41 11.33 11.14 11.08 5.67
cork and cork products;
10 Cellulose. paper and cardboard 18.70 15.27 13.91 13.60 8.56
11 Textile and textile products 24.05 20.42 20.14 18.72 14.63
12 Footwear; hats. caps and
other head-covers 26.42 25.31 23.25 23.25 19.55
13 Stone products. plaster. cement. 
concrete; ceramic products; 21.85 18.44 18.15 17.70 10.79
glass and glass products
14 Pearls; precious and 
semiprecious stone; precious 19.22 22.21 22.21 20.41 15.91
metals and precious 
metal products
15 Plain metals and plain
metal products 17.99 14.19 13.07 12.64 5.67
16 Machines. appliances and
equipment; electro technical
equipment 22.54 18.47 11.59 11.60 7.09
17 Vehicles. aircraft and supporting
transport equipment 21.67 18.57 11.78 12.16 6.15
18 Optical. photography.
cinematography. measuring.
controlling. precise. medical. 18.88 16.13 10.71 10.61 4.28
surgical equipment and 
apparatus
19 Weapons and munitions; 
their elements and kit 30.70 30.74 30.74 30.74 30.00
20 Various products 24.02 24.54 24.44 24.52 17.61
21 Art objects. collections and 
antique 14.42 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.00
Average rate 19.18 16.19 13.45 14.50 9.37
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Table 3.1.
Dynamics of the average tariff rate 
second criterion is the ability to produce the imported goods within the
FR of Yugoslavia. Hence, it is not important whether the product is pro-
duced in the FR of Yugoslavia or not, but whether it could be produced on
a competitive basis.
Within the tariff rate structure, the following import charges are imple-
mented:
 Raw material and components which are not produced in the coun-
try have a 1% tariff rate
 Raw material and components which are produced in the country in
sufficient amounts have a 5% tariff rate
 Reserve components which are not produced in the country have a
1% tariff rate
 Reserve components which are produced in the country in sufficient
amounts have a 5% tariff rate
 Equipment which is not produced in the country has a 1% tariff rate
 Equipment which is produced in the country in sufficient amounts
has a 10% tariff rate
 Ready made agricultural products and industrial products which are
produced in the country in sufficient amounts have a 20% tariff rate
 Consumer goods which could also be repro-material and which are
not produced in the country have a 10% tariff rate
 Foreign consumer goods which effect social standard have a 15% tar-
iff rate
 Consumer goods produced in the country have a 20% tariff rate
 Luxury consumer goods have a 30% tariff rate
 Products that had high production protection through the restrictive
import regime, by quantity constraints and licences, have the highest
tariff rate and attract up to a 30% tariff rate.
Analysis of the existing customs tariff reveals that the protection prac-
tice of major companies, such as Zastava, IMT, Sartid etc. has continued
to a great extent. Aside from the promised cessation of all quantity (non-
tariff) barriers, licences for some 20 iron products imported from Russia
were sojourned. The government claimed that imports from Russia could
not be reduced by tariffs (since there had been a free trade agreement
signed with them) and as a result the domestic market would be thor-
oughly destroyed (for example, the steel mill Sartid in Smederevo). Strong
political pressure was imposed, based on the fear that full liberalisation
would close down a large number of unprofitable domestic companies.
During the process of creating new customs tariffs, informal pressures
aimed at maintaining high tariff rates continued.4
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4 This outcome is logical when taking into account that some members of the
Parliament are both ministers and directors of important firms, thereby creating a
serious conflict of interest. For example, the Foreign Trade Chamber of the Federal
Parliament rejected the Government proposal on liberalization. On closer inspection,
it became apparent that almost all members of the Chamber were either directors or
were closely related to the management of large state companies (IMT, Zastava, Obod,
Stankom, FAP, etc.). This clearly illustrates the fact that Serbia still did not divide pol-
itics and business and that strong lobbies fought heavily for increasing their interests.
The dynamics of average tariff rates (non-weighted averages) are pre-
sented in the following table and picture (agricultural products comprise
subsectors 1-4, and the rest are industrial products).
Compared to 1997, the current average tariff rate (the second quarter of
2002) is twice as low. This reduction is very clear in the case of industrial
products, while the tariff rate for agricultural products has remained similar.
Aside from the basic tariff rates, there were, and still are, seasonal tariff
rates for some agricultural products. That rate of 20% is added to basic
tariff rate. It is significant that the rate is applicable only for certain periods
of the year (or season). Seasonal custom is applied when regular customs
protection affects the stability of domestic production.5
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5 Following the suggestion of the Federal Ministry, the Federal government can intro-
duce seasonal tariffs not higher than 20%, the duration of which must be limited. The
Government passes a decree. This procedure has been followed since 1992. Seasonal
tariffs are implemented on flowers, tomatoes, onions, garlic, cabbages, salad, cucum-
bers, bananas, oranges, grapes, grapefruit, melons, apples, pears, apricots, peaches,
plums and strawberries. This tariff is primarily used as means of increasing fiscal
returns, rather than for domestic market protection. Besides, it remains unclear how
additional tariff barriers improve the stability of the domestic market, as official doc-
uments frequently state. 
Table 3.2. Average tariff rates by product groups
1 2 3 4 5
Agriculture 17.2 17.9 16.9 25.2 18.6
Industry 19.7 16.0 13.5 13.0 8.1
Average19.2 16.2 13.5 14.5 9.4
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Graph 3.1. Average tariff rates by product groups
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There is a specific charge for agricultural and food product imports
(prelevman), which is also enforced by the Federal government and is also
aimed at the protection of the domestic market.  Unlike the tariff rate,
which is an ad valorem tax, prelvman is accounted for on the basis of the
quantity of goods, rather than their value.6 Taking into consideration
those extra taxes, it can be concluded that domestic agriculture is heavily
protected. In this way, accounted protection can amount to 60%, which is
very high.
Finally, there is a statistical fee of up to 0.5% (during the 1990s it was
1%) of the CIF value of imported goods. It is charged on all products,
whether any tariff rate is implemented on imports or not. 
Additionally, it should be noted that all domestic prices have to be
increased by an extra 20% sales tax, which considerably increases total costs.
The conclusion can be drawn that, although the first steps in the right
direction have been made, the state is still maintaining a foreign trade pol-
icy of protectionism. Businesses conducting foreign trade are deregulated
and quantity (non-tariff) barriers are discontinued but tariff rates remain
high, specifically for food and agricultural products. The high rate for car
imports also amounts to 20%, which deviates considerably from approved
methodology. This demonstrates that the Government, especially the
Federal Parliament, is not quite ready to give up its interventions and con-
tinues to use high tariff barriers in order to solve microeconomic prob-
lems, such as the non-competitiveness of domestic producers, their low
economic effectiveness, insufficient supply, high production and labour
costs, etc.7
2.2. Non-tariff barriers
An import licensing regime was extensively used until changes in the
Federal Foreign Trade Law (in the first half of 2001). This regime com-
prised 482 products of the SITC (Standard International Trade
Classification). These products made 4.5% of total product numbers, and
had considerable representation in imports.
Approximately a quarter, i.e. 100 products, were subject to licensing
due to international conventions  products, such as explosives and poi-
sons, which are on licensing regimes even in the countries with the most
liberal foreign trade policies. Two hundred and three products were iron
and steel products, and another 90 products were listed for the alleged
protection of domestic producers (e.g. trucks and tractors). Forty-seven
products of them were agricultural and food products. The remaining 40
products could not be grouped and were listed on the license for unknown
6 Following the Decree of the Federal government, importers are liable for a special
charge (prelevman) for the import of agricultural products and food (livestock, pigs
and chickens, animal fat, milk, yogurt, cheese and other milk products, eggs, honey,
most fruits and vegetables, wheat, sunflowers, fruit juices, and spices. On average,
prelevman is 10% of the product value. This measure existed both in former
Yugoslavia and in the FR of Yugoslavia since it was founded. 
7 In several cases the Federal Parliament introduced higher tariff rates than the
Government suggested. It is evident that strong lobbies use their connections to pro-
tect producers from international competition. 
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reasons, such as second-hand cloths, medical equipment, etc. They also
contained some products (chewing gums, bananas, chocolates etc.) whose
import was very profitable. 
The greatest problem with licensing was non-transparency in decision-
making. State administration employees (Federal Ministry for Economic
International Relations and the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce) were
granting licences and contingents after receiving application forms. Thus
licences were granted for particular products and for limited periods of
time. Aside from this, the Commission had the discretionary right to grant
or to refuse a licence requirement on the basis of subjective evaluations:
whether the import threatened general interests, domestic producers
interests or whether the current account balance was in an unsustainable
position. Due to such an extensive set of criteria, the commission was fre-
quently corrupt and extremely liable to diverse political pressures.
Table 3.3. Non-tariff barriers
Import regime
Licence
Quantity 
quota
Value
quota
Wheat, barley, corn, Flour, sugar, chewing gum, white
chocolate, chocolate and other cacao products, infant food,
ice cream, certain products of wrought iron, non-oxidant
iron products, iron leaguer products, steel products, steel
and iron products, radio-transmitters, radar, antennae,
wagons, tractors, vehicles for transport of passengers, heavy
weight transport vehicles, helicopters, parachutes
Live pigs, pork, milk products, leguminous vegetable, lemon,
oranges, grapefruit, tangerines, continental fruit, pepper,
Soya grain, different kinds of seed, hops, chicken fat,
non-refined Soya oil, sunflower oil, corn oil, margarine,
sausages, liver pate, candies, pastries, vegetable products,
fruit juices, yeast, sauces, beer, wine, brandy, raw tobacco, 
cement, dark coal, acetic acid, mineral fertiliser, outer tyres
(new and revitalised), leather cloths, cut wooden structure,
cellulose, paper and cardboard, paper bags, fireproof bricks, 
wire, forged and pressed iron elements, copper products
(rods, wire, pipes and profiles), TV appliances
Vegetable seeds, leather gloves, fur clothes, fake fur products,
woollen material, textile material, cotton material, carpets,
towelling material, textile material prepared for treatment,
textile linen, second hand cloths and carpets, footwear, raw
wool, ceramic tiles, table and kitchen porcelain, cutlery,
glass and glass products, cast iron products, different kinds
of tools, knives and steel cutlery, electrodes, stoves, different
kinds of pumps for fuel, air compressors, torches,
refrigerators and freezers, dish washing machines, irrigation
equipment, elevators, bulldozers, excavator, combines,
washing machines, dry cleaning machines, machines for
metal treatment, electro-motors, transformers, electric
battery chargers, spark plugs, vacuum cleaners, electric
boilers, light bulbs, measuring instruments, chandeliers,
glowing objects
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The largest number of licences which related to food products (chew-
ing gums, sugar-free chewing gums, sugar, bananas, chocolate etc.), as
well as products whose import could earn good profits, were reserved
for large importers, which were often had close connections to the gov-
ernment.
The quantity quota regime was applied to 307 products, and an extra
611 products were under a value quota regime. The table above clearly
indicates that most products listed in those 1400 tariff lines (licences and
quotas) are products not produced in Yugoslavia.
As previously mentioned, tariff and non-tariff protection was applied in
a very non-transparent manner, along with the arbitrary process of deci-
sion-making and with the excessive discretionary rights of people who
passed them on.
Listings related to goods which were protected by the highest tariff rate
(40%) and by permit or a quota are especially intriguing. There were 134
products protected by quota and custom of 40%. Agricultural and food
products, such as live pigs, pork meat, margarine, cheese, fruits, vegeta-
bles, delicatessen products, candies, pastries, fruit juices, beer, wine and
brandies, were predominant. While there is a certain logic regarding the
quota products (conforming to the predominant foreign trade policy of
the high protection of food and agricultural products), the products listed
on the licence regime clearly demonstrate that they were part of a policy
confining anyone who was not directly associated with the government in
conducting these profitable businesses.8
In any case, although there is no material evidence of corruption, or at
least, they are not obtainable by the public, profits were was so high that all
subjects involved in this process, starting with importers and ending with
the Commission which granted import licences, had clear motives for cor-
ruption. In addition, the import lobby pressured legislators to expand
non-custom protection considering that those measures, by limiting
import supply, generate greater income.
Non-custom barriers, namely quantity restriction, acted as very power-
ful barriers to import. Foreign trade reforms in the first half of 2001 had
put an end to them, except for goods on international protection list and
the specific case of the ferrous metal industry.9
The long-standing practice of non-custom barriers to imports in
Serbia, i.e. the FR of Yugoslavia, deserves a comment on governmental
motivation to implement those barriers. Firstly, most administrative
barriers to imports were established only after the imposition of trade
embargoes on the FR of Yugoslavia. Instead of liberalising foreign
trade in order to maximise it, additional barriers to importation were
introduced. Secondly, non-custom barriers to imports were applied
8 That list contained products such as sugar-free chewing gums, sweet chewing gums,
white and dark chocolate, flour, oil, used tyres and used trucks, the imports of which
have always been very profitable. 
9 In spite of the fact that Yugoslavia has a free-trade arrangement with Russia, there was
a legal possibility to levy tariffs on iron imports from Russia. Still, the Russians were
not willing to accept such changes to the FTA. It is very likely that non-tariff barriers
would not have been introduced if the Russians agreed to change the FTA.
simultaneously with the overestimated official exchange rate of the
dinar, which considerably reduced the effectiveness of customs protec-
tion, as well as reducing tariff revenues. This practically excluded
motives for the protection of domestic producers and only had motives
for increasing fiscal income. There were no motives to protect domes-
tic producers, which can be seen from the product listing which
referred to non-custom barriers  the point being, they were mainly in
regard to products which were not produced domestically, or were
produced in insufficient amounts. Thus the fact remains that non-cus-
tom barriers mainly referred to products with highly profitable
imports, leading to the conclusion that it is was a question of highly
profitable import businesses, which were designated for the chosen
few. Motives for the introduction of such barriers to import should be
explored pertaining to rent-seeking mechanisms.
2.3. The Accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
At the beginning of 2001, the FR of Yugoslavia submitted an application
to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In response, in February
2001, the WTO General Assembly formed a working group to assess the
application. During this process, Yugoslavia would have the status of a
bystander. The former SFRY was among the first GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) signatories in 1947 and had remained a
member until 1993 when the GATT General Assembly decided that the FR
of Yugoslavia could not automatically inherit then membership assigned
by the SFRY. Considering that the SR of Yugoslavia was not a participant
at the Uruguay round of negotiations, it could not become one of the
WTO founders.
After the political changes in the country that took place in 2001, polit-
ical tactics for the beginning of the process of joining the WTO were con-
ceived. The Federal Government sees these negotiations as a vital con-
stituent of the reintegration process into international institutions. Also,
in the process of globalisation, its participation in world industry and
trade is essential and the WTO is its most significant representative. Aside
from this, the accession process is an excellent incentive for all govern-
ments to carry out necessary reforms in line with and according to timings
required by WTO terms.
The process of joining the WTO is very complex. It necessitates very
detailed and transparent laws referring to product trading, services, copy-
right protection, investment protection, etc. Apart from the fact that
Yugoslavia will have to comply to these rules and that it will have to co-
ordinate its legislature regarding foreign trade fields, the process of joining
requires negotiations with all interested members of the WTO regarding
its tariff rates. This refers to factual tariff rates, but it also means that tariff
rates cannot be raised above set levels. Matters of subventions and trade in
services also have to be successfully negotiated. 
It should be emphasised that all WTO members enjoy a reduction in
tariff rates which is agreed during any bilateral negotiations. This means
that a considerable decrease in customs barriers to import should be
expected, along with a ban on any new non-tariff barrier. Aside from this,
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this would considerably improve the position of the FR of Yugoslavia
exporters in the world market.10
2.4. Free trade zones agreements
At present (second quarter 2002), Yugoslavia has ratified agreements
on foreign trade with Macedonia and Russia. The agreement with
Macedonia was signed in September 1996. Both sides agreed to complete-
ly remove all tariffs, as well as prelevmans and seasonal customs.
Moreover, they are obliged not to introduce new quantity limitations on
imports and exports. There is an obligation not to introduce subventions
that do not comply with WTO standards.
Principally, the free trade policy is applicable to all products, except for
some that are not listed. There are four lists; two on imports and exports
from FR Yugoslavia and two more for Macedonia. According to the lists
for the year 2000, 97.5% of tariff numbers are on a free trade regime for
Yugoslav imports. Also, approximately 98.8% of tariff lines is on a free
trade regime for Macedonian imports to FR Yugoslavia. This percentage is
lower if, instead of tariff line numbers, import range is used.
Approximately 90% of import and export was on a free trade regime.
Products that are listed are in fact on quantity quotas. This means that
when the quota is achieved, standard tariff rates are applied. Quota
extents, as well as products that are listed, are negotiated annually.
This FTA is not particularly significant, especially since the UN embar-
go was lifted which lead to a significant rise in market competitiveness in
Serbia and changes in market structure. Generally speaking, the scope of
foreign trade with Macedonia is relatively small. Yugoslavia makes a trade
surplus and Macedonian supply is insufficient to affect overall supply in
the domestic market, although some agricultural products could be possi-
ble exceptions. Also, the Macedonian market (current and potential) has a
very limited import potential.11 However, the application of this agree-
ment is liable to the influences of daily politics. Macedonia has recently
one-sidedly removed numerous Serbian products from its free trade
regime as a response to the refusal of the Serbian Government to issue
licences for the transit across Serbian territory of petroleum and petrole-
um derivatives for delivery to Macedonia.
The second free trade agreement was signed with the Russian
Federation. This agreement refers to all products, except for some listed
separately. There are 499 products listed, which cannot be imported to
Russia without tariff, and 195 products that are similar to the Yugoslav
list. This means that 94% of tariff lines apply a free trade regime when the
goods are imported to Russia, while the equivalent percentage with the SR
10 Political problems concerning the present organisation of the state might seriously
slow down the path of accession. There are three different customs regimes in the FR
of Yugoslavia, since Kosovo and Montenegro use their own, rather than the Federal
foreign trade legislation. 
11 According to the data for 2000, foreign trade with Macedonia amounted to $330 mil-
lion, of which Yugoslav exports made $200 million, and exports from Macedonia
amounted to $130 million. 
of Yugoslavia imports is 97.7%. However, these numbers are quite vari-
able when import weights are taken into account, as oppose to tariff lines.
According to the data from the first half of  2001, only 76% of Yugoslav
imports was on a free trade regime, while the corresponding figure for the
goods imported from Russia to Yugoslavia is approximately 98.2%.
However, it should be emphasised that 86% of Russian imports are natu-
ral gas and petroleum.
In response to the data about the listed number of products for which a
free trade regime is not applicable, it could be said that this agreement is
relatively unfavourable for the FR of Yugoslavia regarding the position of
Yugoslav exporters in the Russian market. This could be affirmed by
analysis of the listed products: the Russian list is dominated by products
which are the most important Yugoslav export articles, such as agricultur-
al and food products, wine, cigarettes, medicines, textile, furniture, etc.
On the whole, this agreement does not represent any special new privi-
lege for Yugoslav producers considering existing exporters from
Yugoslavia. However, the existing FTA presents a substantial encourage-
ment to foreign investors, who could start production in Yugoslavia and
access the Russian market on very favourable terms. 12
From the standpoint of increasing competitiveness through imports,
the agreement with Russia is insignificant, since the competitiveness of
Russian industry in finished products is rather poor. 
As for future free trade agreements, within the second round of the
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe there is an initiative for free trade
liberalisation within the region. Under this initiative, a protocol is signed
for the introduction of a free trade zone in Balkan countries: the FR of
Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria
and Macedonia. According to this protocol, by the end of the year 2002, it
is necessary for bilateral agreements to be signed that would clearly define
products that are to be excluded from this agreement. The protocol envis-
ages that at least 90% of trade value must be freed, and also no quantitative
restrictions will be allowed. For the time being, it seems that the products
that will be excepted will be mainly agricultural and some food products.
At present, there are assigned, but not yet ratified, Free Trade
Agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Hungary, which expressed
a wish to sign this Agreement although it is not among protocol-assigned
countries regarding the establishment of a free trade zone. Negotiations
are currently (second quarter of 2002) being conducted with Croatia,
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Negotiations are also being conducted
about the redefinition of the agreement with Macedonia. Slovenia and
Hungary agreed to grant privileges (asymmetrical treatment) to
Yugoslavia, by lifting tariffs from all Yugoslav imports, and that
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12 Rules of origin defined in the FTA must be met prior to granting free tariff export to
Russia. The export goods either have to be completely produced in one of the signato-
ry countries, or have to be processed within a country a sufficient amount. The suffi-
ciency condition is met if less than 50% of the product value is imported from a third
country. Similar (but far more detailed) conditions are listed in the FTA signed with
Macedonia. Annex 2 of this agreement lists minimal processing requirements for 483
tariff lines which have to be met for defining a domestic product. These are the most
detailed rules of origin in Yugoslavia nowadays.
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Yugoslavia can for the time being apply half of the valid tariff rates to its
products. Likewise, Yugoslavia applied an asymmetrical approach to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Negotiations with the remaining countries are
conducted respecting symmetrical tariff lifting.
These free trade agreements will have two advantages. Directly, they will
increase import competitiveness, since producers from these countries
will become more competitive in the  domestic market due to tariff lift-
ing. This advantage is slightly reduced by contracting asymmetrical agree-
ments with Slovenia and Hungary so that, after ratification of those agree-
ments, tariff barriers will still exist for some time. The second advantage
would act indirectly by increasing hard currency incomes within a coun-
try, thus enabling further increases in imports. From the viewpoint of
market structure competitiveness in the FR of Yugoslavia, a prospective
increase in imports has another significant effect: foreign investors are
interested in accommodating as large a market as possible, so that by con-
stituting a free trade zone, their interest to invest in Serbia, that is the FR of
Yugoslavia, increases. An increased number of agreements, that is an
increased number of countries with which a free trade regime is applica-
ble, increases the market where foreign investors, i.e. their companies, can
export their products without custom charge. Therefore the contracting
process of new agreements related to free trade zone reduces barriers to
entry for new (foreign) producers, which thereby increases the competi-
tiveness of the domestic market.
From the standpoint of foreign trade exchange, the European Union is
especially significant for Serbia/FR of Yugoslavia. That is why the decision
of European Union, made in March 2000, to allow one-way (asymmetri-
cal) facilities for the so-called West Balkan countries is very important, i.e.
that there will be no custom charges for the goods from this region, except
for an insignificant number of exceptions. Those trading advantages are
crucial for Serbia/FR of Yugoslavia, since the trade with European Union
countries encompasses almost 50% of total trade. Enforcement of this
decision, which allows an easy approach to the EU market for more then
95% of products, was postponed for a short period hence the disagree-
ment within Yugoslav framework, due to the problematic origin of goods
from Montenegro.
Altogether, foreign trade policy reforms, related to international insti-
tutions and bilateral agreements, could be highly assessed. However, it
seems that previous practice has continued: free trade agreements are
assigned under de facto political pressure. Formerly, the pressure was
internal, intended to provide illusion of the co-operation with the world
(such as the case of agreements with Russia). The pressure is now external,
the international community wishes to reconnect disconnected connec-
tions and introduce permanent, sustainable stability to the region via the
introduction of a Balkan free trade zone.
Such orientation has a few critical points. First, and crucially, is that suf-
ficient trade range simply does not exist among Balkan countries at pres-
ent. Although they are geographically very connected, these countries sim-
ply have no interest in trading amongst themselves. The countries in ques-
tion have similar industrial structures, similar inefficiencies and generally
similar problems. However, it is reasonable to assume that foreign
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investors would rather invest in industry and in infrastructure of a rela-
tively big market (approximately 60 million people) then in a few small
ones. If this happens, Serbia/FR Yugoslavia might become, as the geo-
graphical centre of the region, one of the attractive places to invest in, at
least in this part of the world. Certainly, in order to facilitate this, much
more work needs to be done aside from the simple signing of free trade
agreements with neighbours.
The biggest interest is to acquire benefits improving trade structures via
creating a free trade zone. The weakening of many domestic monopolies
would occur while competitiveness should increase considerably. This is
especially so because other countries have already achieved relatively high-
er standards since considerable numbers of foreign companies penetrated
the market in previous years. New foreign investments, i.e. new entries to
the domestic economy, inevitably reduce the concentration of supply, i.e.
to increase the degree of competitiveness of the market structure.
2.5. Protective measures and antidumping
Existing rules offer the basis for protective measures against disloyal
foreign competition. The following table offers possible measures and a
legal basis for their activation, as well as whether and when those measures
were practically applied.
No. Type of protective measure Legal basis Whether it is
applied
1 Increased tariff rate up to 70% for import from Paragraph 3. Not applied
the states where FR of Yugoslavia is not MFN Custom tariff law
2 Additional custom charges Paragraph 44. Not 
Paragraph regulated
3 Seasonal custom up to 20% Paragraph 45. Regulated
Paragraph and applied
4 Measures for disturbance and damage Paragraph 59. Not applied
elimination which is caused by considerable Foreign trade law
import increase of certain products or when 
import of a certain product is executed by 
means which could lead to disturbances of the
domestic market and which could cause 
considerable damage to domestic production
5 Antidumping Paragraph 60. Not applied 
Foreign trade law
6 Compensating tariff rate Paragraph 60. Not applied
Foreign trade law
7 Exceptional custom protection measures by  Paragraph 49. Not applied
which the standard tariff rate can be increased, Custom law
reduced or terminated
8 Exceptional charges (prelevman) for Paragraph 1. Applied
agricultural and food products import Exceptional import 
proizvoda charge for 
agricultural and 
food products law
Table 3.4.  Protective measures 
The table shows that from eight potential protective measures which
could be regulated in accordance with Yugoslav legal system, only two are
applicable and they are both connected to protection of agricultural and
food products.
As previously mentioned, the legal basis for the introduction of protec-
tive measures exists in cases when a particular product causes, or can
cause, damage to domestic production. However, these protective meas-
ures have not been applied so far, except in seasonal custom cases and
prelevmans.
During the ten years of existence of the FR of Yugoslavia, special pro-
tective measures were not applied even in cases when conditions were met,
due to the fact that, for a long period of time, the FR of Yugoslavia was
under economic sanctions.
Our foreign trade system envisages conditions and procedures for
antidumping measure application. However, regulated antidumping pro-
cedures have not been applied in the FR of Yugoslavia so far.
Decrees of paragraph 60 of the Foreign Trade Law is entirely related
to procedures relevant to antidumping. Regulated procedure is entire-
ly based on decrees related to Agreements of Applicability in para-
graph 6: General Conditions for Custom Charges and Trade pertain-
ing to the year 1994, which were ratified by FR of Yugoslavia in
December 1998.
It is assumed that dumping exists when a certain product is imported at
the price lower than its normal value and in thus causes or threatens to
cause serious damage to domestic production. Companies, enterprises or
legal officials can submit a proposal for the commencement of antidump-
ing procedures to the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce.
The Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce decides whether dumping existed
and whether it caused any damage. Following the examination of evi-
dence, the Chamber of Commerce has 30 days, starting from the day of
submission, to foreword the case, with its comments, to the Federal
Ministry for Economic International Relations. Still, the very introduction
of a Chamber of Commerce as an association of domestic producers to the
process, with interests to reduce the competitiveness of foreign producers,
can lead to biased decisions by which completely loyal and legal foreign
competition could be judged as dumping. Therefore, this can present hid-
den barriers to import. 
The Federal Ministry for International Economic Relations examines
proposals for commencement of antidumping procedures; executes the
procedures and implements measures in accordance with the Law on
Implementation, paragraph 6, GATT 1994. Decisions about commencing
and completing the procedures, as well as on executed measures, are
announced in an official FRY paper. No claims can be raised against this
decision but there is a possibility to bring the case before the Supreme
court.
If it is legally concluded that the import causes damage, or if there is a
danger to domestic production, the Federal Ministry for International
Economic Relations assigns an antidumping charge.
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2.6. Technical regulations, standards and procedures of certifying
compatibility
Standards and technical regulations are defined as rules established by
the Government and have to be accomplished so that a certain product
can be sold at a certain market. They are considered as technical barriers to
import, since they increase production and transport costs, which reduces
competitiveness of imported goods, so that the significance of imports as
source of competitiveness is reduced. Furthermore, extra costs arise since
working capital has to be increased.
Imports are subject to obligatory examination, aiming to establish
whether they meet trade conditions for the Yugoslav market.
Depending on the type of product, conditions are set, which have to be
met for trade in the Yugoslav market. Special conditions are set for fol-
lowing products:
 food products and products for common use
 technological products, semi-finished products, raw material and
waste made from endangered flora and fauna species
 animal products, raw material and waste of animal origin, seeds for
artificial insemination and fertilised animal ovaries 
 particular agricultural and food products
 plants, pesticides and fertilisers
 measuring instruments
 specific technical products
 motor vehicles
Conditions for entry into the Yugoslav market, fundamentally speak-
ing, are equal for importers and domestic producers. As a result, obligato-
ry attests, certificates and other documents that have to follow imports,
should not present barriers to foreign companies. This attitude should be
not be taken for granted, considering that indicated rules are bilaterally
executed, so that rigorous application of these regulations is unequal
amongst domestic and foreign producers.
For imports of a technical product, prior to customs, it is obligatory to
provide an attest. The attest confirms that the product meets technical
conditions for sale on the domestic market. The importer submits a claim
for attest issued to the Federal Bureau for Standardisation, which makes a
decision whether the product has to be attested. If it is not necessary, the
Bureau issues a certificate that is used in the custom process. If the prod-
uct has to be attested, the Bureau notifies the applicant which laboratory is
appropriate for testing. Following the testing, if the product meets regula-
tions for the Yugoslav market, attest is issued as a basis for custom proce-
dure  and the product enters the Yugoslav market.
For certain products for measuring: length, level surface, mass, pres-
sure, density, concentration, temperature, time and frequency, as well as
electromagnetic field measuring, it is necessary to provide a certificate
issued by Federal Bureau for Measures and Precious Metals, which con-
firms that the product satisfies conditions regulated by law, in order for
this product to be imported into the  FR of Yugoslavia. The certificate is
issued on the basis of a written request. If the product passes the proce-
dure, a certificate is issued and the product can be subjected to custom
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charges. Certificates can be obtained either from the previously men-
tioned Bureau or from an authorised laboratory.
For the importation of some products it is necessary to provide a state-
ment from the Federal Bureau for Standardisation showing that those
products comply with the rules of homologisation (homologisation state-
ment). This obligation exists for vehicles, equipment and components
which are to be build into vehicles and which can endanger traffic safety,
the environment or the conservation of energy. A homologisation state-
ment confirms that vehicles, equipment and components comply to har-
monised technical conditions. Importers or consignation retailers fore-
word homologisation enquiries for cars, equipment and components to
the Federal Bureau for Standardisation. The testing of vehicles, equipment
and components for homologisation can be entrusted to an authorised
laboratory by the Bureau. On the basis of the test results, that are regis-
tered in a report for that type of vehicle, component or equipment, a
homologisation decision is issued when the Federal Bureau assigns the
number of homologisation. The Federal Bureau for Standardisation
accepts international homologisation document for vehicles, equipment
and components according to rules which are in addition to the agree-
ment on issuing unique technical regulations for vehicles with wheels,
equipment and components that could be built into those vehicles and
about the mutual acceptance of homologisation standards in line with reg-
ulations signed in Geneva in 1995. Homologisation has to be approved
before the product is released for sale in the FR of Yugoslavia, i.e. before
import. Therefore the following could be concluded:
 from an economical and technical point of view, all inquires related
to technical regulations and standards are comprehensive and equal
for domestic and imported products
 imported products which comply with technical conditions could be
subject to customs duty collection without any specific difficulties.
Imports to the FR of Yugoslavia have to satisfy conditions which refer
to quality and which are regulated for sale in the Yugoslav market. These
are sanitary, veterinarian and phyto-sanitary conditions as well as condi-
tions related to environment protection. Special regulations concern the
quantity and quality control of agricultural and food products. Technical
products, measuring instruments and motor vehicles are regulated sepa-
rately. As for imports, quality control is obligatory for 53 groups of agri-
cultural and food products.
The laboratory testing of products encompasses the analysis, or super-
analysis, which determines whether the product complies with regulated
quality conditions that refer to chemical ingredients and the content of
certain products. Sampling is carried out by standard methods and equip-
ment for sampling of a specified product. The quality control of imports
defines whether the product complies with the designated quality for sale
in the Yugoslav market. The quality control of imported products without
quality regulation accounts for content quality, as well as the content of
the product, and compares them to similar products. Such quality control
is carried out at the border crossing shortly before collecting custom
duties. After completing the quality control process, a quality certificate is
issued which confirms that the product complies with quality conditions
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for sale in the Yugoslav market. A claim for issuing the certificate is sub-
mitted by the importer. Products for which quality control is inquired
cannot be imported into the FR of Yugoslavia without a certificate.
A claim for issuing the certificate includes the description of the type
and name of the product, the exporter, the country of origin and the
means of transportation: type and number, loading point, stop points,
product value, identification of the person which will pay reimbursement,
number of units, gross and net, mass and main data of product quality.
Supporting evidence along with a claim should confirm the claimed data.
For products that have no regulated quality, the importer has to addition-
ally submit a complete product specification.
An import certificate includes: the name of the person which granted
the certificate, the number of the certificate, the name and residence of the
importer, type and number of the transport means, the country of the ori-
gin, the name of foreign supplier, loading point, stop points, the type and
name of the product, goods units number, date and number of lab analy-
sis, gross and net mass of the product, a statement confirming that the
product complies with designated conditions, the date and place of certifi-
cate issue and the signature of an authorised person.
The time required for testing the technical characteristics of certain
products depends on the type of product and type of testing. If the test is
done with the aim to issue an RSO attest, testing lasts between two and
seven days, but in the case of protection attests, tests can last up to three
weeks. According to the rule, only one product unit is submitted for tech-
nical testing.13
A particular problem is that imports are often tested in authorised lab-
oratories owned by domestic producers that are their direct competitors.
In those conditions, it is in the interest of the domestic producers to at
least postpone, if they are not able to eliminate, attest issuing. Therefore an
absurd situation is created in which products of the companies with world
reputation, which already have all necessary attests in European Union,
are waiting for domestic attest issuing.
2.7. Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures
Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures are applied to human and animal
health as well as environment protection. These measures can consider-
ably limit trade and for this reason they are subject to many international
standards, conventions and recommendations.
Quality control and sanitary, phyto-sanitary and veterinary protection
measures, as well as the control of using of these measures in Yugoslavia
are in line with control measures in the European Union. Bearing this in
mind, it could be concluded that measures in this field, generally speaking,
do not present significant barriers to imports. However, the practice of
applying these measures is frequently rather biased, which eventually cre-
ates barriers to imports. 
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13 The costs of technical testing are not high. Testing for obtaining an RSO attest costs
$165, of which $15 is an administrative tax, and the rest are the costs of the laboratory
that does the testing. Protection attests cost $600.
Food products and consumer goods have to comply with certain condi-
tions that refer to health standards. Food products must be considered
edible or drinkable both in processed or raw form.
For imports of technology products, unfinished goods, raw materials,
waste, endangered species and genetic samples of wild flora and fauna,
biotechnology and genetically modified organisms inspection is per-
formed at the border crossing which refers to environment protection.
The federal inspector for environmental protection has the right to:
 prohibit the import of engendered flora and fauna species whose
trade is prohibited by international agreements and to order return
to the sender
 prohibit the import of genetically modified organisms which do not
meet international agreements and to order return to the sender
 prohibit the import of technology and biotechnology which can
endanger the environment
 prohibit the import of products, unfinished goods and raw materials
which can endanger the environment and to order return to the
sender
 prohibit the import and transit of waste if it is performed contrary to
assigned conditions and to order return to the sender
 order other measures for the elimination of risk from endangering
the environment in the border zone
Specified measures are introduced in the form of a written decision
which is final and against which no charges can be raised to the Supreme
Court. 
The import, export and transit of wild flora and fauna, genetic
resources, biotechnology and genetically modified organisms are autho-
rised by the relevant Federal Ministry.
The importation of animal products, raw materials and waste of animal
origin, seeds for artificial fertilisation, fertilised ovum for animal repro-
duction and other items which could transmit disease is restricted to a few
border crossings, designated by the of Federal Ministry for Agriculture.
Parcels of specified products are liable to obligatory veterinary-sanitary
examination by the federal veterinarian at the border at the customs vet-
erinary station. These parcels must be supported by state of health certifi-
cates, if international agreements do not require otherwise. The inspection
is performed during loading and reloading.
In import decisions, the federal ministry assigns veterinary-sanitary
conditions for imports of  animals, products, raw materials and waste of
animal origin, seeds for artificial fertilisation and other items that could
transmit disease. Import is prohibited for specified products if the export-
ing country or transit countries are contaminated with contagious disease,
or if there is a reasonable fear that contagious diseases could enter the
country. The federal ministry can decide to postpone inspection or order
quarantine for parcels containing products that could contain contagious
elements.
Plants could be imported only at border crossings which have stations
of the Federal Ministry of Inspection for Plant Protection.
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2.8. Other barriers to import
Aside from specified barriers, there are other less apparent, indirect bar-
riers to import to Yugoslavia.
The poor transportation infrastructure presents an important barrier to
imports. The basic infrastructure in Serbia is quite advanced, if nominal
capacity is taken into account. However, years of neglect, insufficient
investment and poor maintenance, as well as war damage (the result of
bombing in 1999), have lead to an inadequate and ineffective road and rail
network. The condition of the infrastructure, together with inefficient
transport companies, has led to a considerable increase in transportation
costs, thereby leading to more expensive imports.
Roads in Serbia are generally in a very poor condition. Although the
road network is relatively developed, with more than 400 km of highways,
inadequate maintenance has caused deterioration and as a result increased
the costs of vehicle maintenance. According to preliminary EIB estimates,
only 30% of roads are in good condition. Although the structure of trans-
port companies is relatively good (with strong competition and private
companies), new vehicles are missing. Presently, the majority of vehicles
are not allowed to travel to the EU countries.
The railways are in an even worse condition. The basic railway infra-
structure is outdated: train speeds are limited in many segments of the
network, which leads to poor competitiveness of the railways when com-
pared to roads. However, some products have to be transported by rail,
therefore high costs cannot be avoided. There is a state monopoly in rail-
ways. Railway companies are extremely ineffective and it cannot provide
a modern and fast service. Their capacity is considerably reduced
(according to some estimations, up to 80% of wagons are unusable).
The closest sea port for importers to Serbia is the Port of Bar. The port
itself is in a poor condition with no modern receiving and loading equip-
ment and an insufficient service supply. The main connection to Serbia is
the Belgrade  Bar railway, which is also in a bad condition. There is little
competition from road transportation in this section of the network due
to the high associated costs in that part of the country (a result of the cur-
rent bad condition of the road infrastructure between Belgrade-
Podgorica-Bar).
Danube ports are poorly equipped for goods loading so that the potential
of river traffic cannot be utilised, except in the fragmented case of cargo and
petroleum. Additionally, the Danube is not easily navigable due to the
remains of bridges that were destroyed during the bombing in 1999. At the
beginning of 2002, removal of these remains from the Danube commenced,
which will probably lead to reconstruction of destroyed bridges and the
replacement of pontoon bridges that present serious navigating obstacles.
Another barrier to foreign trade, and therefore to import as well, is the
very strict regime of visas for Serbian citizens, including businessmen, for
travelling to the EU and other countries where the most important
importers to Serbia are based. It is extremely difficult and expensive for
businessmen to obtain visas to visit fundamental trade partners.
One of the most important barriers to increasing imports is an insuffi-
cient export capacity of its industry. The low level of exports cannot gen-
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erate an abundant inflow of foreign currency and so lower import
demand. In the long run, a balance of payments deficit arises which fur-
ther pressures the country to introduce import barriers and thus reduce
imports in order to tackle the large foreign trade deficit. 
A fundamental barrier to Yugoslav exports is the poor competitiveness
of domestic industry, concerning the price, quality, marketing, and avail-
able credit arrangements. That problem existed before the introduction of
UN sanctions from 1992. Until 1992, a large proportion of exports went to
the Soviet Union as well as to the markets of the other CIS (being, at the
time, closed for Western goods), and also to non-aligned countries.
Nowadays, the situation is very different. During the sanctions the situa-
tion was dramatically worsened. 
The reason for this is insufficiency is a lack of new investment, in equip-
ment as well as in human capital. Aside from this, the existing equipment is
practically obsolete, reducing competitiveness to a very low level. Possible
export bases can be created in small and medium-sized companies which
specialise in certain areas and which acquired some experience during last
10 years. However, characteristically they are more directed toward the
domestic market (although some exceptions can be found). At present,
competitive sectors are agriculture, raw materials, textiles, and some servic-
es. Eventual further development of software production could make this
sector competitive, but that is not the case for the time being.
One of the main problems is a decline in relevant information flows.
First of all, there is no regular information exchange with the international
business community. The telecommunication network is underdeveloped,
which means that access to the Internet is considerably troublesome, espe-
cially with dial-up access in small towns and villages. It can be noted here
that the competence of domestic managers concerning modern manage-
ment methods, marketing, financial management, etc is very poor. This
makes the situation even more difficult. Therefore, preconditions for
progress in Serbia are, first of all, development of the communication
infrastructure, staff development and the training of new professions.
The structure of the current account balance of the FR of Y is quite spe-
cific. Namely, aside from import and export flows, important lines are
remittances, pension receipts, and incomes from the sale of ex-Yugoslav
Republic property. Also, due to the UN sanctions, interest payments, as
well as profit transfer, is practically insignificant.
According to official data, in the period 1995-99 a deficit of $5.5 million
was created, that is approximately 12% GDP. However, allegations that
this deficit is overestimated are just. There are a few reasons for this.
Primarily, large segment remittances were not recorded and thus the cur-
rent account deficit is also overestimated.
In conclusion, Yugoslavia is in a difficult position as far as the current
account balance is concerned. In the future, considering that a foreign
trade surplus cannot be relied on, the situation can hardly improve. If
there is no inflow in the process of privatisation or through direct foreign
investments, it seems as though Yugoslavia will continue its debt accu-
mulation. A positive aspect is the considerable inflow of foreign curren-
cies from Yugoslav citizens living abroad. It seems noteworthy that in a
year when imports are twice as large as exports (2001), with practically no
foreign investment, foreign currency reserves grew quite high. This is
happening primarily because the population has started to sell their
reserves to the banks, rather then to street dealers, and because of the
inflow from international community donations. In accordance with
this, non-competitive exports will most likely create a rise in the foreign
trade deficit, thus creating an important barrier to our imports.
2.9. Conclusion
A large move from high to moderate protectionism has been already
achieved. Reforms in the foreign trade policy have removed many barriers
to imports. However, analysis indicates that there are still considerable
barriers to imports. Some of them are not easy to remove, especially in the
short term. In other words, even in the longer term, particular barriers to
imports will remain. That should be taken into account when examining
the influence of imports on the market structure. 
3. IMPORTS AND THE MARKET STRUCTURES
3.1. Introduction with methodological remarks
In order to create a comprehensive analysis of a domestic market struc-
ture, Serbia was treated as a small open economy. Thus foreign trading
had to be included in the analysis. Considering the differences in nomen-
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Table 3.5.  Current balance of payment
Current Account, mil. USD
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Balance of Goods -2,070 -1,816 -1,619 -1,788 -2,834
Export 2,756 3,033 1,676 1,923 2,003
Import 4,826 4,849 3,295 3,711 4,837
Balance of Services 456 493 228 331 436
Export 818 914 471 624 759
Import 362 421 243 293 323
Net factor income 25 8 -41 41 -26
Inflows 59 57 43 53 48
Payments 34 49 84 12 74
Withdrawn currency 
from private 310 655 668 848 1,237
international accounts
Inflows 662 1,033 948 1,132 1,698
Payments 352 378 280 284 461
Current Account Balance, 
excluding Grants 1,279 -660 -764 -568 -1187 
clature used by the Federal Bureau for Statistics (whose data is used for
domestic production: supply analysis) and the Federal Customs
Administration (whose data is used for import and export analysis), the
direct integration of the data was not possible. An exceptional problem,
which turned out to be irresolvable, is that in certain number of cases dif-
ferent measuring units were applied, making comparison impossible (for
example, clothing production is reported in square meters, and foreign
trade flows are registered in tons).
Out of 1,882 products surveyed by the Federal Bureau for Statistics, 520
are clearly identified within the custom tariff, either in one or in several
tariff lines. One hundred and nine products were identified by name but,
for various reasons, there was no way to compare production and import
levels. In the case of 97 products, one tariff line corresponded to several
products from the nomenclature of the Federal Bureau for Statistics, mak-
ing it impossible to compare domestic and foreign trade flows. The
remaining 1,156 products could not be equally identified within the cus-
tom tariff. The reasons for such numerous unidentified products vary.
Firstly, certain products are non-tradables by nature (for instance, warm
water production). Secondly, there are differences in the classification
methods of the same products (for example, in one nomenclature, inter-
nal-combustion engines are classified in two groups, up to 50 kW and
above 50 kW, whereas in the second one up to 30 kW, between 30 and 70
kW and above 70 kW). Such technical problems eliminated large number
of products from further analysis.14
In the case of the 520 products, net imports are calculated by subtract-
ing exports from imports. The total domestic supply was then obtained by
adding net imports to the production. Out of this group only net import-
ing products were included, whereas net export products were excluded
from further analysis because of illogical results  obtained supply share
was above 1 (considering that total supply was lower than domestic pro-
duction). In the case of certain products, even total supply obtained in this
manner was negative (larger net exports than the production) which could
be explained through re-exporting, through stock sale from previous
years, as well as through poor evidence of domestic production. Fifteen
products, with no domestic production were excluded as well. In this
manner a list of 289 products with positive net imports was created and
further analysis was directed towards those products.
The final list of 289 products can be regarded as a sample for the analy-
sis of the total effects of introducing imports to the market structure
analysis.  As a sample, 289 is 15% the of the population, which makes it a
valid statistical base for significant estimation. The outlined  methodolo-
gy demonstrates that the sample was chosen, to a great extent, in an unbi-
ased manner. There are two elements of possible bias. One can be found in
the fact that the chosen goods are only the products with net imports.
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14 There is an obvious need for harmonization of the classification between the Federal
Bureau for Statistics and the Federal Customs Administration. Considering that the
Federal Custom Administration uses a revised international standard trade classifica-
tion, that classification should be the base for the adjustment. The proposed adjust-
ment would expand the opportunity for the broadening of not only this market struc-
ture analysis but many other analyses.
Nevertheless, considering that there should not be a significant connec-
tion between the fact that the particular industry is import or export ori-
entated and the fact that the market has a high or low concentration, it
may be concluded that this does not lead to biased results. The second ele-
ment regards the practical omission of clothing from the analysis, since
clothing production is reported in square meters and importation in tons.
This fact does not significantly distort the general conclusions but it
should be borne in mind.
3.2. The effects of net import on competition
The introduction of net imports dramatically changed the previously
obtained statistics on market structures. The average HH index dropped
by approximately 63%, which can be assessed as very significant.
However, this information can be very misleading. Generally, even with
the introduction of net imports, and with a considerable decline of the HH
index, obtained HH values remained extremely high in comparison with
international measures, especially American standards.
The main conclusion is that net imports greatly reduce supply concen-
tration. First of all, prior to the inclusion of net imports, the average HH
index was 7,025, which can be assessed as extremely high. After including
net imports, the average HH index was reduced to 2,248 (a reduction of
approximately 68%). This data demonstrates the effect of net imports on
market structures in a small open economy. Large economies (the USA or
EU, for example) would certainly not experience such an effect of net
imports on domestic flows. It should also be noted that the drastic reduc-
tion in the HH index occurred in spite of an extremely protective foreign
trade policy.15 Therefore, even in conditions of strong protectionism, net
imports considerably lower the supply concentration level. In other
words, dramatic change in domestic market structure occur. (see Chart
3.2. and Table 3.6.)
The product result classification, that is their market classification
according to the market structure character, before and after the inclusion
and exclusion of foreign trade are given in the following table, using the
HH index classification which was used in previous chapters.
HH indices are shown before and after the introduction of net imports
into the market structure analysis. 
The graphs reveal that the distribution is very asymmetrical. There is
approximately a third of products, i.e. markets which are above the aver-
age HH index, whose market structure competitiveness is under average.
Approximately two-thirds are under the HHI index average, which indi-
cates that the degree of competitiveness for those markets is above aver-
age. However, there are approximately 50 products (out of 289 analysed)
with an HH index above 5,000. These are very high values which indicate
extremely non-competitive market structures, which persist even after
introduction of foreign trade.
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15 Import and export production data relates to the year 2000, i.e. the period prior to the
induction of foreign trade deregulation and foreign trade regime liberalisation, based
on banning non-tariff barriers to imports and significant reduction of tariff rates. 
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Table 3.6. Basic statistics of the HH index including and excluding imports
Number of Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
observation Deviation
HH excluding
net imports 289 322 10000 7420.81 2986.34
HH including 
net imports 289 0 9980 2379.90 2730.77

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
                    
Chart 3.2. The average HH index excluding net import and including import
HH excluding HH including 
net imports net imports
8000
7000
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0
Table 3.7. Product summary by market character
HH Market Frequency Share Frequency Share
character excluding including 
import import
0-1000 Low
concentration 4 1.38% 139 48.10% 
1000-1800 Medium 
concentration 10 3.46% 20 6.92% 
1800-2600 High 
concentration 11 3.80% 28 9.69% 
2600 and more Extremely 
high  264 91.34% 102 35.29% 
concentration 
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Chart 3.3. HH index excluding net imports
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Chart 3.4. HH index including net imports
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Still, the average HH index continues to be high despite its reduction
following the inclusion of net imports. According to international stan-
dards (originally American) any industry with an HH index above 1,800 is
considered to be as an industry with substantially concentrated supply.
That means that the average Serbian HH index is situated deep in a zone
of highly concentrated supply.
Further detail in following table, shows that the high HH index remains
mostly in primary production. The table presents a classification of prod-
ucts into six basic categories: energy and fuel, raw materials, unfinished
goods, capital goods, consumer goods and consumers durables.
Before a detailed analysis, it is necessary to explain values defined as
concentration and protection. Supply concentration at product market
can have following values: 1 for HH index from 1,000, 2 for HH index
value ranging from 1,001 to 1,800, 3 for HH index value ranging from
1,801 to 2,600 and 4 for HH index value above 2,600. Protection accounts
for the tariff rate and import regime. It presents a tariff rate product and
number which signifies the import regime (1 for free import, 2 for quality
or quantity quota, and 3 for permit).16
Regarding protection, a reasonable average is obtained: protection is
lower for energy (fuels) than for raw materials, and then it increases
towards higher processing levels. Foreign trade policy in Serbia, that is the
FR of Yugoslavia, has always taken into account, more or less, the degree
of processing, so that tariff rates were usually lower for raw materials,
components and unfinished goods, than for equipment and consumer
goods. With respect to energy and fuels, they are not relevant for further
analysis, since the market structures in these businesses are crucially
16 Protection regards tariff rates and import regime that existed during the year 2000.
Table 3.8. Summary of the basic results of the HHI by product type 
Average for the type of product
Number Share Import HHI HHI Decrease Concen- Protec-
Product
of share excluding including of HH tration tion
type 
products import import
Raw 
materials 40 13.84% 39.75% 7798 3578 51.5% 2,830 8.69 
Unfinished
goods 62 21.45% 50.98% 7908 2711 62.6% 2,370 17.48
Capital 
goods 55 19.03% 54.90% 8072 2301 68.1% 2,420 17.57
Consumer 
goods 83 28.71% 43.70% 5718 1946 56.7% 2,280 30.03
Consumers 
durables 36 12.45% 69.17% 9169 1828 80.7% 1,750 25.02 
Energy
and fuels 13 4.49% 57.13% 7428 1746 68.9% 2,000 6.10 
Total 289 100.00% 50.62% 7025 2248 63.1% 2,248 19.92
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dependent on technology (and consequently on the cost function), as
much as they are dependent on domestic natural resources.
The product structure in the high supply concentration category (HHI
above 2,600) is especially interesting.
A very high share of unfinished goods and consumer goods is displayed,
and raw materials are slightly lagging. However, the average HH index
(after including net imports) in the case of raw materials and unfinished
goods is far above average HH index for consumer goods.
The following graph displays the dependence of protection levels and
the HH index value after including net imports.
Table 3.9.  Results for highly concentrated markets by product type
Type Num- Share HHI HHI  Decline  Protection Transport 
ber excluding HH costs
net import
Energy and fuel 2 2.0% 7,434 6,556 8.8% 7.50 4.00
Raw materials 22 21.6% 8,004 5,956 23.0% 8.23 4.14
Unfinished 
goods 25 24.5% 7,887 5,977 23.8% 23.28 2.64
Capital products 
dobra  20 19.6% 8,300 5,139 35.1% 18.72 2.45
Consumer 
nondurablesds 25 24.5% 6,666 4,438 28.5% 29.77 1.72
Consumer 
durables 8 7.8% 9,708 6,926 28.2% 32.03 1.75
Total/average 102 100.0% 7,828 5,517 27.0% 21.11 2.66 
Chart 3.5. Scatter diagram of protection and the HH index including net imports
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Protection
The correlation estimates between protection and market structure
character after including net imports indicate no statistically significant
relations between those two values. (Table 3.10)
It can be observed from the table that the Pearson coefficient of correla-
tion is also not statistically significant. Such a result was theoretically
expected since market structure character depends on a large number of
elements whereas imports, i.e. barriers to import, present only one of the
factors. Obviously the effect of some other factors, for example, initial
market character that has an HH index before import introduction, is far
more significant.
However, it is theoretically justified to expect a statistically significant
correlation between the HH index reduction after including net imports
and the degree of protection. Below is a graph displaying the interdepend-
ence between the HH index reduction after the inclusion of net imports
and protection.
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Table 3.10. Correlation between protection and HH index including import
HHI including Protection
import
HHI including 
import Pearson coefficient of correlation 1 0.046
Significance 0.451
Protection Pearson coefficient of correlation 0.046 1 
Significance 0.451 
Chart 3.6. Scatter diagram of protection and HH index reduction
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The table shows that the correlation coefficient of 0.193 between pro-
tection degree and HH index decline is statistically significant. The con-
clusion is that a lower protection level is associated with more competitive
market structures, i.e. the supply concentration degree is lower. This was
theoretically expected and is henceforth an empirically (statistically) con-
firmed conclusion.
The following chart displays the HH index classification according to
product type: 1 raw material; 2 semi-product; 3 capital goods; 4 con-
sumers non-durables; 5 durables; 6 energy and fuel. The upper and lower
horizontal lines display the maximum and minimum values within a
group. The grey triangle displays the inter-quartile difference: the 25%
observation ranges which are situated above and below the median line
(which is presented by black line within the grey triangle). The medial line
is one of the central tendency measures, which displays a value in the cen-
tre of the sample.
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Table 3.11. Correlation between protection and HH index decline 
HHI Protection
reduction
HHI reduction Pearson coefficient of correlation 1 -0.193 
Significance 0.001
Zatita Pearson coefficient of correlation -0.193 1
Significance t 0.001 
Chart 3.7. HH index including net imports by product type
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The chart indicates that the average HH index is significantly higher for
raw materials than for consumer non-durables and durables. Equipment
and unfinished goods are situated in the middle, but the HH index in the
product instance is higher than average. The results are supported in sev-
eral ways. Generally, the import procedure of raw materials is far more
complex then for imports of consumer goods. First of all, the market for
raw materials is very specific in terms of big orders, usually done by com-
panies with large working capital or which have been dealing with the
same suppler for a long period of time. Secondly, transport costs often
present very significant costs due to the low product unit value. Thirdly,
dealing with large foreign trade businesses was very complex because
Yugoslavia did not participate in the international payment system so that
domestic companies had to buy raw materials in the domestic market at a
higher price. Fourthly, the insurance of foreign trade businesses was not
possible, and foreign companies did not want to credit domestic produc-
ers either. Fifth, considering the size of the Yugoslav market, there are only
a few domestic producers of equipment and repro-materials so it is not
reasonable to expect more than one producer of tractors, cars etc. in
Yugoslavia. Sixth, repro-material and equipment import is often limited
by political pressures; a preference for domestic components to contribute
as much as possible to the final product, aiming to employ domestic
capacities, even to the extent that a domestic component was purchased
even if it was more expensive and it caused a reduction in quality. 
Final consumers, however, respond in a exceedingly rational way; with-
out political motives and definitely without taking national interest into
account. Smaller foreign trade businesses are also possible, so that often is
it is not necessary to make large orders for it. Generally, the imports of
consumer goods could be the speciality of small companies: import costs
are low, and dealing with these businesses does not require expertise in
sophisticated financial operations. The fact that the HH index after
including net imports is most likely overestimated in the case of consumer
goods, since large amounts of goods entered the country illegally, i.e. the
import is not reported and so the Yugoslav market supply is probably
underestimated. Consequently, the degree of competition in market struc-
tures is overestimated as well. This possibly accounts for the energy and
fuels that are intended for retail trade. Conversely, it can be supposed that
imports are not underestimated in the case of raw materials, equipment
and unfinished goods, since companies do not have a clear motivation for
it and, at the same time, illegal imports of these goods are extremely diffi-
cult to perform, even if motives for it existed.
The general finding of the significant correlation between changes in
competitive market structure (the HHI index reduction after including
net imports) and the degree of protection was tested on the product level,
that is, on relevant product markets. The results of this analysis are dis-
played in following table.
Bold font in the table signifies coefficients which are statistically signifi-
cant at 0.05 level.
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It has been demonstrated that there is a statistically significant correla-
tion with predictable theoretical findings in the cases of unfinished goods,
consumer goods and permanent consumer goods. However, statistically
significant correlation regarding energy and fuel, raw materials and capi-
tal goods were not found. One of the reasons for such a result could be
transport costs. This is why the effect of transport costs on market struc-
ture has been tested, i.e. the effects on this market structure after includ-
ing net imports into the  analysis. Following these requirements, prod-
ucts were classified into 5 groups according to the share of transport costs
in total costs. The first group encompasses products with low transport
costs, and the higher group numbers signify higher transport costs as a
share in total costs.17
The following graph displays the HH index classification by transport
costs of imports. The graph indicates that with an increase in the share of
transport costs, supply concentration increases, and so too does the HH
index.
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17 Classification it is performed on the basis of expert estimation.
Chart 3.8. Distribution of the HH index including net imports by product category
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Correlation Energy Raw Unfinished Capital Consumer  Durable  
and fules materials products goods goods consumer 
goods
HHI reduction  -0.027 -0.13 -0.314 -0.161 -0.245 -0.359 
and protection
Table 3.12. Correlation of protection and the HH index decline by product type
Testing of the correlation between the reduction in supply concentra-
tion and share of transport costs, indicates the presence of a statistically
significant correlation between those two variables which is in accordance
with theoretical findings: the higher the share of transport costs, the lower
is the reduction of supply concentration after including net imports into
analysis. 
The next analysis is an investigation of the mutual effect of factors
which were so far defined as significant: transport costs, initial market
structure (prior to including foreign trade), and protection (protection
degree) on market structure character alteration. Regression analysis with
an independent variable, the HH index after including net imports,
revealed the following results: R2 (determination coefficient) equals 0.48,
which can be assessed as acceptable. Also, all parameters, as the ones with
variable protection, are statistically significant and in line with theoretical
findings. This can be explained simply: the introduction of transport
expenses, which greatly reflect the product type, as well as the introduc-
tion of previous market structures (excluding imports), has removed
many obstacles, which were obstructing protection correlation and the
HH index.
The following regression model has been assessed:
Y= B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3,
Where X1 stands for the variable HHI excluding import, X2 is the vari-
able protection, X3 is the variable transport costs, and Y stands for the
dependent variable HHI including imports. The  results are below
(Table 3.15):
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Table 3.13.  Display of basic results according to product type
Average for product type 
Product Product HHI HHI Reduction Protection
category number excluding including HH
net imports net imports
1 71 6,993 1,837 68.0% 24.06 
2 97 7,304 2,243 65.0% 25.09 
3 90 8,006 2,631 63.0% 15.33 
4 17 7,467 2,821 56.0% 15.56 
5 14 6,578 3,935 31.0% 5.98 
Table 3.14.  Correlation between transport costs and HH index decline after the
inclusion of net imports 
HHI reduction Protection
HHI reduction  Pearson correlation coefficient 1 -0.174 
Significance 0.004
Transport costs Pearson correlation coefficient 0.174 1
Significance 0.004
Thereby, the following model is obtained, with a determination coeffi-
cient of 0.48 along with all statistically significant parameters:
Y= (0.149)X1 + (16.419)X2 + (438.670)X3,
Therefore protection increase, using this studys definition, for 1, leads
to an HHI increase of 16, and a shift from category 1 to category 2 leads to
an HHI increase of 438. However, it is not possible to see which influence
is more significant on the basis of parameter price value, considering that
those two variables are characterised by two different value grades. The
standardised coefficient (Beta) reveals which influence is more significant.
It can be seen that the influence of previous market structure is the high-
est, followed by influence of transport costs (which contain information
about the product type), and protection influence is the lowest, but it is
still statistically significant.
Below are the regression results of independent variable HH index
decline for the equal regressors. Once again, the following regression
model has been used:
Y= B0+B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3,
Where B0 stands for the constant, X1 stands for the variable HHI
excluding net imports, X2 is the variable protection, X3 is the variable
transport costs, and Y is the variable HHI reduction. The results
obtained are displayed in Table 3.16:
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Table 3.16 Regression results
Non-standardised Standardised
coefficients coefficients-beta t-value Significance
Regressors B Stand. 
error
Constant 60.798 8.046 7.557 0 
HHI Excluding
import 0.004 0.001 0.309 5.563 0 
Protection -0.330 0.111 -0.171 -2.985 0.003
Transportation 
costs -8.132 1.893 -0.238 -4.295 0
Table 3.15.  Regression results
Non-standardised Standardised
Coefficient coefficient t-value Significance
Regressors B Stand.
- beta
error
HHI excluding 
import 0.149 0.040 0.326 3.744 0
Protection 16.419 7.327 0.127 2.241 0.026
Transport costs 438.670 125.975 0.301 3.482 0.001 
The following model is obtained:
Y = (60.798) + (0.004)X1 - (0.33)X2 - (8.132)X3,
Although estimates of those parameters are statistically significant, R2,
i.e. the determination coefficient, equals only 0.181, which can be regard-
ed as relatively low.
The most powerful influence is domestic market structure (HH index
excluding import), so that the largest reduction in supply concentration is
observed in cases with a high initial supply concentration (that is with a
high concentration of domestic supply) which is almost a trivial result.
However, the high statistical significance of transport costs is very note-
worthy, whereas the statistical significance of protection is slightly lower.
Such findings clearly indicate that, in the cases of products with high
shares of transport costs, the reduction of custom and non-custom pro-
tection (the reduction of barriers to imports) do not lead to a reduction in
supply concentration, i.e. to increased levels of competitive market struc-
tures.
In conclusion, an analysis of market structures in relation to industries
was conducted.
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Code Industry Product HHI  HHI HHI  Protec- Signifi-  
of in- number excluding including reduction tion cance of
dustry import import transport
costs
102 Coal production 3 3,984 3,017 26.95% 7.56 5.00
104 Raw petroleum 1 2,827 1,639 42.04% 1 3.00
105 Petroleum 
treatment 10 8,884 1,729 79.77% 6.37 3.10
107 Production of 
iron products 3 9,035 4,441 49.76% 43.20 3.67
108 Iron ore 1 10,000 1 99.99% 0 5.00
109 Zinc 1 10,000 9,207 7.93% 15 4.00
110 Production of 
aluminium products 3 9,228 5,896 36.74% 10.00 3.00
111 Minerals  9 7,953 3,120 50.03% 5.89 4.44 
112 Glass production,
ceramics 15 8,668 4,249 47.15% 24.48 2.53
113 Metal products 32 7,645 2,772 59.34% 19.16 2.56
114 Production of
machines and 27 8,415 1,564 78.75% 14.81 2.30
equipment
115 Car production 8 7,643 2,779 67.98% 26.24 2.00
117 Production of 
electrical appliances 39 8,391 1,676 78.10% 22.93 1.62
118 Basic products of
chemical industry 33 8,155 3,399 58.12% 9.99 2.94
Table 3.17  Basic results in relation to industries
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Chart 3.9. Display of HH index including net imports by industries 
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Code Industry Product HHI  HHI HHI  Protec- Signifi-  
of in- number excluding including reduction tion cance of
dustry import import transport
costs
119 Final products of 
chemical industry 35 6,587 1,184 76.75% 16.05 1.26
120 Raw gypsum 1 10,000 9,909 0.91% 8 5.00
121 Lime production,
cement 6 4,845 2,045 42.67% 17.81 4.17
122 Wood 1 2,850 2,826 0.84% 8 5.00
123 Cork 1 10,000 261 97.39% 5.2 4.00
124 Production of paper
products cardboard 8 7,712 3,819 43.08% 25.42 2.75
and cellulose
125 Yarn 5 7,912 1,113 73.62% 5.73 2.80
126 Textile products
(excluding cloths) 5 9,008 3,497 56.33% 17.97 1.00
129 Production of 
rubber products 8 8,052 1,407 79.99% 29.69 2.38
130 Food industry 26 4,310 2,226 37.34% 48.18 1.69
131 Drink production 5 3,538 699 83.43% 35.20 1.40
132 Production of food
for animals 2 5,316 1,242 76.07% 21.50 1.00
134 Remaining products 1 1,685 1,627 3.41% 20 1.00
The classification of industries in relation to the HH index, the basic
characteristics of a competitive market, is displayed in the following table.
The following conclusions arise from the previous tables:
 the highest HH index values remained in aluminium, steel, ceramics,
glass, paper and basic chemical industry
 the lowest HH index values are recorded in beverages, fibres, chemi-
cal processing machines (cosmetics, detergents, etc.) and electrical
machines 
 the greatest decline in the HH index was found in beverages, gum, oil
processing, machines, electrical machines and chemical processing
 the smallest decline in the HH index was found in coal, aluminium,
cement and food.
Such results can be explained to a great extent by factors which have
already been analysed. There is no singular answer to the question as to
why market structure remains so highly concentrated. As for raw materials
and unfinished goods, the main reasons are restrictive import regimes,
high transport costs, political reasons, strong lobbies, as well as the
insignificant scope of the market. As for food, the main reasons can be
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Table 3.18.  Average HH index by sectors
Average HH index by sectors
0-1000 1001-1800 1801-2600 Above 2600 
Iron ore extraction Production of oil Production of Coal production
and gas construction 
materials
Production of final Production of Production of Iron and steel
finished wood fuel derivatives food products
products
Drink production  Machine Production of 
engineering non-ferrous metals
Production of Processing of
machines and non-ferrous
electrical appliances extraction
Processing of Production of
chemical products non-metal minerals 
Production of Processing of
textile yarn non-metal minerals 
and textiles
Latex processing Metal processing
activity
Production of Vehicles production
cattle food
Graphic industry Production of basic
chemical products 
Production of stone,
gravel and sand
Production of cut 
construction material
and panels 
Paper production
and processing
Production of
ready made textiles
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found in truly high protection, both tariff and non-tariff, and in a relative-
ly complex procedure of meeting all the demands relating to sanitary and
phyto-sanitary requirements (specific barriers to import). In the case of
clothing and footwear, there is high protection as well but, everything con-
sidered, the real supply concentration is, in fact, lower than the displayed
one, as a consequence of unrecorded (illegal) imports. In the case of
machine production, appliances and other equipment, the HH index
reaches approximately 1,600, which is remarkably high.
4. IMPORT AS A SOURCE OF COMPETITION
The results of the empirical analysis have confirmed theoretical expec-
tations. In small markets (such as either Serbia or the FR of Yugoslavia),
import present, generally speaking, a very significant, if not a decisive,
source of competition. It has been demonstrated that the introduction of
net imports considerably reduced the supply concentration. Still, not even
the introduction of net imports into supply analysis leads to the identifica-
tion of a competitive market structure. However, this approach appears to
be crucial in identifying the significant differences which occur amongst
some markets, both individual products and groups of products. While
imports raised competitiveness in consumer goods and the durables mar-
kets, market structures for raw materials and repro-materials remained
non-competitive to a great extent.
It is very unlikely that import liberalisation, that is removal of remain-
ing barriers to import, will lead to changes in domestic market structures
for raw materials and repro-materials. Considering that barriers to
imports were much lower than in the case of consumer goods and
durables, the share of transport costs is an obvious factor that results in the
inability of the imports of these products to raise the competitiveness of
the domestic market structures. 
This situation can be extremely dangerous. Non-competitive market
structures for raw and repro-materials is manifested in price rises for these
products and that inevitably raises the costs of domestic producers who
use those products. The increased costs are passed on to consumer goods,
that is to CPI, regardless of their market structure character. A hidden
danger lies here in that increases in input prices would occur at perfectly
competitive markets. Hence, raw and repro-material markets should be
under a much higher degree of competition policy control than the con-
sumer and permanent consumer goods market. 
5. CONCLUSION
Even with high import barriers, like the ones from the year 2000,
imports were an extremely significant factor in the domestic market struc-
ture. This resulted in a contrived increase in the degree of competitiveness.
Therefore, it is certain that the liberalisation of foreign trade (a reduction
of import barriers) should be supported by a competition policy. For
empirical verification of this recommendation, it is necessary to wait for
the year 2001 data analysis, when (commencing from the first of June) the
elimination of non-tariff barriers and the reduction of tariffs for imported
goods occurred. It is reasonable to expect a further increase in the compet-
itiveness of the domestic market structures. However, detailed analysis
will show which markets are resistant to change, regardless of import lib-
eralisation. This can arise for various reasons but most significant is a high
share of transport costs. More detailed research into the reasons for this
resistance is necessary. However, these are precisely the markets that
should be subject to a domestic competition policy.
Further, it is necessary to investigate the possibilities (the areas for fur-
ther liberalisation of foreign trade policy) that will reduce import barriers.
Some of these barriers, especially administrative ones, are technically rela-
tively easy to remove. However, it is usually very difficult to proceed with
such reform. In the case of the FR of Yugoslavia, some limitations exist:
the process of joining the WTO; the process of Stabilisation and
Association with the EU; the political and logistic power of existing
domestic, but also future, domestic producers. In reference to this, it is
very difficult sometimes to perform routine technical tasks, like the termi-
nation of non-tariff barriers to import. This is even more so, since there is
the impression that the current (republic) government does not have a
clear concept whether liberalisation of foreign trade regimes is a priority
and whether such liberalisation is conducted because it is considered to be
good for the country. 
Criticism of the current foreign trade liberalisation course which is
leaving domestic producers without protection is often heard and also
that the protection is necessary in order to attract quality strategic
investors. Without the governments clear policy on foreign trade liberal-
isation, it is considered a favour to the international community for mem-
bership of international organisations (e.g. WTO) rather than political or
logistic pressures aimed at maintaining effective protection. This is even
more pertinent as a result of political adjustments (the yet undefined
relations between Serbia and Montenegro, independence carried out
through new a Constitution etc.)  used as excuses for postponing fur-
ther foreign trade regime liberalisation.
Contrary to this class of import barriers, some other barriers are more
structural and their causes more long lasting so they cannot be dealt with
in the short term. A typical example is the  low hard currency inflow due
to low export earnings. Insufficient importation is a consequence of the
low competitiveness of the domestic economy, which cannot be changed
overnight. Further, the removal of some barriers is related to significant
interventions. A typical example is the state of the domestic transportation
network. It has been demonstrated that transport costs are a significant
factor in determining domestic market structures and that a poor infra-
structure increases non-competitive imports in some industries.
Rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure, which would lead to drop in
transport costs, especially in road and railway transport, requires heavy
investment and it is not certain to what extent funds for financing those
investments would be secured. That is to for a greater extent related to the
construction of new facilities within a transport infrastructure which
would further reduce transport costs. However, even overcoming the
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problem of scarce capital for transport infrastructure improvement, the
reduction of transport costs has its limits. Transport costs always exist and
domestic producers will always have a certain advantage over foreign pro-
ducers, i.e. domestic products will always have a competitive advantage
over imported ones.
One of key factors in incorporating foreign trade policy into competi-
tion policy is based precisely on an unbiased survey of the possibilities for
further foreign trade liberalisation, i.e. markets with concentrated supply
where the expected liberalisation of foreign trade policy cannot signifi-
cantly alter its non-competitive structure, that is it cannot lead to compet-
itive market structure. Precisely those markets, i.e. incumbent companies,
should be subject to classic competitive policy measures. Analysis based
on data from the year 2000 indicates that those are, above all, raw and
repro-material markets and their unfinished goods. This outcome should
be re-examined for the year 2001, as soon as the data becomes available,
and once the liberalisation of the foreign trade policy has occurred. The
year 2002, will demonstrate the results of a response to foreign trade com-
petitiveness in a significantly liberalised foreign trade policy.
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IV Analysis of Existing Legislation
1. SOURCES
The basic rules of monopoly prohibition and fair market competition
are included in the existing Federal and federal units Constitutions. The
FR of Yugoslavia Constitution (article 74) proclaims the equality of all
economic entities and equal working conditions for everyone, and pro-
claims every, act and measure which creates or instigates a monopoly
position, that in any way constrains the market to be unconstitutional.
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (article 64), apart from stip-
ulating equality of economic entities in greater detail, contains practically
the same legal arrangement. The formulation of the Constitution of
Montenegro (article 47.) is somewhat different. , In addition to the pro-
claimed guarantee of entrepreneurship and economic freedom, it pro-
hibits every measure or act which creates or instigates a monopoly posi-
tion and prevents the market economy.
In order to understand the constitutional framework of competition
policy rules in Yugoslav law the following points should be noted:
 The emphasis the constitution places on equality of economic enti-
ties (there is a parallel emphasis on the independence and freedom of
association), and on conditions which are applicable for all, is not
inspired, at least not primarily, by the idea of free and fair competi-
tion. The Constitution wishes to emphasise, under conditions of
dominant social and state property, the independence of entities in
public ownership, and their equality, i.e. equal conditions for all,
regardless of the form of ownership. Therefore these constitutional
regulations should be viewed in the context of all the regulations on
equality of all forms of ownership
 A central constitutional regulation in this sphere is therefore the one
about the prevention of monopoly. Along with this, the constitution
sanctions: (a) every measure or act that is aimed at gaining a monop-
oly. The difference between measure andact, is more stylistic then
practical, meaning that sanctioning of all legal acts, general (statute,
bylaws of executive power  article 71, article 2 RS Constitution), but
also singular (agreements, acts by which the horizontal and vertical
merging of entities is achieved), but also all other actions which lead
to monopoly, regardless of what could be understood by that. (b)
Measures or acts that create and/or instigate a monopoly position are
sanctioned, and here the meaning of the terms in use is questionable.
In the obviously insufficiently precise constitutional text instigation
probably indicates indirect achievement of monopoly, indirect pro-
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vision of monopoly activity, for example through regulations or pol-
icy of concession generating. Nonetheless, these could also be acts by
which prevention of monopoly is omitted, for example the way in
which the notion of a dominant position on the market is interpret-
ed. (c) According to the constitutions, measures and acts which cre-
ate a monopoly are unconstitutional (according to the Montenegrin
constitution it is prohibited, which is the same, because that prohib-
ited by the constitution is unconstitutional). Emphasising the
unconstitutional character opens up, on the one side (c1), the possi-
ble direct applicability of a constitutional provision, even without
further legal regulation, makes possible the repeal or non-enforce-
ment of a law or other general act which creates a monopoly, until
the final evaluation of its non-compliance with the Constitution,1
that is it enables the annulling of a contract2, ex offo or on request of
an interested party. On the other side (c2), there is an issue of consti-
tutionally legal protection against acts by which monopoly is created
or instigated, through the control of the constitution compliance of
any general act, but also with constitutional appeal against a single
act, supported by conditions under which constitutional appeal can
otherwise be submitted.
 Direct implementation of the Constitution in the prevention of
monopoly does not exclude further legal regulation on this matter.
Since it is a question of regulating competition through, at least in
theory, the still valid Federal Constitution, for a single Yugoslav mar-
ket, it relates primarily to Federal laws.
 Finally, the impact of constitutional prohibition against making and
instigating a monopoly should be considered rather limited.
Constitutional texts alone contain elements that inaugurate the
opposite philosophy, opening the possibility for the existence of
monopoly position. Those are, first of all, elements by which particu-
lar goods and resources are reserved as social and/or state property.
3. Competition policy regulation is codified by the Antimonopoly Law
(Official Gazette FRY, no. 29/1996). Competition rules and other rules
by which fair competition is regulated, that is by which unfair competition
is sanctioned are contained in a series of other laws, of which the most
important are:
 The Law on international trade  (Official Gazette FRY, no. 46/92,
49/92, 16/93, 24/94, 28/96, 29/97, 59/98, 16/99, 17/99, 36/99, 44/99,
53/99, 55/99, 73/00, 23/01)
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1 The Government of Republic of Serbia passed the Decrees of oil and oil derivatives
transactions in April 2001, which limited the right of oil import, by which only NIS,
public company in area of oil production and transactions, is authorized to import.
Constitution compliance of this Decree was denied by authorized plaintiff, but constitu-
tional courts did not pass the verdict for the time being, hence the Decree is still in use.
2 See article 14. Law on obligations. According to general rules obligation rights abol-
ishment of prohibited agreement is established on request of any interested person
and then it is the courts official duty to look after it. Still, competition policy law
established, who can claim examination of monopoly contract, which can but doesnt
have to result in annul sanction, depending on consequences caused by it and to
which he was directed at.
 The Law on obligatory relations (Official Gazette FRY, no. 29/79,
39/85, 45/89, 57/89, Official Gazette FRY, no. 31/93, 22/99, 44/99) 
 The Law on  stockpiles (Official Gazette FRY, no. 58/98, Official
Gazette FRY, no. 16/93, 24/94, 32/94, 28/96, 29/97, 16/93, 24/94,
32/94, 28/96, 29/97, Official Voice RS, no. 18/92, Official Gazette
RCG, no. 556/92)
 The Law on statistical research system (Official Gazette FRY, no.
80/94, 28/96)
 The Law on public price control system (Official Gazette SFRY, no.
no. 84/99, Official Gazette FRY,», no. 32/93, 24/94, 28/96)
 The Law on federal market inspection (Official Gazette SFRY, no.
24/74,22/78,23/80, 22/87,71/88, 35/91, Official Gazette FRY, no.
24/94, 28/96, 59/98, 44/99, 74/99, 73/2000) 
 The Law on trade (Official Gazette FRY, no. 32/93, 50/93,41/94,
29/96)
 The Law on companies (Official Gazette FRY, no. 29/96, 33/96,
29/97, 59/98, 74/99, 9/01)
 The Law on the basis of social control of prices (Official Gazette
SFRY, no. 84/89)
 The Law on foreign investments (Official Gazette RCG, no. 52/00,
Official Gazette FRY, no. 3/02)
Indirectly, for antitrust regulations, that is for competition policy, pro-
cedural laws are significant as well, The Law on general administrative
procedure (Official Gazette FRY no. 33/97, 31/01), The Law on admin-
istrative disputes ((Official Gazette FRY, no. 46/96), etc. 
From the opposite angle, regulations by which monopoly is constituted
could be quoted, that is the ones which create a foundation for their estab-
lishment, for example:
 The Law on telecommunications (Official Gazette SFRY, no.
41/88, 80/89, 29/90, 34/92, 24/94, 28/96, Official Gazette RS, no
38/91, 41/91, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 20/97, Official Gazette RCG, no.
59/00)
 The Law on the railway
 The Law on public companies
Further on the text of the Antimonopoly Law (Competition Act) will be
specially analysed, followed by remaining rules related to competition pol-
icy and rules of unfair competition and other regulations.
2. ANTIMONOPOLY LAW
It can be assumed that this law is an elaboration of the constitutional
principle preventing the initiation or instigation of a monopoly position.
On the one hand, in the first article, which lays out the purpose of the leg-
islation, the law appears less ambitious than its constitutional source. It
does not set out to, regulate against the creation of a monopoly position,
(it is called antimonopoly) but exclusively the abuse of this position,
which as a consequence causes the violation of competition and creation
of disturbances on a single market. On the other hand however, the scope
of the legislation is slightly extended, since it envisages taking measures,
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i.e. penalising, not only abuse of monopoly position, but of dominant
position on the market and of monopolistic agreements.
From an economic point of view, the Law is concerned only with the
consequences of monopolistic, i.e. non-competitive market structures,
and those consequences are denoted as violation of competition and cre-
ating disturbances on a single market. In other words, the Law is not con-
cerned with factors that create such structures and the process of their ini-
tiation. Accordingly, none of the acts that lead to non-competitive market
structures (monopolistic or/and dominant position) is sanctioned, that is
acts that lead to market power. That relates, most of all, to the control of
mergers, bearing in mind that mergers are one of basic factors that create
non-competitive market structures and market power. It is clear that a
merger of a few companies into one leads to a reduction in, or to the dis-
appearance of competition on a given market. This mechanism relates to
horizontal mergers, i.e. mergers of companies in the same industry, i.e.
companies that are competing with each other on the market. Economic
theory and empirical research of market structures indicates that precisely
those horizontal mergers are the most significant source of non-competi-
tive market structures and market power.
Besides horizontal mergers, non-competitive market structures can be cre-
ated by vertical mergers as well, i.e. mergers of companies that are not in the
same industry; instead, one of them is a supplier, and the other one a buyer of
some article (raw materials, inputs, etc.). In other words, vertical mergers are
mergers in which the companies involved are those which have different posi-
tions in a chain of production and supply. Both types of mergers (horizontal
and vertical) are the basic element of non-competitive market structure initi-
ation and market power, but the mechanisms through which this occurs are
substantially different. While horizontal mergers cause this directly, through
reduction of competition on the market, vertical mergers can cause it indi-
rectly, first of all, through establishment of barriers to entry to new competi-
tors, that is through control of market entry process (disclosures).
Considering that the Law does not mention mergers whatsoever, it is
clear that there is no difference in the legal treatment (sanctions) of hori-
zontal and vertical mergers. Such a difference is certainly necessary, con-
sidering that, as was already implied, mechanisms through which various
kinds of mergers lead to non-competitive market structures significantly
differ. Taking that into account, the identical treatment of horizontal and
vertical mergers is counterproductive for an active and efficient competi-
tion policy. Namely, in this way, only more stringent criteria (suitable only
to horizontal mergers) are applied to all mergers, or only mild criteria
(suitable only to vertical mergers) are also applied to all mergers.
The next element in the creation and maintenance of non-competitive
market structures are barriers to entry for new producers. According to
the earliest definition of barriers to entry, it should be mentioned that
everything that enables economic profit to be made on the market, in a
long-term belongs to the category of barriers.3 If in some industry eco-
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3 In this, alike examining in introductory chapter, so called Harvard definition of barri-
er to entry is accepted. It is more suitable for requirements of this study then alterna-
tive and more restrictive Chicago definition.
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nomic profit occurs (the profit which is above normal profit, which corre-
sponds to the cost of the capital, i.e. the cost of purchasing the capital on
the market), it attracts the entry of new producers, which in the long-term
leads to dissipation of economic profit and the establishment a market
equilibrium with a normal profit (profit which corresponds to the cost of
capital). If the source of economic profit is a non-competitive market
structure, the economic profit attracts new competitors, but if barriers to
entry do not exist, entry of new competitors introduces competitive mar-
ket structures. Precisely for this reason incumbent producers strive to dis-
able the entry of new competitors by creating entry barriers.
The Law does not stipulate categories of barriers to entry and exit from
the industry. Since it does not recognise such categories, the Law does not
make a difference between real and potential competition. It is precisely
the entry of new competitors that presents one of the most crucial sources
of market competition. According to some theories, the possibility of the
entry of new competitors alone, i.e. the existence of potential competition,
leads to competitive performance from monopolists. If some conditions
are fulfilled, monopolists will perform just as companies on a perfectly
competitive market.4 Using terminology of the Law, regardless of the
existing market structure, that is supply concentration on that market, the
existence of free entry will disable the abuse of the monopoly position.
However, the Law is not concerned with the preconditions for the appear-
ance of monopoly behaviour, and therefore does not deal with barriers to
entry. Thus, there are no sanctions against the measures and acts of eco-
nomic entities that create new barriers to entry for new competitors.
Finally, predatory pricing is another way of non-competitive market
structures creation. Predatory pricing takes place if a company, by reduc-
ing product prices below the marginal costs and/or average costs of pro-
duction, eliminates its competitors, and eliminates competition on the
market. The basic idea is that competitors too will have to reduce their
prices below the marginal/average costs, which will lead them to financial
losses. The losses will, in the long term, inevitably lead to their bankruptcy
and liquidation, and in that way competitors will case to exist and the firm
that enforced predatory pricing becomes a monopolist, which opens the
possibility for monopolistic behaviour and the appropriation of economic
profit.5 The Law does not mention predatory pricing, hence there are no
sanctions against it. 
The Law, therefore, only penalises monopolistic behaviour, but not the
creation of a monopoly as such, or the intention to create any non-com-
petitive market structure. Consequently, if a domestic company does all it
can to eliminate its competitors, and attains a monopoly (using the termi-
nology of the Law secures a monopoly position for itself)  it cannot be
penalised on the basis of the Law, regardless of the means used for gaining
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4 It is the matter of contestable market theory, already mentioned in introductory chapter.
5 It remains an open question, how  a company which executes predatory pricing will
survive the period in which its revenues are lower than total costs, that is in which it
records losses. It is assumed, implicitly, that such company estimates that, as to this
point, it will be in favored position in relation to its competitors.
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the monopoly position. According to the Law, such a hypothetical compa-
ny would be punished only if it started with monopolistic behaviour. 
Accordingly, the legislator is not interested in the market structure of a
specific industry, nor how it came about, but only in the performance of
the firm(s) within the existing (given) market structure. The Law is only
concerned with prevention of effects, notwithstanding the cause (market
structure): factors that caused the effect and performance of the firms. It is
precisely in this that the Law differs from modern competition legislation.
Even the oldest law of that kind, the Sherman Act,  of 1890, explicitly pro-
hibits monopolising, that is attempts at monopoly creation, which gives
the legislation an active role regarding monopoly creation, i.e. active role
in the protection of competitive market structures.
From an economic point of view, competition legislation should deal
with development and protection of market competition. On the basis of
article 1. of the Law, it could be concluded that in this case it is not at all a
matter of competition policy and legislation, but only about economic
monopoly regulation and/or other non-competitive market structures,
along with the effort to prevent monopolistic behaviour of already existing
monopolies. In that sense, the legislator reduced competition policy to
only one segment of itself (very specific, basically minor), and gave a com-
pletely defensive role to the Law.6
The Law sanctions only abuse of monopoly position, and such per-
formance would be described as monopolistic behaviour by contempo-
rary economic theory: decreasing the output (supply), increase of prices
above marginal costs, which, according to microeconomic theory, leads to
allocative inefficiency (measured by Habergers triangle). It reduces social
welfare, and redistributes the remaining welfare to the monopolist. By the
way, the legal formulation that abuse of monopoly position violates com-
petition makes no sense, since monopoly position itself is a violation, i.e.
elimination of competition.
By concentrating only on monopoly behaviour that implies only alloca-
tive inefficiency (dead-weight welfare loss), the legislator completely neg-
lects other adverse monopoly effects on welfare, such as static and dynam-
ic production inefficiencies, as well as open space for rent seeking behav-
iour. Therefore, all these phenomena and their adverse effects on social
welfare, which could be more devastating than allocative inefficiency are
completely neglected by the Law
Strict implementation of the Law would not redress any of the above
mentioned adverse effects of monopoly. If a company has monopoly posi-
tion, but it does not abuse it in the sense of Law, there is no possibility of
sanctioning the above-mentioned adverse effects, since monopoly posi-
tion is not the stipulated by the Law. Furthermore, above-mentioned
effects/behaviour cannot be classified as monopoly position abuse. Thus,
once again, in this way, the weaknesses of the Law that is concerned with
effects (and only some effects), but not with their causes, is revealed.
6 The root of this concept should be explored in long standing non-market tradition of
our state, in which an institution, such as the Price Office, legally establishes prices for
a large number of products, whereas the state media pursued those who raised prices
unjustifiably. It seems that this law presents an endeavor to maintain the tradition of
arbitrary state interference.
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While abuse of monopoly position was relatively easy to decode (at least
for an experienced economist), greater problems occur with the attempt
to theoretically explain abuse of dominant position. While the microeco-
nomic theory of monopoly is clear and undisputable, the theory of the
dominant firm does not offer simple conclusions and it still includes cer-
tain controversies. It is very unlikely that any economist (regardless of
experience) will be able to simply theoretically explain the concept of the
abuse of the dominant market position, that is effects which that abuse has
on social welfare.
It is apparent that this was an attempt to sanction the behaviour and
performance of the firms the enjoy market power on markets which are
not monopolistic. So, it was decided that those structures were to be
labelled as dominant position on the market, which is quite an unfortu-
nate solution; this becomes obvious when one must decide whether a par-
ticular firm enjoys a dominant position on the market.7
Monopolistic agreement presents what economic theory calls cartel, i.e.
open collusion.8 the penalisation of such behaviour of economic subjects
is absolutely justifiable, since a perfect cartel has the same effects on alloca-
tive efficiency and social welfare as monopoly and monopolistic behav-
iour.  Therefore, although the Constitution does not directly provide
grounds for such a provision of the Law, this very provision is, from an
economic point of view, absolutely justifiable.
In order for the Antimonopoly Law to come into effect it is necessary to
fulfil the following necessary conditions:  
 That an economic entity (company or other legal entity  through
this the law excludes or does not conceive a non-incorporated entre-
preneur as a monopolist) within the market has: (a) monopolistic
position, or (b) dominant position, or (c) that two or more econom-
ic entities make a monopoly agreement (existence of monopolist,
dominant position on the market or monopolistic agreement);
 That they committed acts or introduced measures which abuse
monopoly and/or dominant position (abuse of monopoly). The abu-
sive measure or action is not specifically required in the monopolistic
agreement. It would be too early, however, to conclude that cartel is
prohibited per se. Abusive aims, that is  acts and measures are
included in the term monopoly agreement alone;
 That the abuse, or action caused an effect which consists of: (a) viola-
tion of competition, and (b) causes irregularities on the market. All
that was indicated in the previous three points should be achieved
cumulatively.
Each of these conditions will be examined closely.
2.1. Monopoly and dominant position
Monopoly position assumes non-existence of any competition, in pro-
duction of goods, in trade of goods, or in provision of a specific service.
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7 In the case of symmetrical duopoly, not a single competitor has a dominant position,
and both enjoy considerable market power.
8 It is the term cooperative oligopoly sometimes used in the economic literature.
According to the Law  Monopoly position on the market is enjoyed by an
economic entity which on a single market does not have competition.
(Article 2, Paragraph 1).
According to economic theory, when theoretically defining monopoly a
few questions should be answered, that is, it is necessary to fulfil several
necessary conditions. The first necessary condition is that, on the supply
side, only one economic entity exists, which, strictly speaking, is not iden-
tical to the ambiguous legal formulation entity which on a unified mar-
ket does not have competition. The second condition relates to market def-
inition, i.e. answering the question to which market does previous statute
relate. Namely, competition among numerous producers has taken place
on something which is for those producers, a competitive relevant market,
hence, the market on which the effect of competition and the actions of
competitors are felt by each competitor.
Relevant market can be defined with two aspects:
 geographical (space) relevant market;
 relevant market from the point of the substitutes. 
As far as geographical relevant market is concerned, it is necessary to
include transport costs into the analysis. Namely, in case of products with
high transport costs, i.e. high participation of transportation costs in total
supply costs, the geographical market is inevitably limited. In that sense,
particular products are not transportable, that is they are not subject to
international trade (non-tradable), since high participation of transport
costs eliminates international competition. An additional increase of trans-
port costs, that is their participation, leads to similar appearance on the
domestic market, so that the domestic market is geographically segmented,
so that instead of a single market, a large number of local markets, which
are not connected amongst them, simultaneously exist. In relation to this,
the legal formulation single market in terms of products with high trans-
port costs directly leads to an incorrect conclusion. Whereas a single pro-
ducer has competition on a single market, burdened with high transport
costs, he cannot set a competitive price at any other local market.
Therefore, local monopoly can exist, although by implementing legal pro-
vision of the Law, monopoly position and monopolistic behaviour on the
local market are not penalised at all. In reference to this, it is necessary to
establish legal provision, even the obligation that the geographically rele-
vant market should be specified for each product individually.
After defining the geographically relevant market, the question of
weather there are close substitutes for monopolist products, i.e. whether
price cross-elasticity of demand between two products is significant. If
there are close substitutes for the product (which leads to significant price
cross-elasticity of demand), markets of all these products constitute the
relevant market from the point of substitutes. Regardless of the fact that,
for example, only one producer for the product exists, existence of close
substitutes which are produced by competitors make impossible the cre-
ation of market power, that is monopoly behaviour.9
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9 For example, cellophane and wrapping paper are indeed different products (from the-
ological and their physical characteristics point of view), but they are at the same time
close substitutes.
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Finally, the Law formulation that implicitly indicates a single market as a
relevant one, does not enable consideration of the firms that have diversi-
fied production (multi-product firms), i.e. firms that simultaneously oper-
ate on many markets. Namely, such firms, which, on various markets enjoy
different degrees of market power, can be very dangerous from the point of
competition violation, that is construction of non-competitive market
structures with markets they are dealing with.10 Taking all this into account
the legal formulation (expression) single market does not make sense.
Dominant position is declared negative, without quantification, and is
defined as the non-existence of significant competition in production or
trade in goods and services.
An economic entity which on a unified market does not have significant
competition has a dominant position on the market  (Article 2, Paragraph 2.)
The existence of a dominant position of a firm on the market is estab-
lished by the Antimonopoly commission, a body that acts within the
Federal Ministry of the economy and domestic trade. Not only does the
Law not contain criteria by which dominant position is to be established,
nor define the procedure Decree on forming the antimonopoly commis-
sion (Official Gazette FRY, no 24/1997), it also fails to oblige the
Commission to establish and publish those criteria. The Internal docu-
ments of the Commission are internal instructions only, they are not
obligatory, and as criteria they can be analysed only on the basis of scarce
Commission practice.
In 1999, the Antimonopoly Commission accepted an internal act called
Criteria for identifying monopoly and/or dominant position of econom-
ic entities on the market. The Act attempts to define a number of signifi-
cant questions for forming of these criteria. First of all, the term market is
defined along with differentiation of geographical and real market. Then,
the issue of market position is addressed. Following contemporary exam-
ples, the act regulates market share that is greater than 25% or 1/3 of the
total market as a basic yardstick for the establishment of dominant posi-
tion. This proposal should be reviewed through the act, implying addi-
tional criteria: (a) economic power of the economic entity (measured by
the usual economic parameters such as revenues, profit, turnover in previ-
ous calendar year  the author of the act thinks that there is a difference
between those two categories (revenues and turnover), availability of cred-
it lines and approach to domestic and foreign capital markets, (b) the
power of potential competition which at the moment when market posi-
tions are established are not present on the relevant market but can come
to existence rapidly and effectively, (c) consumer market power, (d)
monopolistic behaviour and results, for example agreement on prices or
sharing the market. Apart from fourth additional criterion that comes into
the second sphere of competition rules, specially sanctioned by the
Antimonopoly Act  monopoly agreement, from legal point of view crite-
ria is principally acceptable.
These criteria do not even formally resemble a legal act and are present-
ed as a professional (expert) report on possible criteria. Except for the first
Analysis of Existing Legislation
10 That is specifically related to possibility of effective predatory pricing. .
parameter, quantifying the market share, the rest are presented in an
entirely descriptive manner. The Antimonopoly Commission would
therefore have to define each additional criterion, in every concrete case,
thus rendering relative the initial parameter. Even if this act on the criteria
was published, and did not remain an internal instruction, the criteria for
establishing dominant position which the commission applies could not
be established with certainty from this text. Practice on the other hand,
contains (in the minutes of the Antimonopoly Commission session) only
appeals to these criteria, but not to their explicit elaboration. The conclu-
sion remains that these non-transparent criteria, prepared as they are in
the manner of a professional report, cannot be considered proper guide-
lines for economic entities. Generally, it is on the level of widely known
fact that greater economic power strengthens dominant position, that the
ability of potential consumers reduces it, and that presence of potential
competitors leads to constrained behaviour.
Economically speaking, it is very unlikely that anyone will, on the basis
of previously quoted legal definition and these criteria, be able to deter-
mine with certainty weather the firm examined a has dominant position
on the market. Even more since it remains unclear why the legislator used
the comparative term (more significant), instead of positive (significant)
competition. Even if it was not the case, the formula significant competi-
tion is so vague that without vast additional directions it is not possible to
reach any conclusion. Such a legal definition of dominant position on the
market opens up immense space for discretionary decision/making by the
body that executes this Law, that is the Antitrust Commission. Whats
more, since the Law does not stipulate the obligation to establish guide-
lines for precise definition of dominate position, nor the procedure for
making that decision. The Legal provision alone, according to which dom-
inant position exists when there is no considerable competition can be
reinterpreted very elastically. In this way, when investigating the dominant
position of one of the two mobile telephony operators in Serbia recently,
the commission mentioned the technical  technological superiority of
that operator.
Such a vague definition of dominant position on the market endangers
successful companies, which, due to the superiority of its business in rela-
tion to competitors, increase their market share. Increasing market share
alone, by which those companies call attention to themselves, is enough
for a company to be proclaimed a company with dominant position on
the market, which opens up possibility for taking legal actions which effect
their business, i.e. financial results of that business. Even more, since the
Law, form the point of its penal provisions, treats monopolists and com-
panies with dominant position on the market equally. In this way, incen-
tives for companies to invest in increases of efficiency in relation to its
competitors are wasted. Incentives than lead to increases of economic effi-
ciency, and therefore to increase of social welfare are rendered ineffective.
It is very likely that the legal category of companies with dominant
position on the market came about from the need to legally control those
non-competitive structures which are not monopolies (in situations
where a monopoly does not exist, but where some participants in the
market competition wield considerable market power). Accepting this
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need, it is evident, however, that the existing legal decisions are not at all
satisfactory.
An interesting and important question is when does the Commission
identify the existence of monopolistic and/or dominant position of an
economic entity; what initiates its proceedings? Conforming to the text of
the Law: when abuse of this position exists.
The Law therefore empowers the Commission to follow and analyse
the measures and acts  of an economic entity which has dominant posi-
tion on the market and takes measures against abuse of this position.
Analysis and measures against abuse are on an equal level, simultaneous
procedures. One provision of the Law (article 8.) has the same implication
that authorises every party concerned to initiate procedure through appli-
cation to the Antimonopoly Commission: application relates to abuse of
monopolistic and/or dominant position.
The provision which establishes dominant position on the market and
connects this to the fact (or assumption) of its abuse is logical considering
the repressive character of the Law. The Commission is not authorised,
nor is any other body which is not governmental to react to the fact that a
monopolist or dominant entity exists, setting up special rules of the game
in this situation, rules which would have preventive effects, prevent their
abuse. Even measures that are not penalties, such as ordering an econom-
ic entity to take appropriate measures and actions in order to eliminate
the identified incorrectness or omissions proceed once abuse of monop-
olistic or dominant position has been confirmed.
2.2. Monopolistic agreement
A Monopolistic agreement is defined as every agreement concluded by
economic entities between themselves, or agreement within the frame-
work of an association of economic entities (therefore the constitutive act
of an association of economic entities), which is aimed at, that is which
leads to violation or prevention of competition and causes disturbance on
the market, that is which can damage the consumer (article 4, paragraph
1 of the Law).
The Law does not recognise any difference between horizontal and ver-
tical agreements. All agreements are treated equally by the Law, which
cannot be assessed as a favourable solution. In principle, horizontal agree-
ments pose a far greater danger for competition, that is a danger for com-
petitive market structures, than vertical agreements. Monopolistic agree-
ments (cartels) are sometimes identical to horizontal agreements in the
economic literature. Most economists consider vertical agreements in
principle, and especially agreements between two companies which have
no significant market power, insignificant in their adverse effects to com-
petition, believing that they can sometimes have some positive effects in
strengthening competition, increasing economic efficiency and bringing
gains to the consumer.
Considering that the Law does not differentiate between horizontal and
vertical agreements, it pays equal attention to both of them, which practi-
cally means that economic entities which enter one or the another kind of
agreement are equally likely to be punished because, and to have their
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agreement proclaimed invalid. The problem is that while horizontal
agreements present a clear and direct danger to market competition
and/or competitive market structures, vertical agreements can sometimes
improve market competition, and the Law treats them in the same man-
ner. The same attention is paid to them and those agreements are treated
the same.
Considering that in the case of a small open economy such as Serbia/FR
Yugoslavia, with a small domestic market, imports present a very signifi-
cant source of competition, special attention should be paid to enabling all
those association arrangements which enable improvement of imports,
and in that way, generate domestic market competition. In a large number
of cases, vertical agreements are of the import associational pattern (exclu-
sive importers/distributors, sale through certain, previously agreed chan-
nels, development of a sales network etc.) for certain products. For a host
of economic reasons, big international producers insist on exclusive dis-
tributorships for their products in our country and/or the Region. Such
agreements are not only treated the same by the Law, they are in fact
deemed to be monopolistic.11 Surely, a vertical agreement of exclusive dis-
tribution represents an opportunity for enhancing competition on the
domestic market, whale also forcing big international producers  com-
petitors, to compete through their exclusive distributors on the domestic
market. Here too, the consistent implementation of the Law would cause a
reduction in the competition on the domestic market caused by to compe-
tition from imports.
In modern market economies vertical agreements between companies
with small market power (such as indicated examples of exclusive distri-
bution) are commonly not treated as violations of competition. These
agreements are not considered dangerous for competitive market struc-
tures. Considering that the Law does not differentiate between horizontal
and vertical agreements, there is no basis for vertical agreements to be
reviewed in the light of the market power of the actors involved in them.
In such manner, it is possible, through consistent implementation of the
Law, degrade rather than improve the competitiveness of the market
structures.
Accordingly, it appears that, according to the Law, concluding a
monopolistic agreement as such (per se) is an incriminating act. However,
article 4. paragraph 4. of the Law specifies that certain agreements are not
considered monopolistic, i.e. that any monopolistic agreement as such
(per se) does not have to be an illegal act.12 According to this provision of
the Law, each agreement and/or monopolistic agreement can be subject to
re-examination in view of its consequences, which opens up the possibility
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11 Article 4, paragraph 2 quotes agreement of import, that is export of goods exclusive-
ly or predominantly through certain economical subject as example of monopolistic
agreement.
12 It is not considered that monopolistic agreement is agreement of business if it con-
tributes to improvement of production or goods transactions, instigates technically-
technological development and if it is useful for consumers, under condition that no
additional limitation are imposed to economical subjects in businesses which are not
necessary for achieving those gains.
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for implementation of the rule of reason. In other words, monopolistic
agreement is not per se a punishable action and/or measure.
On the one hand, such a solution, at least in the given framework, is
desirable. Since no distinction is made between horizontal and vertical
agreements, for practical purposes vertical agreements between companies
with considerable and small market power, it is necessary to create some
leeway in implementation of the Law, otherwise its consistent implementa-
tion would render void a large number of agreements which increase eco-
nomic effectiveness and improve competition on the domestic market. In
other words, in conditions of non-differential monopolistic agreements,
implementation of the rule of reason is the only acceptable solution.
In other respects however the legislation is not advantageous. It opens
up space for long-term re-examination of obvious competition violating
cases, such as horizontal agreements, i.e. agreements that directly reduce
or even eliminate competition on the market, instead of pronouncing
those agreements as such (per se) against the Law, and punishable.
Similarly, it creates an opening for the companies that concluded the
agreement to influence the Commission and thus gain considerable mar-
ket power. Such companies would, surely, be considerably engaged in
convincing decision makers that precisely their agreements belong to arti-
cle 4., statute 4. of the Law, that is that they have  a positively effect on
social welfare.
A far better solution is to make a distinction between horizontal and
vertical agreements within the Law itself, so that horizontal monopolistic
agreements are penalised per se, and that exclusively in the case of vertical
agreements the rule of reason is applied, so that from one case to another,
depending on the effects, vertical agreements can be annulled and
penalised. This would open up the possibility for enforcing an aggressive
competition policy in the case of horizontal monopolistic agreements and
a careful, defensive and balanced competition policy in the case of vertical
agreements.
Providing that, in reference to this article, paragraph 2. of this article of
the Law (in which the legislator quotes examples of those agreements) is
examined into more detail, it becomes evident that the article is dealing
with the prohibition of cartels, i.e. prohibition of explicit collusion
amongst competitors. One of the results of contemporary economic theo-
ry, that is one of results of the theory of industrial association, shows that
the biggest danger to the survival of a cartel is cheating by the cartel mem-
bers themselves; the ones who made the agreement. If cartel members
themselves cheat each other regarding the agreement, the cartel falls apart,
regardless whether it is legal or not. Analysis within the framework of this
theory of co-operative oligopoly has shown which factors encourage disin-
tegration of cartels, and therefore which institutions and mechanisms
make their creation and successful implementation easier. The legal prohi-
bition of those institutions and mechanisms, and the punishment of their
use, would ease implementation of the Law and of competitive policy.
Finally, it should be noted that strict legal control of monopolistic
agreements in these conditions leads to the generation of pervasive incen-
tives. It has already been pointed out that the legal ground for control of
mergers does not exist. It is worthwhile for two companies that operate
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within the same industry, to merge immediately, since this is quite legal,
instead of to conclude monopolistic (horizontal) agreements, which are
prohibited by the Law. In other words, the Law generates incentives for
the creation of non-competitive market structures, since it is far easier to
break up a monopolistic agreement, than a non-competitive market struc-
ture created through mergers.
The Entities entering into monopolistic agreement can be any type of
economic legal entities. It is not necessary that any of the participants in an
agreement be a monopolist or have dominant position on the market.
Monopoly or dominant position is the result of the agreement, one of the
consequences that must occur in order for the penal mechanism to be ini-
tiated. The Law defines the concept of monopolistic agreement as the vio-
lation or prevention of competition.
Regulating associations of economic entities (which should be under-
stood as including the establishment of associations in the terms of article
419. of the Law on Companies; legal entities that is created by two or more
firms, for the purpose of profit, which makes transactions in its own
name, but to the benefit of the founders), or forming of industrial and
other forms of associations, the achievement of monopoly or dominant
position is presumed, and its abuse is sanctioned.13 In principle, monitor-
ing of the operations of business associations is reasonable, considering
that the work of such associations provides favourable conditions for col-
lusion and effective implementation of monopolistic (cartel) agreements.
It is very unlikely that by controlling the foundation of such associations
alone, and not their implementation over time, one can hope to sufficient-
ly reduce the possible conclusion and implementation of monopolistic
agreements.
Incidentally, the Law on companies regulates cartels (approves of
them), indicating that they should be prohibited, only if they  contravene
the competition regulations. The Antimonopoly Law  orders the
Antimonopoly Commission to react if there are elements of monopoly
and/or dominant market position abuse in the agreement.
Violation and/or prevention of competition, i.e. accomplishment of
monopoly or dominant position should be the aim of a monopoly agree-
ment, that is participants involved in the agreement should have the inten-
tion to exclude or violate the competition. But monopoly agreements will
be deemed to exist even when there is no such aim (intention), if violation
of the competition can be objectively demonstrated, even without partici-
pants intention, that is, if disturbance of competition happens.
Exclusion or disturbance of the competition is not, however, sufficient
for an agreement concluded by economic entities (of any kind) to be qual-
ified as monopolistic. It is also essential that (a) there is intention, to
objectively produce or at least that there is a possibility to produce distur-
bance on a single market, that is (b) possibility to cause damage to con-
sumers (it is not essential for the damage actually to occur). Therefore the
abuse or possibility of monopolistic agreement abuse should exist, making
this a central concept. 
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entities which are concluding the agreement disappear. 
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2.3. Abuse of monopoly and/or dominant position and abusive sub-
stance of monopolistic agreement
Monopoly and/or dominant position is a fact that exists or does not
exist. A firm which  (as a result of the circumstances) already has a
monopoly and/or dominant position cannot be sanctioned, nor can the
state be expected to create such competition. The abuse of monopoly
and/or dominant position is therefore an justifiable target for legal action
(when recognised by the law) or repression by the government.
Acts which are intended to violate competition and instigate market dis-
turbance and which enable material benefit and other advantages based on
unequal relations in businesses, but which also cause damage to another eco-
nomic entity and/or the consumer are considered to be abuses of monopoly or
dominant market position. (Article 3., paragraph 1.).
It has been previously demonstrated that abuse stands for: (a) violation
of competition and causing market disturbances, (b) which enable the
gaining of material benefit or other advantages, and (c) which cause dam-
age or can cause damage to another entity or the consumer.
Such a definition of monopolistic behaviour makes it possible for per-
fectly legitimate and socially desirable behaviour on a competitive market,
to be proclaimed monopolistic behaviour. For example, behaviour of
companies that invest in research and development and therefore gain
technological advantage over their competitors, expressed in lower aver-
age costs, which can lead to the of the price decrease and an increase of
consumers surplus, i.e. social welfare, is undoubtedly socially desirable.
Such a company, in the terminology of the Law, gains material benefit
(increased profit due to low costs), based on unequal relations in business
(due to application of superior technology which is a consequence of its
own investments in research and development),   and which causes dam-
age to another economic entity (i.e. its competitors, by reducing their prof-
it or causing them financial losses). Therefore, the Law punishes the com-
petitive firm whose behaviour is socially desirable and leads to an increase
in economic efficiency and social welfare. 
The Antimonopoly Law, for example, enumerates what kinds of abuse
can exist, stating that:
 Increased prices of goods and services (including three parameters:
increase which is above average prices on the domestic market, which
is above world prices, and increases prices with simultaneous reduc-
tion of production);
 Omission of price reduction, by increase of a mark-up or in a similar
way, when reduction of price should have occurred as a consequence
of custom tariffs reduction or other import levies, tax reduction, etc.
 Cessation or decreasing of production, commodities exchange or
technological development;
 Unequal treatment of other participants on the market (the demand
is not that the persons are connected)
 Imposing additional restrictions on transactions (in addition to
tied trade, it was, for some time, common to make the purchase of
shares a condition).
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In paragraph 2. the Legislator describes in detail the actions from the
previous paragraph of article 3. of the Law. 1) price increases for goods and
services and increases in trade costs (price increases above average growth of
prices on the domestic market, price increases in comparison to comparable
world prices, price increases along with simultaneous reduction of produc-
tion), (article 3, point 2., paragraph 1) which are phenomena recorded
only on perfectly competitive markets, most often they represent the reac-
tions of competitive companies to cost changes due to changes of input
prices. By themselves, these phenomena have nothing in common with
monopolistic behaviour. Until costs/costs changes are identified, it is not
possible to make a conclusion about the market character, or the nature of
a companys behaviour. Thus, the definition of monopolistic, or some
other non-competitive behaviour, in contemporary research is connected
to the detection of long-term economic profit (Harvard approach), differ-
ences between prices and marginal costs (Chicago approach), and identifi-
cation between market (DCF) and replacement value of the capital of the
company (Tobins q). Aside from the fact that, with any given average
price growth, with assumption about equal share of all companies with
total income, 50% of companies would inevitably record price growth
above average, so that, implementing this provision of the Law, they
would all be accused for monopolistic behaviour.
2) increase of mark-up and trade costs for import of goods with lower cus-
toms tariffs, other import levies and sales tax and abuse of tax reductions for
domestically produced goods which are exempted from sales taxes or for
which the sale tax is reduced, (article 3., paragraph 2., point 2.) is a point
which has nothing to do with competition policy, so it remains a mystery
why it appears in the Law.
3) termination and reduction of production, exchange and technological
development; (article 3, paragraph 2, point 3) are types of behaviour
exhibited by perfectly competitive companies which in that way react to
(exogenous) market changes and do not have to have anything to do with
monopolistic behaviour.
A detrimental connection of economic entities which (a) has business
conditions as its object, (b) which aims or leads to or can lead to distur-
bance of competition and causes market disturbance, (c) that is by which
damage can be caused to the consumers are monopolistic agreements.
(Legally and technically the generally poorly edited Law is at its vaguest on
this point, the conjunctions and and that is (i.e.) are used in a confus-
ing way).
Once again, in the Antimonopoly Law examples of this abusive sub-
strate are given. Closely quoted in a way that is slightly more logical than
the one in the Law, they declare: 
 Market partitioning or closing, including sale of goods on only spec-
ified markets, as well as giving up, preventing or limiting the rights
to sell and buy, the rights to import and export.
 Indirect or direct price fixing
 Exclusive sale/dominant sale to only one entity or through exclu-
sively one entity, import and export exclusively through one entity
 Termination or limitation of production, sale or technically-tech-
nological development
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4) implementing unequal conditions while concluding the same business
with different economic entities, (article 3., point 2., statute 4.) can be
interpreted, in the vocabulary of modern economic analysis, as price dis-
crimination. The contemporary theory of price discrimination has not
yielded unambiguous conclusions about its effect on welfare. Therefore,
implementation of the Law, that is abolition of price discrimination, could
lead to a decline in welfare. What is more, persistent implementation of
this provision would proclaim (make) null and void a large number of
existing tariff structures in our economy, with tremendous consequences
to welfare distribution. That would, for example, mean abolishing differ-
ent rates of telecommunication services for households and business sub-
scribers, by which domestic cross-subsidisation would no longer be possi-
ble, that would further increase profit and decrease consumers surplus.
5) conditioning acceptance of additional obligations in an agreement
which is concluded with another economic entity in relation to the subject of
the agreement. (article 3., paragraph 2., point 5.), presents prohibition of
so called tied trade, for which, as for price discrimination, the contempo-
rary theory of industrial association does not give unambiguous answers
on the issue of  welfare.
The Antimonopoly Law, however, excuses individual agreements,
which  at least in terms of syntax and spirit satisfy all the conditions,
and/or are included in the enumerated types/examples. This will be the
case when the agreement contributes to the improvement of production
or exchange of goods, instigates technological development and/or eco-
nomic development. The mentioned violations of competition are then
allowed, except if they are not necessary for achieving the privileged goals.
In fact this is a leewayregulation, whose extent and significance depend
on the policy of the Law implementation in general. According to this reg-
ulation, a monopolistic agreement ceases to be punishable, per se, and its
legality is judged on the grounds of the rule of reason.
2.4. Bodies and procedure
The central body that deals with confirming and penalising monopolis-
tic and/or dominant position and monopolistic agreement abuse is the
Antimonopoly Commission.14
The Antimonopoly Commission triggers the process of confirming and
preventing and/or sanctioning of monopolistic and/or dominant position
and monopolistic agreement: (a) upon a report, (b) at its own initiative
(ex offo).
A report has to be presented to the Antimonopoly Commission (al) by
The Federal Market Inspector who by performing an inspection identifies
the existence of monopolistic abuse, and monopolistic position and
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Antimonopoly Law and related laws are given in a great detail in section 4 of this
chapter and in the succeeding chapter. At this place indicated are principle rules about
bodies and procedures which are significant for identifying of non-competitive mar-
ket structures concept alone, and punishable mechanisms which are predicted by
competition policy.
134 Competition Policy in FR Yugoslavia
monopolistic agreement. The expression identifies in article 10 of the
Competition law is not appropriate., According to this Law, The
Antimonopoly Commission is authorised to identify the existence of
monopoly abuse or dominant position and monopolistic agreement
abuse, so the entire concept of the Law, along with further authorities of
the Commission over procedure would make no sense if the Commission
was bound by the fact that The Market Inspector has or has not identified
prohibited monopolistic behaviour. The Federal market inspector only
hands over a  report to the Commission for further procedure when it
encounters the existence of a prohibited monopoly. 
The Report can also be presented to the Antimonopoly Commission
(a2) by any interested party. Behind this generalised formulation three
entities can exist: (1) participants on the market, which regard that by
abuse of monopolistic and/or dominant position and monopolistic agree-
ment, the principle of free competition is undermined, (2) consumers,
who believe that they have been damaged, that is that they can be damaged
by the conclusion of a monopolistic agreement (article 4, statute 1. Of the
Law), and (3) everyone who is obliged to report a criminal act, according
to the general rules of criminal legislature that is criminal procedure, con-
sidering that officials by monopoly abuse perform a criminal act (article
12 The Antimonopoly Law). What will happen if a report is handed over
by a person who does not have a legal interest? Considering that the
Commission also performs ex offo, such a report will be taken into
account by the rule. The point in defining the person submitting the
report is, first of all, to establish the obligation of reporting (the legal basis
for constitutional liability for omission as well), and secondly, the estab-
lishment of a participant position within the legal procedure, for an offi-
cial who submits a report.
The specific form of the report for initiating proceedings before the
Antimonopoly Commission is (a3) an obligation to present to the
Commission the agreement of association or formation of an industrial or
other form of association. The parties are obliged to present the agreement
within a period of 15 days from the day of concluding the agreement. The
point of this provision is that the Commission determines weather the
agreement has elements of monopoly or dominant position abuse, so con-
sequently it is a matter of a particular report which initiates proceedings
by the Commission.
The Commission is obliged to perform (b) in accordance with official
duty. That is anticipated by the Antimonopoly Law, in such a manner
that the Commission has a duty to observe and analyse acts and meas-
ures of entities which have monopolistic and/or dominant market posi-
tion. (In Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Law, in poorly handled legal lan-
guage, this duty of the Commission is envisaged, then its duty to deter-
mine the existence of monopolistic or dominant position that is monop-
olistic agreement, with understanding that appropriate act has been pre-
viously established). Proceedings are ex offo based on processing the
decree of the Law (article 9.) which points to the authorisations that is
acts of the federal market inspector, and the Law of federal market
inspection authorises and obliges the market inspector to supervise inde-
pendently implementing federal regulations by which, amongst other
things the exchange of goods and services, import and export, etc is
regulated. (article 3 of the Law).
Once the report is presented or once the process is started on the initia-
tive of the Commission, the Commission can require that the economic
entity, under investigation, present the agreement, contract or other act
which is related to the suspected monopoly. Not acting in accordance with
such a ruling is a special violation, for which there is a warrantee fine for
the legal and authorised person involved. (The person that fails to submit
the agreement about joining or forming of industrial or any other forms of
association will be treated in the same manner). Along with the fine, a so
called preventative measure can be determined: publication of the verdict.
The law mentions other inappropriate protection measures too: seizure of
objects and prohibition of performing business; these measures are passed
once the effect is instigated, and they are not in accord with the rules on
common administrative oversight.
If the commission determines that abuse of monopolistic or dominant
position exists, that a monopolistic agreement has been concluded, that is
that abuse can be achieved through the conclusion of association agree-
ment, it can  if there are conditions for it  order removal of irregulari-
ties. If the addressee acts in accordance with the order, logically, although
the Law does not emphasise it, further actions cease, but a fine can be
imposed since the abuse already existed. If addressee (economic entity,
association) does not act in accordance to the order a temporary prohibi-
tion follows, halting transactions involving certain goods, that is tempo-
rary prohibition for business association operations. The duration and
manner of ending the prohibition are not defined, so the conclusion can
be drawn that the temporary measure will last as long as it takes to remove
the irregularities, or prolongation and termination of procedure by
declaring a permanent measure. Finally, independently from the order for
removal, the Commission can pass a fine for economic violation.
After an unsuccessful attempt to remove the irregularities, or without it,
if there are no conditions for it, the Antimonopoly Commission can
impose a fine, for an economic violation. The Antimonopoly Law legis-
lates (as well as the Law of trade for unfair competition), a criminal act,
punishable with from 6 months to 5 years imprisonment, for the autho-
rised person, if by abuse of monopolistic agreement or dominant position
or by concluding a monopolistic agreement which instigated market dis-
turbance, which as a result has an advantageous position, on the basis of
which economic benefit is achieved or could be achieved, or if it caused
damage to another economic entity.
Along with the fine protective measures can be passed for an economic
violation: (a) to the company (a1) public announcement of the sentence,
(a2) seizure of objects (goods to which monopoly abuse referred to), and
(a3) prohibition for performing certain businesses, and (b) to authorised
person (b1) declare the verdict, and (b2) prohibition for performing
duties which they performed at the time of violation. Prohibition for per-
forming businesses and prohibition from the performance of duty can be
passed for from 6 months up to 10 years.
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3. COMPETITION AND RELATED RULES IN OTHER REGULATIONS
The rules which prevent monopoly and other forms of unfair competi-
tion are contained in range of other regulations. Some of them (older than
the Antimonopoly Law) are in competition with this Law, and with the
same goal permit existence of other bodies. The remaining regulations are
supplementary in nature, or attempt to regulate unfair market competi-
tion in specific areas.
The law of obligatory relations, a codification of rules on obligations,
in article 14., prohibits determination of rights and obligations by which
monopolistic market position is used or created for anyone. A monopo-
listic agreement of any kind, considering the nature of the contract, in
relation to this, is worthless and is not legally binding. Not only is it
impossible for associates to force one another to meet the commitments
made in such an agreement, but any interested party can call upon its
worthlessness.
The Law on trade contains numerous rules by which fair competition is
protected (this law, until the introduction of the Antimonopoly law, regu-
lated prohibition of monopoly too). Basic decrees, aside from the pro-
claimed fair competition, obligatory obedience to good business customs
and protection of consumers, explicitly prohibits state bodies from limit-
ing free trade and acting within the market, to disturb competition and
place individual traders or buyers in an unequal position by their actions,
support, or in any other way. Typical of the time when it was passed, this
decree is the basis for an entire chapter of laws which is entitled:
Temporary measures for prevention and removal of irregularities on a
unified market, which, admittedly under certain conditions, includes not
only prohibition of trade for singular products completely, but also prohi-
bition for singular producers to participate in trade of certain products,
prohibition for producers to use certain raw materials etc.
As far as violation of competition rules is concerned, the Law prohibits
unfair competition, speculations and limitation of the unified market.
Unfair competition is, according to the Law on trade, is an act of a trad-
er which is against good business customs and which causes damage or
can cause damage to other traders or buyers. Although for example, the
law relatively exactly enumerates such actions, mentioning mostly clas-
sic forms of unfair competition: false claims in advertisements, negative
advertisements, false data about the origins of the product, but also exag-
gerated bonuses as a part of advertising campaign.
Speculation is, according to the same law, instigation of disturbance on
the market and unjustifiable price increase with aim to achieve unfounded
material benefits, for example by hiding goods, through tied trade, and
similar.
In this case there is a problem of defining unfounded material bene-
fits. In a legal sense, it can be understood as a quest for legal basis to
adopting material benefit, that is weather adopting of such benefit is based
on positive legal regulations. Economically speaking, it is impossible to
define unfounded ownership benefits. If legal basis exists, that is, if the law
is not violated, every ownership benefit is well founded, considering that it
is achieved on the market, that is through trade transactions. The basis of
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ownership benefit is entrepreneurship, and an entrepreneur should face
the consequences (good and or bad) of his entrepreneurial activities.
In uncertain conditions, and business decisions are always made in
uncertain conditions, speculation, in an economic sense, represents per-
fectly legitimate market activity. Entrepreneurs estimate (speculate) future
market parameters and on the basis of theses estimations (speculation)
make their business decisions. In other words, entrepreneurial activities,
by their nature, inevitably involve speculation.
The Law specifies hiding of stock as a typical speculative activity. It is
evident that a trader hides his stock in conditions in which he thinks that
the sale of that stock will not be profitable, or will be less profitable than at
some future date. Both forms of behaviour are, economically speaking,
perfectly legitimate. As for the first type of behaviour, it cannot be expect-
ed that the trader will act against his own interest and sell the goods at a
price which brings financial loss. As for the second case, if the seller
expects a higher profit in the future, he simultaneously losses real, present
profit, so that he alone faces the risk, considering that there is no certainty
of future profit.
It is very probable that the activity of hiding stock as it appears in the
Law on trade is taken over from the earlier legislation, i.e. from the post-
war period, when state intervention on the market was extensive and was
based on legal control of prices. In those conditions, in which quoted
product prices were below the costs of their supply, no economic reason
existed for sellers to sell their goods. Therefore, in order to secure supply,
it was necessary to provide other, non-economic instigation to sellers to
offer the goods for sale. In other words, by this, sellers are forced to sell
goods, i.e. forced to behave contrary to their economic interest.
Limitations of a single market can originate from economic entities 
traders, but state bodies as well, which limit free appearance on the mar-
ket, specially by enabling widening of sale network, by forcing the sale of
goods and similar.
According to the Law of trade, unfair competition, speculation and lim-
itation of unified market are punishable acts, violations, economic distur-
bances, and even criminal acts.
The law of international trade also sanctions unfair competition. For
quoted examples as forms of unfair competition in this law it is character-
istic, that is for some of them, that they are most of all causing damage to
a competitor, but not to the competitive principle, sometimes even not so
clearly. For example, contracting export at the lower price than the price
the company agreed for, and through this causing the damage to that
company. The price does not have to be established against the principles
of fair business, that can be usual exporter price that is qualified as an
unfair competitor. As if prohibition is the case, and not protection of fair
and free competition, in the name of state protectionism. Even more since
through this, domestic companies are unable to compete with other, for-
eign companies at world market. If one domestic company reduced its
prices in order to be competitive to supply some other company from a
third country, it would, in accordance with the legal decree, be proclaimed
as guilty of causing damage to adomestic competitor, Other forms of com-
petitor violation in this Law are somewhat more logical.
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The Law of public price control system (»Official Gazette SFRY«, no.
84/99, »Official Gazette FRY«, no. 32/93 and no. 28/96), in regard to the
manner in which the concept of public price control is determined, it
inevitably encompasses competition regulations, that is regulations which
are implemented against monopoly. Public price control, according to
this law, implies activities of social-political community bodies (original
meaning of this forgotten concept that could mean federation, republic as
federal unit, autonomous province, commune) who follow price move-
ments and take measures to prevent and remove the market disturbance.
This law first of all explicitly forbids one kind of agreement which has
monopolistic characteristics: companies and their forms of association,
while establishing product and service prices, are not allowed to agree among
themselves, that is establish prices for same type of products and services.
Subsequent to endeavour of rules codification about monopoly, and
the introduction of the Antimonopoly Law this decree seems superfluous,
such a monopolistic agreement is an example of monopolistic agreement
according to article 4, statute 2, point 2 of the Antimonopoly Law.
However, the Law of public price control excludes from the prohibi-
tion, agreements establishing the criteria for pricing, concluded by power
company, railways and PTT traffic, companies, within the framework of
their communities.
At first sight, this solution is contrary to the prohibition of indirect
agreements on prices from the Antimonopoly Law, and it could be con-
cluded that by codification of monopoly rules in the later Antimonopoly
Law, according to the principle Lex posteriori derogat lex priori this regula-
tion was in fact abrogated, rendered invalid.
Deeper analysis leads to a different conclusion. At the time when the
Law on public price control went into effect this behaviour took place in
the context of a regime of social companies factual regional monopolies in
accordance with the territorial principal to the level of federal units, and
then encompassed into communities, regulated by law. Those companies
had (and still have) the exclusive right (and obligation!) to operate in these
industries and provide the services. Agreeing on criteria was aimed at
indispensable unification of tariff politics  in order for the system to
function  and rules of the Law of public price control had a role to put
under control existing, recognised and legally established (of telecommu-
nications, of railway) monopoly.
Companies, or communities in these activities were obliged to present
pricing criteria to the Federal Government for their opinion, which adopts
a position on criteria and forwards it to communities and companies.
A legal sanction for disrespecting the Governments opinion is made
indirectly. Companies or communities are obliged to present prices
formed according to these criteria to the federal legal body in charge of
pricing (Federal Ministry of economy and domestic trade, today), within
five days before the intended implementation,. The Ministry warns when
the prices do not conform to criteria adopted in accordance to the law,
and if the warning is not taken, suggests the introduction of public price
control measures to the Government.
A Special regime is anticipated for prices in some other industries as
well (production and trade in oil and oil derivatives, natural gas, coke,
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iron and steel and non ferrous metals, alkaline chemicals, medicines, etc.).
Companies form prices corresponding to market criteria, whose param-
eters are determined by the Law, and they are also obliged to present the
criteria and prices to the Government, that is the Ministry, which imple-
ments the same mechanism of control.
It is clear that this is a price control system, that is an economic regula-
tion, and not real competitive legislation, that is competition policy for
improving and developing competition.
This is confirmed by the legislator himself, when ordering, in article 16.
of the Law, that the administrative bodies in charge of price  perform a
series of analytical actions and measures,  clearly associated to a state-con-
trolled, and not market economy.
4. PROCESS PATTERN OF COMPETITION LEGISLATION
4.1. First-degree procedure
4.1.1. Authorisation
The legal source authorisation process and its system of standardisation
greatly affects the nature and content of the procedure itself, as well as the
directives by which specific bodies utilise it. Competition commission
authorisation does not prevent the abuse of monopolistic powers and the
conclusion of monopolistic agreements. The interventions in the single
market are determined twofold:
 Primary (original) authorisation is assigned by Anti-monopoly Law
decrees (Official Gazette FRY, no. 29/96)
 Secondary (deducted) authority assigned by the Law of Federal
Market Inspection decree (Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 24/74,
22/78, 23/80, 22/87, 71/88, 35/91,  Official Gazette of the FRY, nos.
24/94, 28/96, 59/98, 44/99, 74/99, 73/2000, 70/2001)
a) Primary
The Anti-monopoly Commissions exclusive authorisation for acting in
this area is found in article 5 of the decree. Anti-monopoly Law states that
the Commission is responsible for performing various activities ( it is
liable for taking measures., supervising and analysing actions, estab-
lishing existence) which prevent and terminate the damaging conse-
quences of monopoly positions and agreement collusion abuse. The
Commissions liability, according to this law, encompasses:
 taking measures;
 monitoring and analysing actions;
 verifying a monopolys existence (or the existence of a dominant
position).
Although seemingly clear and precise, this decree presents only a
partial solution. In practice, weaknesses are evident. The weaknesses
are the consequences of the existing competition legislation concept
alone. Consequently, it is a matter for the legislator who introduced
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Anti-monopoly Law that stopped half way. He anticipated the decree
(article 9) of the law that the Commission which, according to its position
and authorisation, is confined to federal market inspection. In other
words, the Commission will, providing that it wishes to regularly and
legally perform its actions, have to implement according to the requests
of the decrees forming the Law of Federal Market Inspection.15
b) Secondary
As noted above, the authority of the Commission can be reduced in
response to its insufficiencies and inaccuracies, already mentioned in arti-
cle 9 of the Anti-monopoly Law from the article of the Law of Federal
Market Inspection. However, that produces difficulties which are com-
mon in situations when lex specialis (in this case insufficient) and lex
genenrali exist simultaneously. In reality, difficulties exist in precisely
defining the authority of the Commission, since the terms used in differ-
ent legal texts vary, which result in further discrepancies in the legal regu-
lations in this area. The authority of Commission includes:
 supervision of the implementation of federal laws and other federal
regulations;
 supervision of the implementation of general acts from the transac-
tional area, the price and quality of the goods and services;
 leading the procedure;
 making decisions and deciding on appeals;
 taking measures within the rights and obligations defined by federal
law.
4.1.2. The concept of the party
Obligations, which the authority for performing the procedure will
have in relation to that individual, depend on what is considered to be a
party and its legal position. Special competition legislation contains a gap
even here since it does not include explicit guidelines on what can be con-
sidered to be a party in a Commissions investigation. Consequently, the
assistance of additional legislation (the Law of General Legal Procedure) is
needed, which is indicated by the decision of the Competitive Act and Law
of Federal Market Inspection alone. According to the Law of General Legal
Procedure, a party is considered to be individual upon whose request the
procedure has been initiated, or against which the procedure is carried
out, or which, with an aim to protect his own rights or legal interest, has
the right to take part in a procedure. An application for a procedure which
is to be carried out before the Commission would mean that each initiator
of an act is considered to be a party within that procedure. Problems occur
when a presenter appears to be every interested individual or when the
procedure is initiated by official duty. It remains undefined who will, in
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the authorisations of market inspection are regulated.
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this case, be considered to be the second party. The Commission cannot
simultaneously be a collective legal body, which decides according to the
law, and a party within the procedure. Granting party position to any
member of the Commission, or professional services of the Commission,
is against unbiased and objective principles and also leads to the applica-
tion of omission.
4.1.3 Initiation of procedure (initial act)
Significantly, initiation of a procedure has multiple meanings, which
are not adequately defined in special competitive legislature.
Consequently, a full answer to this question requires analysis encompass-
ing the decisions in the Law of General Legal Procedure, indicated by arti-
cle 23 of The Law of Federal Market Inspection. The importance of  the
resolution of the question as to who is the authorised entity for initiating a
procedure derives from the fact that answers to the following questions are
dependant on it: (1) what is the form of the initiation; (2) what is the con-
tent of initiation; (3) is there a deadline and how long is the initiation peri-
od of the procedure; (4) when is the procedure initiated; (5) what is the
obligation of the Commission towards the initiator and, more precisely,
who is considered to be a party in this procedure? Thereby, according to
valid legal regulations, initiation is possible:
 ex offo (on official duty)16
 by officials (federal market inspector);17
 by any interested individual.18
Initiation of a procedure before the Commission makes it possible,
through interpretation and analogy, to get an answer to the question of
what is considered to be initial act and what is its content. However, an ex
offo initiation raises the problem of defining the moment when the proce-
dure is considered to be initiated and, in relation to this, what is the dead-
line for the Commission to deliver its first-degree decision. In the first
instance the maximum period, assigned by the Law of General Legal
Procedure, is 2 months while in other cases there is no precise answer.
4.1.4 Presentation of evidence
The key question concerning the presentation of evidence is the defini-
tion of the factual basis on which the Commission forms its decision. A
general decree on this is contained in the Competitive Act assigned by the
Commission (meaning their professional services) analyses and super-
vises, while precise decrees about this contain additional laws for this
area. So the Law of Federal Market Inspection contains a ruling which pres-
ents an elaboration of the general norm from the Law of General Legal
Procedure, and which states that, in order to determine factual standing, an
inspector has the right to examine the goods, business area and equipment,
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17 Article 10. Antimonopoly Law. .
18 Article 8. Antimonopoly Law.
business accounts, agreements and other legal documentation which pro-
vide insights into the business with a view to implementing the regulations
from the domain his is supervising. These activities could be attributed to,
what Antimonopoly Law calls supervision and analysis of the work.
However, the question is when did the procedure begin before
Commission started. The Law of General Legal Procedure provides that
this is taking any action. However, a problem appears when, as a conse-
quence of such a decree application, the procedure before the
Commission leads to unequal performance of the Commission and
imposing of unequal positions on the parties. This happens in the case
that when the presenter is official, the first performance could be consid-
ered as questioning its exactness and sufficiency (whether by direct inves-
tigation into books and other documents relating to the economic entity,
or its request to declare report quotation), whereas it is unclear how to
define, and on what basis criteria, a certain act is a first act in situations
when the procedure is initiated ex offo.
4.1.5. First-degree decision
Once the procedure is over, the Commission is authorised to pass a
first-degree decision. Since the procedure before the Commission repre-
sents a legal process, the ruling by which the decision about the main (in
meritum) subject is made, is a decision. Considering that the Commission
is collegial legal body, for fully valid decision-making, a qualified majority
(quorum) of Commission members is necessary and for a majority deci-
sion by present members is required for passing the decision.
Implementation of the Law of General Legal Procedure decisions states
that the Commission is able to make a ruling about two kinds of legal acts
whose differentiation is based on differences of their sentences. So, the
Commission is able to pass a sentence at the conclusion of a procedure
which represents a constitutive legal act. With such an act, the
Commission forms a new legal relationship and alters or ceases any exist-
ing legal relationship. Contrary to this, by declaring a legal act, the
Commission would have more authorisation to determine what is formal-
ly declare that the legal relation (it could be certain fact as a part of that
legal relation) is conceived or in opposite case that it does not exist. Due to
the specific nature of a competitive act, the Commission does not make
clearly constitutive or clearly declarative legal acts. On the contrary, in
most of the cases it makes the law more precise by making decisions with-
in a sentence. Firstly, it verifies that a monopoly, a dominant position,
exists (a legal relation) and that its abuse exists, or that a monopolistic
agreement decision exists (as a fact), whereas, in its second part, it con-
tains obligations for certain parties of the legal procedure which is charac-
terised that act as a partially dependent act. So, for example, determina-
tion that one economic entity has a dominant (monopolistic) market
position which is something to be determined by the Commission, will
find its counterpart in the declarative sentence. Contrary to this, the sec-
ond position of the same sentence, in most cases, regulates, for example, a
going back to retail prices for period, which presents an obligation for
parties to perform in a certain way. 
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The problem of mixed legal acts appears in domain of its manifestation.
While constitutive legal acts render for future (pro future, ex nuns) per-
formance of legal declarative act on the other side expands to backwards
(ex tunc). If, for example, a sentence concludes the existence of a monop-
olistic position, abuse is accepted. That means that there is a legal basis to
determine raised achieved equity benefit in that period. Acceptance of the
constitutive character of these legal acts means that the period when the
abuse occurred is legally irrelevant and that the primary aim is its pre-
vention in future, disregarding the previous performance of the economic
entity. A special problem exists in those cases where Antimonopoly Law
assigns that the Competition commission, once it determines that an eco-
nomic entity abused its dominant market position, or exclusively monop-
olistic agreement, will pass a sentence which will order that economic enti-
ty to take certain measures and acts in order to remove determined irreg-
ularities and omissions. That happens because, in such situations, as past
Commission performance proves, decisions whose sentencing contains
orders to parties to cancel certain articles of the agreement, does not pres-
ent an agreement of joining. Neither could it be treated as a measure or act
(although it is necessary to take some actions), although it represents an
agreement.
Undoubtedly, the final result which Antimonopoly Law aims to prevent
is profit: benefit equity achievement. It is usual practise of criminal legisla-
tion that for criminal acts which are motivated by greed, the most effective
deterrent is a fine, as the primary punishment, and as a secondary, deduc-
tion of acquired illegal assets or funds. However, the Commission does
not have a mandate to impose fines, nor to deduct benefit obtained
through criminal acts, which abuse of a monopoly position is. First of all,
because Antimonopoly Law, as lex specialis, does not anticipate such a
possibility. Instead there is the possibility to declare fine in assessor proce-
dures: a criminal procedure for criminal acts, such as the abuse of a domi-
nant position, which can be taken against managers in economic entities,
and procedures against the economic entity, in accordance with its eco-
nomic violations. 
However, the principles of efficiency, speed and care dictates that it is
completely rational and desirable to determine the increase of the owners
assets by the Commission and to include it in its sentence decision, if there
has been abuse. Firstly, because its determination is made easy and it pres-
ents a constituent part of the analysis and control procedures of business
books and the other documents of the economic entity which are per-
formed by the Commissions professional services as the most competent
for this area. Secondly, costs resulting in the determination of this benefit
will be much lower if they present part of the procedure before the
Commission, instead of duplicating these activities in eventual judicial
proceedings.
Aside from this, existing competition legislation does not have a policy
on appeals to decisions. The Commission does not have powers of suspen-
sion, i.e. its declaration does not delay the execution of the sentence.
However, it remains unclear who is the entity liable for execution of the
sentence and in which period of time its execution is to be made, for
example, when a damaged economic entity does not wish to execute it. 
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It has already been mentioned that the procedure before the
Commission represents a general legal procedure, which means that for
the execution of a legal act, it is the authorised person who passed it on, i.e.
the Commission. However, existing legislation did not grant the
Commission such authorisations. Additionally, its personnel is not tech-
nically capable of fulfilling this task. The question of executing the passed
sentences is also complicated by the nature of the area in which the act is
brought: a sentence which orders the elimination of certain articles or
entire agreements or contracts, the re-establishment of price levels to
some previous date, etc. Those are the measures which cannot be executed
by enforcement. Such legal gaps cannot be fulfilled by warrantee or pass-
ing fines for criminal acts to officials and economic violation to legal offi-
cial. That is because a warrantee of the declaration of criminal acts and
economic violations already exists, so their preventive effect is negligible.
In other words, their duplication does not make the decision-making any
easier.
Sentences contained by Antimonopoly Law that, through the sentence,
provide the economic entity a certain period of time, does not take meas-
ures and acts aimed at removing established irregularities and omissions.
The Competition Commission can temporarily prohibit transactions of
certain goods, which only delays and deepens the problem of execution,
but it does not solve it since, in this case, the question is who, how, and to
what deadline is reasonable to execute such a sentence and what are the
consequences for the market, etc.
As executive body, only the communal official market court can appear
as the registrar which will, within executive procedure, eliminate prohibit-
ed behaviour from the list of registered businesses. If that it is the only or
dominant business of an economic entity, the question of temporary liq-
uidation could be considered. Conversely, according to general trade
rules, an economic entity could carry on with its business occasionally or
to a lesser extent (especially if it was not the primary producer). If an eco-
nomic entity continued to perform, regardless of the temporary invalida-
tion of the registered business since prohibition is enforced only for a lim-
ited time, initiation of a new procedure would have to follow and result in
new sanctions. Along with all this, registration regulations do not recog-
nise the temporary elimination of a business so it would most likely have
to appear as a special annotation and note in the registry supplementation.
Specific procedures would have to be effected in statistic registry.
However, this is not the end of the legal problems and dilemmas.
4.1.6. Appeals declared against first-degree decisions (the appeal
procedure)
The question of who is regarded to be a party within the procedure has
its counterpart in a phase of appeal procedure in the form of the question
concerning who has the right to appeal, which is likewise connected with
the content of the first-degree decision and its sentence. The Law of
General Legal Procedure states that against any decision passed on in first-
degree, any party has the right to appeal. That means that the presenter of
initial act has the right to declare appeal. However, full analysis demands
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that the review of the right to appeal is connected with the decision of
first-degree sentence. If the decision is made against the economic entity,
it is just that he has the right to appeal. Difficulties arise in other situa-
tions, as when a presenter is not satisfied with a sentence as it is of less
advantage to him (e.g. disagreements over the exact date to which prices
are returned). It is not clear if there should be a right of appeal in that case. 
Aside from this, although they do not represent parties within the pro-
cedure, the state (that is the public prosecutor, public defender and other
state bodies), when authorised by law, can declare appeal against the deci-
sion by which the law is violated in benefit of physical or legal officials, and
to the disadvantage of public interest.
Further, there are problems of deadlines for appeal, which are shorter
then in general legal procedures and problems which are presented by
incorrect lessons about legal remedy. Therefore, the significance of legal
matter alone leads to the fact that, in this legal area, appeals against the
first-degree decision are allowed and the simultaneous possibility of carry-
ing out the legal dispute.
It is interesting to note that the legislator indicated through only a few
decrees of competitive legislation that the procedure before the
Commission is considered to be urgent. It is the matter of decisions which
assign the deadline for appeal against the first-degree decision but which
are shorter than the deadlines that are valid in general legal procedures.
So, as opposed to general deadlines for declarations of appeal, which is,
according to the Law of General Legal Procedure, 15 days, Antimonopoly
Law, whose decrees, such as lex specialise are primary in implementation,
anticipates appeal deadlines within eight days.
A problem of  a more technical legal nature which articulates
(non)competent legal and regulative performance of the Commission
assembled in accordance to existing regulations, relates to lessons about
legal remedy against first-degree decisions. Incorrect legal lessons, which
are numerous in Commission practice, damage the positive view of the
Commissions work and the existence of competition legislature. The
problem of incorrect legal lessons about legal remedy is easy to solve in
theory by utilising decrees of the Law of General Legal Procedure which
greatly elaborate in that area, but the question is whether they will still
produce particular problems in practice.
Firstly, due to the fact that procedure itself is hybrid, inaccurate and
insufficient before the Commission.
a) Finality and execution
Execution of the legal act, in this case of the Commission, is the genuine
aim of its implementation. Otherwise it will remain notional. Existing
competitive legislature does everything to present a decision of the
Commission as a frivolous warrantee. The main point of execution is sat-
isfying and protecting the interest which defends norms of competitive
legislature. The legal act can be carried out when it becomes executive,
more precisely when all conditions are achieved, or when there is the pos-
sibility for its individual legal norm to become reality. First of all, this pos-
sibility is granted to the act addressee: the one whom the act effect is
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addressed to and  the one to whose disadvantage the act is made. The time
the addressee has for the execution of obligation is called action, or pro-
ceeding the deadline in which he is authorised to willingly and, by his own
means, execute individual legal norm. The rule of administrative law is
that, if the addressee does not proceed in accordance with the act, the
mechanism of forced execution of the additional act goes into effect.
Considering that Antimonopoly Law does not anticipate the suspense
effect of a declared appeal against a first-degree decision, that means the
execution of first-degree sentence comes into force from the moment it is
presented to the party. Presentation to the party is also the criteria from
which execution of second-degree decision begins, i.e. decisions made on
the declaration of appeal.
b) Appeal procedure before a first-degree legal body (commission)
The first-degree body (Commission) handles control authorisations, in
relation to declared appeals, as well as in relation to appeal decisions. That
means that the Commission deals with instruments and authorisations
which support regularities and accuracy of the proceeding:
 possibility to complete first-degree procedures if needed which, as a
consequence, makes determining of factual conditions more com-
plete; execution of new reviewing processes with the primary
goal of enabling the party to declare itself about facts and circum-
stances which are important for making the decision;
 withdrawal of appeal decisions, i.e. its replacement with a new deci-
sion (presumably with a different sentence);
 cancellation of the first-degree decision and reversion to a new
process of first-degree body;
 alteration of first-degree decision;
 rejection of the declared appeal and confirmation of the first-degree
decision;
c) Appeal procedure before a second-degree legal body (federal ministry)
Authorisations of a second-degree body are also twofold: in relation to
legal matters alone and in relation to first-degree decisions which are con-
ditioned by appeal. The second-degree body, in this case, when Federal
Ministry for Economy and Internal Trade has following authorisations at
its disposal:
 to refuse the appeal and therefore indirectly confirm regularities and
legitimacy of first-degree decision;
 to annul the decision entirely or partially depending on the complex-
ity of the matter, efficacy and speed principles of procedure and fac-
tual proposals of appeal decision;
 make a decision about the matter by himself (there is no data related
to the Commissions decision within the practise of Federal Ministry
so far);
 present the subject to a body authorised for first-degree decision-
making (according to the practise of Federal Ministry, the only way
of deciding against the Commission decision);
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 alter the decision (there is no data according to presented documen-
tation);
 declare that decision is proclaimed null and void. 
4.2. Administrative matters
4.2.1. Complaints for bringing legal actions
A party which is not satisfied with a legal act has the right to ask for
court control, i.e. has the right to bring legal actions. Administrative mat-
ters are a specific court dispute whose subject is the examination and
assessment of the legal work legality in a specific case. In our legal system,
legal disputes are accepted in accordance with a system of general stipula-
tion, it is expressed in the constitution and legal decrees. Article 120,
statute 1 of the Constitution of the FR of Y assigns that the legality of final
legal acts determines the  authorised court in a legal dispute if the law does
not anticipate other judicial protection. However, in Article 2 it antici-
pates that in special cases, bringing legal actions can be excluded by the
law. In accordance with the decrees legislator in article 9, the Law of Legal
Disputes anticipates that bringing legal actions is possible but through
negative enumeration: presenting cases in which bringing legal actions is
not possible. Therefore, constitution-creator and legislator are coming
from the point that bringing legal actions is a rule, and the legal exclusion
of that possibility is the exception.
Antimonopoly Law continuing with its concept of insufficiency and
inaccuracy does not contain a single decree dedicated to this question  it
does not explicitly assign the possibility of bringing legal actions but is
does not exclude that possibility either. Therefore, it is concluded that
bringing legal actions in this domain is not possible. The Law of legal dis-
pute conditions the possibility of legal actions by enforcement of final
legal act. Legal theory and practise are unique in assumption that final
legal act is considered to be legal act which is implemented in second-
degree i.e. by second-degree body. Therefore, complaint for bringing legal
actions is possible only in those cases when previous second legal method
is used, which is assigned by the Law of legal procedure  appeal against
first-degree decision. Considering the Antimonopoly Law regulates that
against the decision of the Commission, appeal is permitted that means
the legal dispute is possible only against the decision of Federal Ministry
for economy and internal trade as second-degree body, only if prior to
that it was appealed against the Commission decision as a first-degree
body. In case that dissatisfied party within legal procedure does not appeal
against the decision of the Commission, it unable judicial protection of his
own interests, freedoms and rights.
Initial act by which bringing legal actions is initiated is called complaint.
Complaint content should be such that it contains a request for a definite
judicial decision of the party which is not satisfied by the outcome of the
final legal act. When it is a  question of who can institute legal actions the
situation is clear  the defendant as one side in a dispute is always the state
that is its administration. More precisely appeal for instituting legal
actions is allows legal request directed against the State, in this case against
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Federal Ministry for economy and internal trade as presenter of second-
degree decision.
Especially interesting question is if the complaint submitted against
decision of the Federal Ministry could be apt for initiation of dispute with
full jurisdiction. Dispute of full jurisdiction authorises the court before
which it is instituted, aside from deciding about subject of complaint
appeal  regularity of legal act, that it can decide about legal situation itself
as well as reimbursement of the damage that is recovery of the things
which were deducted. Therefore in this case, court would, aside from
authorisation to discuss and make decisions about regularities and legality
of decisions made by Federal Ministry for Economy and internal trade,
have possibility to, through its own decision, solve the question whether
there was abuse of dominant position, or monopoly position, that is
whether monopoly agreement was concluded and what are the conse-
quences caused by it. The law in regard to legal dispute assigns that initia-
tion of full jurisdiction dispute is a possibility of a court and not obligation
and regulates confining to following cumulative conditions: that the
nature of legal situation is such that court through its decision cannot
solve it, and estimation of that aptness is left to court.
Considering that further reports contain analysis of (im)possibility to
institute legal actions before Federal Constitutional court by constitution-
al complaint submission, it seems that protection of freedom and rights,
or prevention of monopoly position abuse would present legal matter in
which instituting legal actions should be allowed. If opposite stand is
accepted court control of legal acts, that is juridical protection of freedoms
and rights would be unsaid and practically ineffective. Without full juris-
diction dispute interested party that is party which considers that legal act
is instituted to its inconvenience enters a veritable labyrinth of new proce-
dures since in the case of annulled legal act new legal act supervenes before
Commission, Federal Ministry for economy and internal trade which is in
sharp contrast with thrift, efficacy and principle of fast work.
Prosecutor in legal dispute is most frequently the dissatisfied party
coming out of legal process. Theoretically speaking that means that poten-
tial presenter of the complaint (prosecutor) can be: legal official  eco-
nomic entity which considers decision of the Federal Ministry which
affirms first-degree decision to his inconvenience to be illegal, state body 
Federal market administrative inspection that is before him Federal mar-
ket inspector on the basis of legally assigned authority and individual,
individual. And while party legitimisation of individual which is the pre-
senter of the appeal by which process is instigated before Commission
(according to Antimonopoly Law  every other interested person) is indis-
putable, the dilemma, whether as a party in legal dispute individual which
so far did not participate in legal procedure but which considers that by
legal act his right and freedoms are disturbed, remains unsolved. Taking
into account that legal dispute presents, what seems like last possibility for
protection of freedoms and rights of troubled ones, by a single legal act
such a person should be granted party legitimisation. However, the prob-
lem appears when his interest for that should be explained since the appeal
for instigation of legal dispute is not a complaint actio populis. According
to the existing legislation explicit possibility for something like that does
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not exist. Existence of complaint legitimisation assumes the existence of
legally-relevant relation of a person to the subject matter of legal process.
Nevertheless, certain space for legal construction exists since decrees of
competitive legislation assign that for initiation of procedure before
Commission, it is necessary to comply with cumulatively set conditions
out of which, for this question interested ones are that certain perform-
ance instigated disturbance and caused changes at the market. Such
consequences can damage any person, even the one which was not the
party in legal process. 
Participation of an individual is possible only in form of institution
behind the interested person regulated by article 16. the Law of legal dis-
pute. However, possibility of its appliance are very limited. Limitation is
due to decrees since interested person is considered to be every third per-
son which would be directly damaged by annulled denied legal act. That
means that as interested person in legal dispute any individual can appear
but only if following postulates are content: that the previous one was the
party in multiple-party procedure which is satisfied by its outcome so that
as a consequence it did not file the complaint, that legal dispute is instigat-
ed, that the subject matter of the dispute is slow estimation of legal act reg-
ularities and legalities by which it has been affirmed that dominant posi-
tion that is monopolistic agreement exists and that it has been abused and
that its termination would be to its detriment. To its damage in this case
should be interpreted as possibility of instituting the new legal act with dif-
ferent content by which his freedoms and rights could be disturbed, inas-
much as the sentence went into effect.
4.2.2. Complaint
Legal dispute is, principally speaking single degree. It is a fact that pos-
sibility to use the complaint against first-degree court decision made in
legal dispute is exception. Therefore making second-degree court decision
is uncertain. Aside from this, dissatisfied party in legal dispute had excep-
tional legal means at disposal, their possibility to be submitted are limited
by their nature that is conditions which are necessary for their perform-
ance as well as the extent and direction of their performance.
4.3. Criminal procedure
Criminal responsibility can exist on the side of:
 the responsible person in an economic entity which abused its posi-
tion;
 the federal market inspector if he did not report abuse as a criminal
act of which he became aware while performing his official duty;
 a member of commission or professional service in the case of official
duty abuse.
The criminal responsibility of these entities requires initiation of crimi-
nal procedure, which is exclusive authority of public prosecutor. From
this pont of view following solutions are possible: that prosecutor alone
institutes legal actions upon conclusion of initial investigating acts or that
it proceeds on the basis of submitted criminal record.
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4.4. Violation procedure
Presents some kind of sanction for non-co-operative individuals in
legal procedure. So violation procedure is initiated and a company or
other legal official can be punished with fine ranging from 30,000 to
150,000 new dinars if on the request of the Antimonopoly Commission
they do not present agreements, contracts, deals and other acts which are
related to production, trade or technically-technological development as
well as responsible person in association if he does not present agreements
about associating or funding industrial and other forms of joining.
The problem of preventive measures  public announcement of judge-
ment,  confiscation of property and prohibition to perform certain busi-
ness, and responsible person  prohibition to perform the duties which
they performed at the time of the violation act.
4.5. Procedure according to legal complaint
The question of permission to institute legal actions before the Federal
constitutional court by submitting a constitutional complaint is part of
more extensive question about list of individual freedoms and rights
through which constitutional judgement protection is granted. More to
the point, which are the freedoms and rights whose protection is authori-
ty of Federal constitutional court. Procedure in accordance with constitu-
tional complaint presents singular constitutionally legal dispute with aim
to protect the most important freedoms and rights proclaimed by consti-
tution. The question whether there is a place for initiation of procedure by
constitutional complaint becomes more significant by the nature of rights
which are to be protected and by doubtfulness in legal theories about
whether the possibility of legal dispute excludes possibility of instituting
legal actions related to constitutional complaints and the other way
around? On federal level, possibility of submitting constitutional com-
plaint is standardised by FRY Constitution and federal regulations. The
Constitution of the FRY in article 124 anticipates that Federal constitu-
tional court decides about constitutional complaints because of offended
man and citizen freedoms and rights proclaimed by Constitution through
single measures and acts.
First part of this formulation does not induce doubts since it is clear
enough. As acts sufficient to disregard their regularity and legality in pro-
cedure before Federal constitutional court, singular measures and acts are
quoted. When it is the matter of violating right and freedoms by legal acts,
singular legal acts are considered to be amongst others, singular legal acts
of judicial and singular legal acts of constitutional bodyes of FRY. Whats
more,  constitutional acts of silence can be the complaint in this proce-
dure. However, problems appear when the question of constitutional
complaint subsidising should be answered. Constitutional complaint sub-
sidising means that submitting constitutional complaint is permitted and
possible when no other legal protection is provided. Article 128. FRY
Constitution determines that it makes a decision about a constitutional
complaint, when no other protection is provided. In principle, court con-
trol of constitution (possibility of instituting a constitutional dispute) is
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excluded when there is a possibility of protection by some other legal
regime. In this way the assigned constitutional formulation gives huge lee-
way for interpretation, which makes the situation even more complex in
otherwise intensely imprecise and insufficiently clear and firm conception
of competition legislature. The term provided can be interpreted in two
ways: as generally permitted possibility (regularity) of second legal protec-
tion or as non-exhausted existing legal means. Theory and practise of FRY
are separated when the questions should be answered. Federal constitu-
tional court alone accepted restrictive comprehension which, if possibility
of initiating procedure before the Federal Constitutional Court (SUS) is
accepted in case of freedoms and right violation brought upon by judicial
act in constitutional dispute instituted against decision of Commission or
Federal ministry for economic and internal trade, does not exist. This
means that this institution considers that for freedoms and rights form
this domain other legal protection is provided, precisely in possibility to
initiate constitutional dispute, which in accordance with restrictive com-
prehension does not have to be used at all. More to the point, SUS con-
ceives that legal protection isnt provided when it is not anticipated. Its
comprehension SUS grounds in a fact that for this domain (protection of
rights and freedoms) possibility of instituting constitutional dispute is
permitted. This is just one of possible solutions although Constitutional
act does not contain decrees about it.
In SUS practise only one instance of submitting the complaint is
recorded, violation of rights to equality and equality in earnings.
Unfortunately, even SUS overlooked that unique opportunity for forming
constitutional judicial practise in this domain. Namely, it is the case 17/94
where economic entity submitted constitutional appeal against the deci-
sions of constitutional bodies and courts because he considered that the
right to equal earning with other entities in economy guaranteed by con-
stitution is violated. The right, that is principle about equal earnings is the
right assigned by article 74. Pg. 2 Constitution of FRY and as such it pres-
ents subject of institutional judicial protection as well as other freedoms
and rights which can be deduced from decrees of FRY Constitution.
Constitutional formulation of those rights which says: economic enti-
ties are independent and equal and conditions of earnings are equal for
all presents constitutional decree about competitive position and per-
formance. From contributions which were presented with complaint it is
evident that its presenter already instituted constitutional dispute about
legality and regularity of constitutional act. Instead of resolving numerous
dilemmas and disputes and taking a clear stand by its decision, SUS resort-
ed to, in its terms an elegant solution, leaving the situation open and
moreover opening new questions. Namely, SUS refused the submitted
constitutional complaint by its decision with explanation that its submis-
sion is not permitted since it is submitted by an official registered for per-
formance of trade business and not for protection of personal and citizen
freedoms. The impression which imposes itself is that by this decision SUS
deliberately, indirectly, thwarted the freedoms and rights protection in
the last instance.
Also, opening the problem of legitimisation which is in constitutional
judicial procedure equal to parties capabilities SUS narrowed down the
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possibility of freedom and rights protection even more. In other words, a
presented decision indicates that the only liable entities for submitting a
constitutional claim are those entities which are registered for protection
of rights and freedoms. The short-sightedness and weakness of such a
decision will become clear as soon as an individual appears as the presen-
ter of the constitutional claim, . However, so far SUS practise has not
recorded such cases.
5. CRIMINAL MEASURES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
5.1. Criminal measures in broader sense
In a broader sense all measures taken by the Antimonopoly
Commission are repressive. Some of them, however, have a goal to unable
realisation of monopoly abuse, in any form, and to remove the condition
caused by competition disturbance or condition in which disturbance can
be caused.
Such measures are: (1) decision which regulates taking measures or
actions which are necessary to remove perceived irregularities or failures,
(2) decision which orders alteration of certain decrees related to agree-
ment of joining, that is complying to certain rules so that agreement does
not have the monopolistic character.
This group consist of (3) decision which temporarily prohibit transac-
tion performance of certain goods, if economic entity does not act accord-
ing to decision cited above under (1),
As well as (4) temporary prohibition to association to perform business,
if it does not act in accordance with decision cited above under (2).
Although they prohibit business, these measures by its nature and goal
are not punishments, even temporary prohibition had a goal to remove
the condition of competition disturbed by monopoly, and not to punish
the individual who abused monopoly.
These measures are in  the power of the Competition commission.
Appeal against the Commission decision is authority of federal body in
charge of trade business (now Ministry of economy and internal trade). It
is possible to institute constitutional dispute against second-degree deci-
sion before Federal court.
Criminal measures in broader sense can be classified as measures of
indirect price control anticipated by the Law of public price control. They
can be introduced in accordance with article 12 of this Law (a) in order to
prevent monopolistic price forming, (b) if the companies dealing with
businesses quoted in the Law do not form the prices based on mutual that
is market criteria, and (c) if big disturbances in movement of prices occur
or can occur.
The first case, as a competitive measure, is contradictory, on first sight,
to decisions of Antimonopoly Law. That law tends to prevent monopolis-
tic agreements about price, regulating such agreement as invalid. Still,
within the system as it is, this measure makes sense: not only that monop-
olies can come to exist, but they exist, in singular businesses, on the basis
of the Law. Price policy is chosen as a way of controlling such monopolies.
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The second is specific application of economically  political and compet-
itive logic adopted within the system, and is described further on. Third is
a wide gap for controlled price policy, and it is connected to monopolistic
agreements because market disturbance appears as consequence of pro-
hibited agreements anticipated by Antimonopoly Law.
Indirect price control measures, according to the Law are: the highest
prices, that is highest price level, restitution of certain price level, previous
notice about price alteration regulating the manner in which prices are
formed. The Law does not speak about these measures any more. It is up
to Government, that is Ministry to apply them in accordance to estimated
kind of alteration.
5.2. Criminal measures in confined sense
The Law, however, institutes criminal measures in a confined sense, for
all three forms of criminal act in our legal system, and therefore punishes
violation, economic disturbance and criminal acts.
Violation according to Antimonopoly Law presents withholding of acts
(agreements, contracts, arrangement etc) requested by the Competition
commission, which are related to production, trade or technically  tech-
nological development, that is withholding of agreements on joining or
formation of industrial or other forms of associations.
The act of execution is achieved by (1a) omission to act in accor-
dance with an Antimonopoly Commission order to present required
documents, which was issued when Commission finished, in accor-
dance with report of market inspector, interested person or acting ex
offo, if doubt that the entity has monopolistic or dominant position and
that it was abused is grounded, that is that it can be abused (from the
Commission point of view, it is the matter of collecting the evidence in
previous procedure), or (1b) omission of legal obligation to present
agreement of joining or funding industrial or other forms of association
within 15 days.
In the first case, the responsible legal official or official is liable for vio-
lation in that legal official. In second, responsible person within the asso-
ciation (legal official does not have to exist) is warned with infringement
fine. Warrantee fine are paid in cash and they are not very high. Along
with fines preventive measures can be enunciated: public declaration of
judgement, deduction of objects and prohibition to perform certain busi-
ness, that is prohibited performance of duties for responsible person. Only
first measure is logical. There is no place for the second measure here,
there is no violation subject (except if legislator does not think that docu-
ments by which agreements were formed should be deducted and
burnt), violation procedure does not confirm whether monopoly is
abused, or that some benefit has been attained (violation subject). Even
business prohibition didnt sound right, except if refusal to present docu-
ments continues. Prohibition to perform duty for an official seems to be
more of a omission, and not protective measure. That is possibly, the rea-
son why they are practically not pronounced.
When there is omission which makes the core of violation, Competitive
commission submits report to the body liable for violation procedure.
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If documents are provided, on time or posterior, and if it is established
that elements of monopoly abuse exist, which are removable, measures
and acts for banishment will be ordered, described under A. Regardless of
this or if banishment does not succeeds, second from of violation respon-
sibility may succeed.
Economic violation exists when an economic entity in its business
abuses monopolistic and/or dominant position, that is concludes a
monopolistic agreement. (Surely, the difference in act of execution is only
formal and apparent, as it was indicated, abuse is  covered by the term
monopolistic agreement). Every abuse of monopoly presents an econom-
ic violation, and examples of monopolistic abuse, that is dominant posi-
tion are given in clumsy definition from article 3. of the Antimonopoly
Law are only an indication for a court which makes a decision; the same
implies for examples from monopolistic agreement the article 4. as well.
This is important to emphasise because in terms and examples conse-
quences are variously and alternatively regulated (leads or can lead),
that is as a consequence, on the same level, abstract and concrete danger
and realised consequence appear, which is not common for violation law.
Both the responsible person and legal official can be accused and pun-
ished for an economic violation. Therefore, contrary to violation, respon-
sibility of legal official for conclusion of monopolistic agreement is possi-
ble: if it is hard to decode which participant from the agreement is liable
for presentation of agreement, everyone is responsible for conclusion that
is abuse. (Of course, it is possible to open up the question of essential
accomplice in execution, but that is beyond the needs of the practise.)
Aside from fines, here as well, protection measures for legal and liable offi-
cial, carefully defined by the law are possible. For legal, those are declaration
of the verdict, deduction of objects (which were obtained through abuse),
and prohibition to perform the business, from six months up to ten years.
For responsible person, aside from declaration of the verdict, prohibi-
tion to perform the performed duty as well, in time span from six moths to
ten years. The law does not speak of culprit, but it looks like the term
abuse requires pensiveness.
Penalty measures in confined sense are regulated in some other laws
which indirectly or directly contain competition rules. Example for that is
the Law of public price control. This law also predicts all three forms of
responsibility: violation, economic disturbance and criminal act.
Violation is not presenting, by agreement confirmed, (monopolistic)
businesses price forming criteria determined by law, as well accounting
prices above designated. In a second case, violation fine is placed in pro-
portion to profit gained through sale, so that fine amounts for five to
twenty times value in price difference.
Economic violation aside from the rest, exists when companies or associ-
ations agree about establishing prices. This decree can mean three things:
(a) that agreement which does not have monopolistic character is sanc-
tioned, which is considering criteria for term of monopolistic agreement
practically impossible, and (b) that this economic violation will exist
regardless of sanction for monopolistic agreement, or (c) that one or the
other sanctioning mechanism will be applied. Regulations about concur-
rence indicate that third possibility is an option.
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Criminal act will exist for responsible individual, if the consequence of
monopolistic abuse is heavy enough. Competitive act defines it in com-
plex way, not so clearly (which is, after all characteristic for so called spe-
cial criminal legislature, principally undesirable).By act of abuse it is nec-
essary: (a) to instigate market disturbance (b) establish dominant position
for one or more economic entities through it, in relation to other or others
 particle is not quite exemplary, because if market disturbance always
means privileged position, further part of criminal act entity is not neces-
sary, and (c) so that equity profit or the damage caused to other compa-
nies or consumers can be achieved or is achieved.
Conclusion that, act of execution is finalised by monopoly abuse, which
caused market disturbance through privileged position, can be con-
ceived by linguistic interpretation (no practice so far). Profit, or damage
are just part of pensiveness  otherwise the possibility of attaining profit
would not be at the same level. Warrantee fines are high, form six moths
to five years in jail.
6. CONCLUSION
(A) Basic characteristics of domestic monopolistic legislation can be
summed up in few following marks:
1. Inconsistent codification. Antimonopoly Law  by its name already 
should codify, and at the same time reform regulations which are related
to use of monopoly or dominant position, or prohibition of monopolistic
agreement, and therefore normatively elaborate constitutional principle
about monopoly prohibition too. Purpose of codifying is not applied con-
sistently and that is why (aside from other, not less important reasons) it
did not succeed. Not only that competition regulations remained dis-
persed over other regulations as well (even the Law itself indicates to some
of them), but the system of extremely complex relations between legal
institutions and bodyes liable for competitive measures is formed.
Position of central competitive body and Competitive commission is not
harmonised, along with their authorisations and tasks, legal conditions for
recognisable competitive practice are not formed.
2. Non-finalised system. Indirect and insufficient codification generated
by the nature of the matter, non-finalised system. If an event appears
simultaneously as object of legal regulation contained in few laws,
unequally regulated (for example, agreement about prices is as monopo-
listic agreement in accordance to the Law of obligatory relations invalid
and it does not produce any legal actions, in accordance to Competitive
act it can be annulled, and in accordance with the Law of public price con-
trol participant which achieved preferred prices will be punished in pro-
portion with achieved profit), that can be faulty legal technique in actual-
ising the endeavour to comprehend that event depends on faze in which
legal reaction came to effect. But if simultaneously certain forms of cartel
which are equally considered to be monopoly are not explicitly men-
tioned, regardless of legislators intention, or border made through expres-
sions for example, such as, comprehensible interpretation of the law,
as the practise indicates, is that they are considered to be prohibited. From
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that point of view, system is full of gaps: vertical linking is not sanc-
tioned, monopolistic agreement is not sanctioned per se, for example.
3. Repressive, and not regulative system. The accent in anticipating meas-
ures which could be taken in cases of monopolising in Competitive act
and other regulations is repressive, prevailing are fines and other penalties.
If it is not so visible from the point of enumerating possible measures, it
becomes clear when anticipated measures are related to conditions for its
implementing, specially in terms of monopoly or dominant position
abuse: it is required that certain consequences appeared, or at least threat
that they might appear, and punishment measure is related to them pre-
cisely. Deeper legal analysis therefor allows following question: is protec-
tive object of valid competitive legislationequal market match, free com-
petition, or nevertheless some other values, related to obliteration of com-
petition in this instance, such as regular supply or justifiable or unjus-
tifiable profit.
Warrantee sanctions are therefore, if we are talking about fines, insuffi-
cient to achieve preventive function ( that is proverbial problem in
Yugoslavian violation legislature), or it is still the question of high punish-
ments for criminal act (as if they derive from the time when term econom-
ic sabotage existed). Competitive commission is, along with this in a posi-
tion to instigate procedure for declaration of these sanction, submitted to
bodies in charge, and the rest is up to them. Thats why it is not surprising
that those reports are not submitted anymore, and for criminal act they do
not exist at all. If authority of other bodies is taken into account, then
Competition commission, to whom submitted reports are forwarded by
market inspection, in order to filtrate them and forward them further to
other bodies, does not have significant role at all.
4. Legal standards and discretionary decisions. Establishing terms of
monopoly and monopolistic abuse, even with examples which were given
exempli causam, within them and in spite of them, Antimonopoly Law,
and other regulations which regulate monopoly, contrary to our legal tra-
dition, impermissibly often direct central elements to legal standards. The
fact that term dominant position is not determined by any numerable
entry contained in declared norm, of any power, is the best illustration
for this statement.
That by itself is potential failure, since it does not present reliable
instruction to economic entity for making economic decisions.
Commission practise, relatively meagre, does not give additional informa-
tion. Internal instructions (guidelines) or Commission decisions, unpub-
lished, indicate yet to one more, crucial danger: exaggerated level of dis-
cretionary decision making possibilities: if certain internal criteria have
been already accepted, why are they not morally empowered by publish-
ing. In such manner protection of free match is potentially turned into
centre for market orchestration, which will on the basis of discretionary
decisions in some cases react in others not.
5. Competition regulative as element of economic policy. Previous charac-
teristic of positive competitive legislation allows conclusion that it is, in
functional sense, first of all means for conducting certain state economic
policy, and it applies sanction against those who do not comply to that
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policy, unlike normative system which protects free market. Competition
regulations are means, not final goal of this legal regulative.
(B) Causes concerning these attributes or systematic defects of valid
competitive legislation do not recline, at least not in a first place, in legal
sphere. It seems that absence of market economy as dominant one, rela-
tive, or at last instance illusive independence of economic entities in state
or public property, does not make systematic need for real competition
regulations.
Therefore parallel with (insufficient and ineffective) competitive regu-
lations legal norms which create monopoly subsist (for example JP PTT
monopoly over telecommunication services, which is transferred by
agreement to Telecom Serbia), as well as rules of the game which are
valid for such monopolies (for example, the one from the Law of public
price control).
Further on, conducting active economic policy, the state retains the
right to get involved with market policy, especially price policy.
Therefore, Antimonopoly Law is in some way implanted to the system,
and unclearness and vagueness of some decisions is in the first place result
of impermissibly weak legal technique, but weak legal technique is a con-
sequence of legislators attempts to move at the limit of desirable and
impermissible agreeing and joining of subjects, monopoly prohibitions in
economy whose main industries are monopolised by law.
By introducing the free market, the need for appropriate competitive
legislation is clearly established. 
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V Analyses of the Existing Institutions
1. ANTIMONOPOLY COMMISSION
The legal basis for the existence and work of the Antimonopoly com-
mission comprises two groups of regulations:
 Legal regulations of an organizational character;
 Legal regulations of a procedural character (on the basis of which are
founded the jurisdiction of the Commission and type of proceedings
being standardized).
1.1. Legal regulations of an organizational character
These regulations are contained in a series of laws and acts:
 The Antimonopoly Law (Official Gazette FRY, No. 29/96);1
 He Law on the basis of the state administration system and Federal
Executive Council and federal administrative authorities of employ-
ment in state authorities (Official Gazette SFRY No 23/78, Official
Gazette SFRY No. 58/79, Official; Gazette SFRY No. 21/82.
Official Gazette SFRY No. 18/85, Official Gazette SFRY, No.
37/88, Official Gazette SFRY No. 18/89, Official Gazette SFRY,
No. 40/89, Official Gazette SFRY, No. 72/89, Official Gazette
SFRY, No. 42/90, Official Gazette SFRY, No. 74/90, Official
Gazette SFRY, No. 35/91, Official Gazette FRY, No. 31/93,
Official Gazette FRY, No. 50/93);
 Laws on the basis of employment (Official Gazette FRY, No. 29/96,
Official Gazette FRY, No. 20/99, Official Gazette FRY, No. 51/99);
 General administrative procedural law (Official Gazette FRY, No.
33/97, Official Gazette FRY, No. 31/01);
 Enactment on the foundation of federal ministries, other federal
authorities and organizations and offices of Federal Government
(Official Gazette FRY, No. 41/01, Official Gazette FRY, No.
42/01, Official Gazette FRY No. 43/01, Official Gazette FRY,
No.66/01, Official Gazette FRY, No. 67/01);
 Enactment on the foundation of the Antimonopoly Commission
(Official Gazette FRY, No. 44/97, Official Gazette FRY, No. 67/00).
The Antimonopoly law makes the Antimonopoly Commission respon-
sible for most of the duties connected to of the application of competition
policy legislation and the provision of the unrestrained activity of market
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1 Antimonopoly Law is a translation of Serbian Antimonopolski zakon, rather than
Competition Policy Law.
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competition and fair market contest.2 However, neither the Law itself, nor
the decrees on its foundation, comprise all the regulations of an organiza-
tional character required for the legally effectual establishment of an
administration authority. Such legal gaps in the law could be filled by
analysis and application of the legal regulations implied in the above stat-
ed legal texts which, in the narrowest sense, do not fall into the category of
special antimonopoly legislation.
To understand what weaknesses are created by this conception it is neces-
sary to point out the following facts. The Legal regulations governing vari-
ous types of abuse of monopolistic position and unfair behaviour on the
market are contained in the constitutional and legal texts. In contrast the
Antimonopoly Commission was founded by an act  a Decree of the Federal
Government.3 This raises numerous quandaries and questions. First of all, it
is not clear why the foundation of the Commission and its operation was
legislated for separately from the legal standardization of monopolistic posi-
tion and unfair competition. It could be expected that, together with codifi-
cation of material and legal regulation of competition policy which was car-
ried out with the introduction of the Antimonopoly law as lex specialis4 the
codification of regulations of an organizational and procedural character
would also be addressed. Concerning regulations of an organizational char-
acter, this is indeed what happened. The Antimonopoly Commission is a
special administrative body within the Federal ministry for agriculture and
domestic trade with special authorization, but it is debatable how effectively
this was achieved Firstly, it is still not clear why with the Commission was
established by means of an act of subordinate legal validity compared to the
Antimonopoly legislation itself. These dilemmas could be summarized in
one question. What is the legal nature (character) of the Commission and
what is its place in the system of administrative bodies? An answer to this
could more precisely establish its powers and authorization.
In addition, it remains unclear, why a relatively long period elapsed
between the adoption of the Antimonopoly legislation and the issuing of
the Decree. All the more so, since it is generally known that the procedure
of issuing the laws, being a complex one, requires more time than the pro-
cedure of issuing decrees by executive bodies.
The Antimonopoly Commission is a special administrative body at the
federal level, but its peculiarity is not particularly positive in nature. It can
be concluded on the basis of its founding decree that the employment
relations within the Commission and the proceedings carried out before
it, deviate radically from the acknowledged principles and solutions of
administrative and employment legislation in the country.
It has already been stated that the Antimonopoly law does not state any-
thing in regard to legal aspects of foundation of the Commission.5
2 See Article 5 of Antimonopoly law .
3 Official Gazette SAY, No. 24/1997 .
4 Antimonopoly law, Official Gazette SAY, No.29/1996
5 Such opinion does not deny Article 9. of the stated Law which assigns to the
Commission authorities which has federal market inspection. Having compared in
that way authority of federal market inspection with authorities of the Commission,
this Law, practically, states that in its operation applies accordingly regulations in
regard to federal market inspection. Irrespective of that, these regulations, falls strictly
into the group of regulations of proceeding character.
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However, from the above-mentioned regulations it is clear that that the
Commission, in the language of administrative law, represents a separate
administrative body, collective in type, which, by formation falls within
the structure of the Federal ministry for the economy and domestic trade.
Such a position opens new questions in many areas:
 Is it necessary for the efficient, impartial and objective carrying out of
Antimonopoly legislation, that the Commission be an integral part of
the Ministry?
 Is such an organizational resolution a hindrance to efficient, impar-
tial and objective carrying out of Antimonopoly policy i.e. legisla-
tion?
 Is it, for the purpose of the same aim, necessary that the Commission
be a collective body? How does the existing solution on the appoint-
ment and dismissal of members of the Commission, i.e. the solution
on supervision and responsibilities affect the ability of the
Commission to impose competition policy?
 How does the existing resolution on financing the Commission affect
its unbiased enforcement of competition policy?
(1) The first weakness of the existing method of organization of the
Commission is the fact that commissions usually represent working bod-
ies within permanent administrative bodies, founded on an ad hoc basis
(irrespective of the possible duration of their task and work), whose mem-
bers can be drawn from a government body be outstanding people from
outside. The system of federal bodies of the state administration permits
the foundation of collective bodies and deviates from traditional assump-
tions in only two cases  with the foundation of the Antimonopoly
Commission and the Federal Commission on securities and financial
markets.6 The reasons for the decision introduce  (specific) collective bod-
ies in these two instances in particular could be numerous. It is probably
the case that the decision to accept such a solution, in agreement with the
current direction of public administration reform, was influenced by the
fact that both bodies could have an economic-regulative function. It may
also have been the need to establish them on an ad hoc basis that was
influential. 
(2) This conception should be harmonised with regulations regarding
the status of those carrying out administrative activity. The current legis-
lation recognises, only two categories of persons working in federal
administration bodies: employed (civil servants) and appointed persons,
officials (persons whose selection, nomination or appointment is the
consequence of political will and decision and which represent the
administration administration in the narrower sense of that body.
When analysing the provisions of the Decree it can be seen that the
Commission shall comprise outstanding experts, scholars and business-
men. It is difficult to fit these into either of the accepted categories, so
again, the question arises, does the Commission resemble a working body
of some administration body more closely, than it does a body in its own
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6 See Articles 2,12,26 and 30 of Regulation regarding foundation of federal ministries,
other federal bodies and organizations and offices of Federal Government, Official
Gazette FRY No. 41/2001, 41/2001 and 43/2001.
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right?7. Moreover, the text of the Decree describes them as members,
and not administrative officials.
(3) In terms of this, point 2. Article 3. of the Regulation deserves partic-
ular attention. The method of its legal-technical revision discloses two
serious, conceptual problems.
(a) The first is that members of the Commission, i.e. those responsible
for making major decisions in the field of antimonopoly policy, according
to the Decree itself, may be outstanding businessmen. In other words,
the behaviour of an economic entity (company) is to be supervised by
those who are either owners or managers of other companies.
Outstanding businessmen, either the owners or the managers of compa-
nies, are being given the right to supervise the operation of their, (albeit
potential) competitors, and to issue decisions which could have an effect
on the operation of those competitors, and, thus, to the operation of their
own companies as well. The consequence is to amplify, the already pro-
nounced hybrid character of the Commission by introducing persons who
are not employed in state administration bodies.8 In addition, the deci-
sions of the Commission could have direct impact on the short or long
term interests, goals and positions of members of the Commission who
could, on their own assessment of danger on the market from competi-
tors issue decisions that are not unbiased. The stated resolution, thus,
inevitably amplifies the conflict of interests of Commission members,
instead of prohibiting and penalising it. The goal of members of the
Commission should have been the protection and improvement of com-
petition on the market and maximization of social welfare on that basis.
But instead a seat on the Commission may enable a businessman to
destroy competitors in the field where he operates, establishing a monop-
oly and the maximization of economic (monopoly) profit. 
Within such a framework, the structure of incentives is such, that it is a
great possibility that the stated outstanding businessmen will use their
membership of the Commission for the benefit of their company, i.e. to
acquired profit. In other words, the consequences resulting from this reg-
ulation are that members of the Commission who are outstanding busi-
nessmen could be in a position to function, by breach of duty, contrary to
the social interest and contrary to the principle of equality of economic
agents and in that way, bring about inefficient competition policy, i.e.
non-competitive market structure and their negative welfare conse-
quences. In short, in this way there is an open possibility to completely
abuse the purpose of the competition policy. 
(b) The other conceptual weakness is manifested in the fact that the
election/appointment criteria are not clear enough, and they do not guar-
antee the efficiency of the Commissions work, i.e. efficient formulation
and enforcement of competition policy. 
7 This represents only one more confirmation of the above stated point that by found-
ing commissions, being the federal administration body, deviates from traditional
solutions.
8 It is understood its direct dependence from the Federal Government which, not only
provides material-technical conditions for its operation but also appoint members of
the Commission.
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(4) It remains unclear what kind of administrative body is it, be it spe-
cial or not, when it is not made up of persons with the right to fill such
positions on the basis of their work (in bodies of the state administration).
The Decree does not address the question of equal status of Commission
members, i.e. it does not explain how members of the Commission are to
be appointed. Considering that they have been qualified as outstanding
experts, scientists and businessmen, we suppose that, as such, they must
already have employment in some other place. If this is the case, the ques-
tion is how to treat their work on the Commission: Will they work as vol-
unteers, or will they be expected to take leave from their jobs while serving
as members of the Commission? The last option would, be the most
appropriate, from the aspect of administrative and working law, consider-
ing that they belong to the group of nominated persons.
Irrespective of which option they commit themselves to, there is still a
dilemma about what kind of administration body this is, be it special or
not, when the persons employed in it, during the work in the
Commission, do not have their years of service in effect. It should not be
forgotten that the Commission concept in this way, represents an excep-
tion in one more sense: in contrast to all known federal administrative
bodies to date, where administration comprises only several nominated
persons (a manager of that body whose title depends on the type of body,
assistants, deputies and secretary), the Commission is a administrative
body comprising exclusively nominated persons! In several places in this
study it is noted that one of the connections from which direct depend-
ence of the government body originates is that the Federal Government,
nominates the members of the Commission.
(5) Closely connected to the working status of Commission members,
is the issue of the financial resources set aside for their work. First, are the
members to be salaried (in which case, they acquire rights relating to their
work on the Commission) or, alternatively a fee. Second, what kind of
independence and autonomy can be guaranteed when salaries and other
costs are to be met from the Federal budget?
The matter of compensation for participation in the work of the
Commission (instead for the work of Commission members), who are not
fully employed in federal ministries, other federal bodies and federal
organizations, has been resolved by Decree of the Commission for admin-
istrative matters of the Federal government, issued on the basis of a deci-
sion regarding setting of compensation for persons participating in the
work of federal government, federal ministries, other federal bodies, fed-
eral organizations, and offices of Federal government.
The Federal ministry of justice issued, according to the Law on the basis
of the system for state administration and Federal executive council and
federal bodies, an Opinion, which prescribes that a person nominated by a
competent body, i.e. appointed to a certain function, tasks or undertaking,
in an administration body, takes up employment in that administration
body, on the day of nomination, i.e. appointment, if by the act on nomi-
nation, i.e. appointment it has not been decided otherwise. Thus, all the
rights and obligations of an ordinary employee accrue to the official
according to the resolution on appointment by which the employment is
taken up. However, considering that almost all the members of the
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Commission are already employed, and do not have any intention of leav-
ing their current employment, the matter of their compensation remains
open.
(6) At the end of consideration regarding organizational regulations,
the following question arises: although in the regulation itself, it is stated
that the Commission is a collective body with a President and 6 members,
is it really so? The operating regulations of the Antimonopoly
Commission prescribe that  professional services prepare for sessions
of the Commission, carry out all operations in accordance with decisions
of the Commission and execute tasks entrusted by the Commission.9
Confirmation that the professional part of the work (processing of sub-
mitted applications, establishing of files and setting elements for issuing
major decisions) is done for the Commission, by its expert officers, which
are, by their nature characteristic either to legislation authorities (expert
offices of the Parliament) or executive authority (except offices of the gov-
ernment) as can be seen in the available documents of the Commission
itself. The first question being asked is who is employed in the expert
offices, i.e. which body do they belong to? Firstly, it could be those
employed in the Federal ministry of the economy and domestic trade.
However in the Regulation on systematisation and internal organization
of working places in this Ministry, the existence of such an office has not
been catered for, although, it has to be.10 Theoretically speaking, these
could be persons exclusively responsible for providing expert assistance to
the Commission, but their working places have to be also systematized in
the stated regulation. This is a departure from the usual rule, so the presi-
dent of the Commission, being the immediate manager, issued the
Regulation on internal organization and systematisation of working places
in the Antimonopoly Commission. That solution, per se, is contrary to the
status of the Commission, considering that it is a body within the
Ministry. Of course, such behaviour could not be criticized if the
Commission had been established as a separate administration body out-
side the Ministry, such as, for instance, the Public Legal Office.
Commissions expert offices employ eight individuals on expert opera-
tions. All are highly educated staff, mostly economists and law graduates
(the exceptions being one employee with a degree in agricultural science
and another in organizational science). The staff have between have
between four and thirty-five years of service, and they have come to the
Commission either from the state administration (mostly the Ministry of
Finance) or from business. They all speak English to some degree and
other foreign languages. The staff of the Commission have shown efforts
to acquire advanced training, and actively participate in international
seminars on Antimonopoly policy. Still, it seems that the number of
expert staff is not sufficient to prepare the decisions of the Commission
itself, as well as to carry out competition policy effectively. 
9 See Article 8. of Operating regulations of Antimonopoly Commission. .
10 Contrary to that, in the stated regulation working places are being systemized in the
Sector for prevention of competitors violation on the unified market, which compe-
tence is set so, that in a good deal enters into the scope of Commissions work
165
(7) The Commission will fulfil the purpose of its existence only if it is
independent in its work. The method by which members of the commis-
sion are appointed best indicates how independent it is. Members of the
Commission, irrespective of the fact that the Employer calls them mem-
bers, are officials nominated and dismissed. The legislation in force consti-
tutes the Commission as a government body, more correctly, a body of the
Federal Government. Upon the proposal of the competent ministry, the
Federal Government nominates the members. In that way space is being
established to directly influence the work of the Commission through the
makeup of its staff. In addition there is no special procedure for dismissal
nor is there a limit to their terms of office. As a result, the future make up
of the Commission remains dependent upon daily economic  political
developments.
The Decree on the operation of the Commission, in Article 20, pre-
scribes that the Commission f is responsible for its actions to the Federal
Minister, i.e. the Federal Government. Although such a regulation could
indicate that the responsibility of the Commission for its operation, i.e.
rendering account, has been well defined, this is not the case. In fact the
exact opposite is true. On the basis of this, it can be stated that the
Commission enjoys no independence at all. In addition to that, the prob-
lem is that the Commission is not obliged to submit to the public, i.e. pub-
lish information on its operation, so in a concrete case, its operation can-
not be said to be transparent. 
1.2. Legal regulations of a procedural character
Such regulations should answer the following questions: what is the
legal basis for the establishment of the jurisdiction of the Commission,
what is the extent of its authority, what type of proceedings will be con-
ducted before the Commission and what powers does it possess.
Unfortunately, there are no answers to these questions in any text (either
legal or sub-legal), and an additional problem is the fact that answers can
only be found by the simultaneous application of regulations of general
and regulations of separate (Antimonopoly) character. Although that is
contrary to their legal weight and their place in the hierarchy of the legal
sources, analysis shall start from the sub-legal text.
(a) The jurisdiction of the Commission is given in the decree establish-
ing the Antimonopoly Commission.11 The advantage of such a solution is
obvious to the legal theoretician as well as to the practitioner and should
not be additionally explained. The weakness of the concrete formulation
of Article 2 of the Decree on establishing the Antimonopoly Commission
is the fact that no single basis for the operation of the Commission in the
case of appearance of new aspects of abuse, for example  as well as all
other aspects has been given. As a result it has not enough space has
been left for the Commission to respond to possible new appearances of
monopolistic behaviour and unfair competition, i.e. aspects and conse-
quences of non-competitive market structures and behaviours. A general,
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elastic clause the inclusion of which is almost a rule with such precise
itemizing has been omitted.12 Although the regulations have their bad
sides, the benefits it brings far outweigh its weaknesses. Thus, the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission comprises:
 monitoring, establishing  and analysing of economic entities that
have monopolistic, i.e. dominant position on the market;
 establishing the existence of monopolistic, i.e. dominant position;13
 establishing the existence of monopolistic agreement.
This formulation of  monitoring, establishing and analysing of eco-
nomic entities that have monopolistic and/or dominant position in the
market deserves more detailed comment. Grammatically speaking, the
verb used shows that the starting point of the entire conception is the con-
tinuous work of the Commission, which implies constant activity of
Commission members. as was said before, such state does not respond to
the reality, considering that it is the expert offices that conduct everyday
activities, and the Commission itself meets at certain time intervals14. By
prescribing that sessions of the Commission be held as required and at
least once a month, , the provisions of the Decree as an act of  sub legal
character, are in direct contrast with the provisions of the general
Administrative procedure Act15. Such a situation is legally unsustainable
and is not only in contrast to the purpose and spirit of the administrative
procedure that is to be carried out in before the Commission but is in con-
trast to the very purpose of competition policy legislation.
Also, it is not clear what monitoring, establishing and analysing of oper-
ation means considering it these are activities of different character, scope
and difficulty. When the Commission establishes something, that is par
excellence a  question of assessment, in contrast to the question of what the
basis of its actions are which is a question of a material-legal nature. The
question of when the Commission establishes is equally interesting and
important, since essentially it marks when proceedings before the
Commission are initiated, what stages it runs through, the term for its exe-
cution and the act, which has to represent materialization of that procedure.
The current Antimonopoly regulation does not sanction the establish-
ment of non-competitive market structures, i.e. monopolistic position,
but, exclusively its abuse, which causes the removal of the competition
and provokes a breakdown in the unified market. Observed in that way,
the monitoring and analysing of the operation of an economic entity, are
logically connected with concepts of non-competitive market structures,
monopolistic position and its abuse (monopolistic behaviour), since with
their operation the process of their inception and establishment could be
monitored and analysed. Undertaking such activities, per se, does not
have to mean executing the prerogatives of executive authority, i.e. it is
12 That is not a case when authority has been given to the Commission is in question.
13 Of course, from the legal-technical side the solution is not logical; the Commission
hardly could establish the existence of dominant position without following up and
insight into documents, and as per text, it analyses those who has established domi-
nant position.
14 See Article 3. of the Regulation on operation of the Antimonopoly Commission.
15 See Article 113. of the General Administrative Procedure Act regarding initiation of
administrative procedure.
not imminent to the activities of state administration bodies. It eventually
could represent preparation for operation of activities of establishing.
Hence, it is not clear what is meant by and what the purpose is of estab-
lishing operations of some economic entity and what are the possible
operations of establishing. Establishing has the aim, preparation of the
base of legal fact for issuing the appropriate decision and by its nature, has
a central place in all legal procedures  it represents the essence of proba-
tive procedure. If such a standpoint has been accepted by interpretation of
the provisions of the general Administrative Procedure Act and the
Antimonopoly Law, what is the difference between these activities and the
activities of the expert offices of the Commission? It is possible that such
differences exist, but at this moment it is not possible to recognize them.
Further, by what means (instruments) would this be established, i.e.
what means are available to the Commission to establish operation? For
instance, what business information must the company submit to the
Commission, in order for it to establish its operation and how is non-
compliance with the obligation of submitting such information to be
treated? The question of who shall carry out the evaluation of this infor-
mation, becomes very complex, taking into consideration what operation
of economic entities follow, analyse and control several inspection bodies,
out of which, some are, the same as a Commission, the integral part of the
Federal Ministry of Economy and Domestic Trade, for instance, Federal
Market Inspection, which, from its side has the obligation to initiate the
institution of the procedure in front of the Commission. 
(b) When jurisdiction of the Commission is the issue, it has been deter-
mined with two wide enough, general clauses: the first one is taking
measures to prevent abuse of monopolistic, i.e. dominant position and
concluding of (although it would be more appropriate to say prevention
of concluding) the monopolistic agreement. It is a wide enough net, per
se, but without qualitative essence. The hybrid character of the
Commission established the foundation, which has its reflection in its
hybrid competence. Although the Antimonopoly law and the Decree were
the right place make clear what these measures are, this was not done.
That is why it remains unclear what measures the Commission could take,
and is there any kind of difference in regard to the measures to which
Commission is empowered to take by another clause. Namely, the second
clause says taking other measures established by federal law. It is diffi-
cult to see the intention of the legislator and understand what was the aim
of such a prescription of competence. The impression imposes itself that
certain results could be achieved with the Antimonopoly legislation in
force, despite all mentioned defects and weakness, but its inefficiency and
lack of authority are the immediate consequence of such outlined compe-
tence. In Legal science, measures are understood to be certain directives
for taking action, either directly or indirectly, by force or voluntarily, such
as, for instance, an arraignment by force in the case of a refusal to appear
after a summons, removal from premises of the state body or court,
demolishing of illegally built building and many others. 
A problem with this formulation comprises the following: traditionally,
legal measures consider the subject in which favour or disadvantage they
are being taken and in dependence from their type, could be executed by
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administrative or legal bodies. It is obvious that in this case, we are not
dealing with this type of measure. Antimonopoly law itself does not say
anything in this respect.16 Moreover, they do not point out what federal
law is the issue in this concrete case. In that way, the Antimonopoly
Commission, which is left without instruments for work, cannot possibly
act efficiently. Protective measures connect their existence, exclusively, for
sanctioning of abuse of monopolistic and/or dominant position. That is a
natural consequence that abuse of monopolistic and/or dominant posi-
tion, has been sanctioned through economic offences and criminal
offences. Considering these matters is the exclusive competence of the
third, separate and independent authority  judicial. All the above quoted
weaknesses, unclear statements and contradictory states have their reflec-
tion also, in the proceedings treatment by the Commission. Out of that
key questions have been separated:     
 When does the Commission follow, analyse and establish matters in
its jurisdiction?
 In which way does it do so?
 What do their decisions look like and what do they say?
 Who is supervises compliance with the law?
As distinguished from the Decree, which does not comprise any provi-
sion in that respect, The Antimonopoly law contains several articles dedi-
cated to that matter. Unfortunately, these articles are abundant in imper-
fections and omissions, which is the consequence of their insubstantiality.
The Law itself, although it claims to represent a codification of
Antimonopoly regulations, does not give a precise answer to the question,
who can initiate proceedings before the Commission.
(b1) The Law firstly prescribes  that every interested party can sub-
mit charges on all operations and acts of an economic entity he considers
to represent abuse which, due to its generality and unfinished quality
does not mean, practically, anything. The interested party could be a indi-
vidual, for instance a consumer, an association of consumers, a responsi-
ble person in competitive company and the like. Available material, based
on which the practice has been analysed in the Commission work, con-
firms this position. So, there are cases (indeed, rare) in which proceedings
before the Commission has been started, and in paper files, submitted
charges do not exist. The problem is not to be solved by the application of
provisions of the General Administrative Proceedings Act, which enables
starting of administrative proceeding ex officio. We mentioned this due to
particularity of the proceeding itself being carried out before the
Commission owing to it is difficult to find out when the proceeding ex
officio is considered started. Traditionally, the starting point is taken to be
the first operation of the administrative body. Can the first operation of
the Commission be considered the analysis of the operation of certain
economic entity by means of public information since, as a last resort that
also could be forced into the category of monitoring. If we accept such
16 Measures in regard to other measures anticipated by federal law cannot be considered
as protective measures, which are prescribed by Antimonopoly law in Article 14. since
its pronouncing has been anticipated in the procedure upon economic offenses and
the title itself is protective measures.
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an interpretation, there is space for numerous abuse, and arbitrariness,
which could result in unequal position (treatment) of economic agents in
the eyes of the Commission.17
(b2) Additional confusion provokes provision of Antimonopoly Law
that the charges are to be submitted to the competent federal authority,
although in the entire text, except in introductory provisions, that author-
ity is named as the Commission. It remains unclear if this represents an
omission in legal-technical editing of the text, or that, on the contrary,
there is still is some other authority competent for the same field.
(b3) In additional to that, the quoted provisions contained in Article 8
are, without justified reason, separated from provisions of Article 10,
which prescribe the same obligation for federal market inspectors. That is
why there is new lack of clarity: did they wish to specially stress the impor-
tance of the Federal market inspections operation in this field, or is it
again about unfortunate legal-technical editing of the text. In case the first
is in issue, this provision is completely unnecessary: it represents only a
narrow legal regulation, contrary to the one which obliges every interest-
ed person, what  a federal market inspector should certainly be due to the
description of his working obligation and task. In that way, Antimonopoly
Law the role of federal market is reducing inspection, instead to amplify
the role, which has been assigned to them by lex specialis. Further, this
provision is unnecessary since the failure to report an abuse of monopolis-
tic and/or dominant position is a criminal offence, and considering that
the offence of not reporting is treated as a criminal offence if it is discov-
ered while the perpetrator is in office. If the wish was to stress the impor-
tance of market inspection in repression of monopolistic behaviour and
unfair competition, it should prescribe a term when the inspector is
obliged to submit charges, and sanctions for violation of that term, as well
as to state as precisely, as possible, its context, because, at least, in that part
it should not be levelled with other interested parties, although this last
(the context) in practice, does not provoke excessive problems, consider-
ing that the inspectors together with the charges submit a copy of the
inspection made.
(b4) The practice of acting upon charges submitted to the Commission
differs depending on who appears as its submitter. If it is the federal mar-
ket inspector, expert offices seldom process it by completing and checking
with other data. Such behaviour (trust) has for the base a supposition in
regard to professional and personnel qualification of their submitter.
However, in that way the purpose of existence of one separate authority
for repression of non-competitive market structures loses its sense and
their function becomes almost a protocol. Contrary to that, if the charges
originate from individuals or legal entities, expert offices go to the locality
and by insight into the documents and from discussions with responsible
persons compile Findings in the form of a note or minutes of the meet-
ing which serve as a factual basis for further action by the Commission. In
addition to that, expert offices ex officio check the correctness of quote
from the charge according to other available data.  
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At this stage of the proceedings, in practice, certain problems appear,
for instance non-signing of the minutes of the meeting by responsible per-
sons representing the economic entity, so the Commission itself consid-
ered necessary to react in the form of internal, verbal direction and at one
of its sessions has decided that minutes of meeting have to be signed by all
persons present.
The quoted behaviour of the economic entities investigated (non-sign-
ing) points to:
 lack of knowledge of importance of existence and operation of
Antimonopoly bodies;
 discredit into the work (or even impartial work) of the Commission;
 their disregard of the Commission and its work;
 their essential or formal indifference to participate in the
Commissions work
All this together shows the weakness of the existing legislation, which
did not succeed to provide by their solution, the authority and credibility
of the Commission and thus, enable its efficient work. The act of non-
signing the minutes of meeting is the result of traditional understanding
that with that act the exactness of the factual quotations contained in the
minutes of meeting is being denied. Of course, this denial should be much
more efficient, if carried out by explicit note, i.e. statement to the minutes
of meeting as prescribed by the General Administrative Procedure Act.
From the other side, facts could be denied in further proceeding irrespec-
tive of un-signed minutes of meeting. Finally, per se, non-signing does not
make the minutes of meeting legally invalid. This act of non-cooperation
of the controlled entity remains only the expression of mistrust in the per-
son who has carried out the investigation, i.e. absence of authority.  By
inflexible interpretation of regulations of administrative procedure, non-
signing could be treated as refusing to carry out investigation, which shall
have the consequence of special sanctions. The Commission violates the
rules of general administrative procedure also by the common principle of
verbally, permitting parties to plead in written form. It could be that it
suits the contest and characteristic of the Commission, but, certainly, rep-
resents important digression from the principle of legality.
(c) The following question is, how the Commission operates, i.e. what
kind of procedure is being carried out and how, in front of the
Commission. The Commission, according to the Antimonopoly Law and
Decree on its foundation, has been established as a collective administra-
tion body. However, in its work, the Commission deviates from currently
accepted practice for an administration bodys work. Namely, the rule is
that administration bodies decide upon the requirements of parties.
However, the Decree of operation of the Commission anticipates that ses-
sions of the Commission are to be held as required (which is adequate to
the work upon requirements of the parties) but, and ,, at least once a
month and in that way once more stresses its nature as a working bogy
of the Ministry. That Commission characteristic is additionally ampli-
fied by the provisions of the Regulation on operation, which prescribe that
sessions are to be held according to an Agenda, instead of the procedure
being carried out as a classical administrative procedure. Finally, deviation
from regular administrative procedure prescribed by the Law is reflected
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also in prescribing that Submitter of the request only exceptionally
could be present at sessions of the Commission upon invitation of the
President of the Commission,. or the member replacing him, although
rules of publicity and directness of work of the administration body are
the basic rules of their operation. It remains unclear what request is at
issue: is it a charge which in this part is being treated as a request or, a sep-
arate request to be present which could be submitted by any interested
person including the parties themselves.
(d) The Law prescribes different procedures before the Commission for
the abuse of monopolist and or dominant position and the conclusion of
monopolistic agreements.
(d1) In regard to the abuse of position, the Law differs between moni-
toring, analysing and establishing, which, is perhaps justified from the
point of view of operations to be taken in order to carry out activity, but
does not suit either logically or chronologically to the course of events. In
such a way, the Law in paragraph 1. Article 5. says that the Commission
follows up and analyse the entitys operations which have monopolistic,
i.e. dominant position in the market, and in paragraph 2. the Law stan-
dardizes supposition for carrying out activities quoted in paragraph 1. 
that the Commission, previously, had to establish the existence of such
position (which, after all, refers also to the agreement, and represents a
previous question). But, activities of the commission should have to be
much more complex. The most important reason is the fact that standard-
ized as such, they do not accomplish their real purpose, i.e. cover the
entire field in which the disturbance of competitors market structures
could happen.
In order to qualify the certain operation of economic entity as an abuse
of monopolistic, i.e. dominant position, it is required to accomplish more
cumulative conditions:
 that there is such position of economic entity,
 that economic entity from these positions takes certain operations or
issue acts and
 that due to above and in cause-and-effect connection, with them cre-
ates harmful consequences.
In case activities of the Commission have been carried out only and
strictly according to Antimonopoly Law, repression and sanctioning of
abuse of monopolistic and/or dominant position or concluding of
monopolistic agreement would not be possible. This for the reason that
the Law does not have mechanism for something like that. More correctly,
there is lack of cause-and-effect connection between activities of the
Commission referring to their position, acts and operations, from one side
and consequences on competitors market structures, from the other side.
The effect of operation of the Commission is missing. It could be best seen
in the enclosed document, where expert offices process charges and pro-
pose establishing the monopolistic, i.e. dominant position and operations
and acts of economic entities. This stage of the procedure, the
Commission itself in their documents calls  a proposal of elements for
establishing monopolistic position. Establishing of quoted elements is
carried out on sessions of the Commission, and after that propose issuing
a resolution. However, such dealing of the Commission, as quoted before,
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deviates from up till now known elements of administrative procedure,
but in negative sense. Namely, according to the stated above it could be
seen that there is certain void between proposition of issuing resolution
and its written execution, at least, such connection was not possible to
establish according to documents available. We say this because, after
making the minutes of the meeting from Commissions sessions held, in
which there is no formulating of pronouncements (purview), written res-
olutions follow, so there is question who formulated them and when? Of
course such dealing of the Commission would not be possible if principle
of publicity had been applied strictly and parties in proceedings be enabled
to be present their case at Commissions sessions. Attention shall be paid,
for the moment, to establishing elements for issuing a resolution. From
the available documents, it can be seen that activities of expert offices and
Commission itself are brought down to establishing position according to
criteria that are very open to criticism.
Not only does the Law not contain standards to establish monopoly, or
dominant position, neither does it dictate a procedure for the
Commissions work in that area, nor does the Decree. Moreover, the
Decree on the foundation of the Antimonopoly Commission does not
oblige the Commission to establish these criteria and publish them. The
commission, on its session dated 11th October 1999 established Criteria to
identify the existence of monopolistic, i.e. dominant position of the eco-
nomic entity on the market.18 The document represents internal docu-
ment of the Commission unavailable to the public.  
The quoted document take the form of a 14 page document with a lot of
footnotes explaining some criteria and measures to be taken in order to
use these criteria for evaluation of the observed market structure. By these
criteria some points are explained which were not clear in the Law, and
sub-legal acts of the Government, such as the Decree establishing the
Antimonopoly Commission. However, two basic problems remain. The
criteria are not public documents, so they are not available to the public.
In addition to that, Criteria have not been worked out enough, which
made them less applicable, but a good deal of the text itself is of the
research character. Without denying the requirement to properly explain
some criteria this document, still, do not posses great operational charac-
teristics.
Pursuant to that we conclude that there is not any public document,
which defines (in a substantial and  procedural sense) the method  of
ascertaining monopolistic, i.e. dominant position. Taking into considera-
tion that the Law itself does not define operationally neither monopolistic,
nor dominant position, such state of affairs is more than disturbing and
creates space for completely arbitrary decisions by the Commission. In
such a way the space is opened for political abuse of the Commission itself,
and it is practically invited to carry out arbitration in disputed situations
in economy, having a political background. With this, uncertainty is still
greater, and economic entities are faced with increased regulatory risks on
the market.
18 The Institute for comparative law made proposal of stated criteria. .
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Of course, such state of affairs born uneven situation in practice of the
Commission. So, by the insight into available documents it could be con-
cluded that activities which the regulations call consolidation find its
procedural expression in the term with which the decisions are enacted.
Only in two resolutions issued by the Commission, contain this as
opposed to the 12 cases, which do not.
More precisely, the enacting term of these resolutions is only It is
ordered In such a situation all its weakness is shown in provision of the
Law which does not give an answer to question in which period, i.e. term,
the Commission is obliged to announce their decision in regard to weath-
er they have established something or not. Also, it is not prescribed in
which period the Commission is obliged to submit their decision. The past
practice of the Commissions work shows that it has established, in most
cases the following:
 price increase by firms having monopolistic and/or dominant posi-
tion;19
 concluding of agreements and contracts.
(d2) As distinguished from abuse of monopolistic position, where
activity of the Commission has been prescribed as an activity, in case of
concluding monopolistic agreement, we face one more inconsistency. The
Law prescribes the obligation to all to submit charges to the Commission
in case they know of the existence of a monopolistic agreement. Or the
legislator himself considers certain agreements per se (due to their nature),
dangerous to competitors market structures? In case such understanding
is accepted, what is the purpose of specially standardize obligation of the
Antimonopoly Law, that all agreements and other means of associations,
have to be submitted to the Commission within the period of 15 days from
the date of concluding? This could be understood either as legal-technical
omission in editing of the Law itself, or the expression of political and eco-
nomic understanding, what is considered a monopoly. This is due to the
fact that the expression agreement implies also monopolistic agree-
ments, which are forbidden (except from Article 4., paragraph 4.) and
agreements regarding establishing business associations, which, as such,
have not been forbidden, but it is forbidden to use such associations in
order to conclude monopolistic agreements.
When agreements on association are an issue, i.e. agreements in regard
to establishing business associations, the provisions of the Law in regard to
starting of  proceedings before the Commission are explicit. The
Commission starts its work only after such an agreement was submitted to
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19 Herewith, however, there is a question: is at about an average or some other price
increase? Average price increase does not say anything regarding conditions of opera-
tions of the concrete economic entity, i.e. about conditions of production and sale of
the concrete product. For instance, in conditions of stable prices, it could come to the
price increase of the key production input (for instance, input from import) which
considerably increase total, i.e. average expenses of production. That is, after all, one
of the main argument stating by the economic entity in their defense in front of the
Commission. In case in such conditions should not come to the price increase of that
product, the producer would, inevitably, suffer a loss and abound production, which
is unfavorable from the point of view of social prosperity. I is obvious that the use of
average price increase is contra-productive from the point of view of conducting a
good Antimonopoly policy
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them. However, precise provisions are missing in regard to who is the
entity obliged to submit the agreement, considering that the expression
agreement considers two or more persons who reached it?20
Out of available documents of the Commission itself, it could be seen
that their members and expert offices, their competence in this part,
understand as a possibility to also investigate contracts concluded between
economic entities and authorization to take measures which will change
or delete some of their provisions. Such handling of the Commission
should be treated very cautiously, taking into consideration that it enters,
in great deal, into the freedom of contracting of economic entities. For
that purpose, it is very illustrative to quote the case of NIS Naftagas and
their business partner in which case between this economic entity and the
Company which produces chemical compounds required for the produc-
tion process of NIS, the Contract was concluded in regard to delivery of
the compound over a period of 20 years. The stated Contract was termed a
Contract on business-technical cooperation, although, it could have been
described as a traditional contract, nominated by Law. The Commission,
firstly, established that the provision of the Contract, anticipating the pri-
ority of NIS in reception of the quoted compound and the obligation of
the economic entity to provide the same, as null, and afterwards, ordered
its simple elimination. The stated deletion should be, as per enacting
terms, executed by simple deletion from the Contract text, irrespective of
the provisions of the Contract, which are contrary to the imperative legal
regulations pronounced absolutely null, do not produce legal effect. Of
course, in such a situation the question was avoided, weather parties con-
cluded the Contract wishing to establish that type of obligation, consider it
the essential element of the Contract. Such a destiny provokes the ques-
tion why the order for such deletion of certain disputed article, only one
party of the Contract (NIS) is obliged to do so, considering that enacting
term of solution issued says so.21
2. MINISTRY FOR ECONOMY AND DOMESTIC TRADE
The Ministry for economy and domestic trade represents the govern-
ments authority on the federal level, which together with other ministries,
prescribed by the Regulation regarding basis of systems of federal admin-
istration bodies, Federal executive council and other administration bod-
ies, comprises an instrument of the Federal Government. Already from
20 Moreover, in one of its decisions (solutions) the Commission orders only one con-
tracted party, deleting of certain Article of the Contract regarding business-technical
cooperation?
21 That is not the only objection, which could be put to the Commissions work, from
the proceeding side. In the available documents there are cases which files start with
first degree resolution which could point out that procedure has not been carried out
at all; from some cases it could not be seen what is further destiny of the procedure
after issuing the first degree resolution since data are missing, weather it has been dealt
with or against it the complaint was filed to the second degree body; in some cases it is
missing the connection between first degree and second degree resolution  complaint
of the economic entity, so it could not be seen, on which base the starting of complaint
procedure was effected.
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this sentence it could be seen that as such, the Ministry cannot be inde-
pendent in its work, independent from the Federal Government  of which
it is a part.
Problems caused by its connection for the Government, happen when
this Ministry is given the role of second degree authority in the adminis-
trative procedure of control and prevention of abuse of monopolistic
and/or dominant position, and concluding of monopolistic agreement.
Extremely necessary fairness, autonomy and independence in the control
of stated types of disturbances of competitors structures on the market, is
in logical contrast to the present position of this ministry. All the more so,
the essence of the role of each second-degree authority is the control of
legislative and regularity of work and acts of the first-degree authority!
The Antimonopoly Law prescribes that possible complaint procedure,
upon the complaint filed against decision of Antimonopoly Commission,
is to be carried out before the Federal Ministry for the Economy and
Domestic Trade.22 However, to achieve such a responsible and complex
task, there are some of the following barriers.
(a) Undeniable is the fact that the position of the Commission being the
first degree authority, being the integral part of the Ministry as a second
degree authority, effects to the control and direction which the practice of
the complained body, should have to issue. According to the legally pre-
scribed structure, the Commission is pronounced expert body and as per
definition it should be more expert than the Ministry, being the adminis-
tration body. From the other side, Ministry comprising the Commission
controls and directs its practice, settling as per complains.
In that way the institutional supposition have been made that practice
of the Commission should be directed towards their regulation instead of
classical Antimonopoly function. Then, it is unreal to assume that the
Federal Ministry for domestic trade would have to carry out quickly and in
good quality the monitoring of the first-degree procedure and act. The
first because the nature and scope of work comprising establishing, fol-
lowing up and analysing of abuse of monopolistic, i.e. dominant position,
is such, that their carrying out has been assigned for the jurisdiction to the
separate administration body. It was not assigned to an ordinary body, but
the body that should be very narrowly specialized for that work, consider-
ing that in its scope of work it does not  the right to perform other works
and tasks. It is evident that the range of works of the stated Ministry could
have been wider as well as the internal structure differently composed.
Secondly, could the stated Ministry, in addition to numerous other tasks,
in a acceptably short period of time, carry out work for which a specialized
authority needed a certain period of time? Investigation of regularity and
legality of the first-degree procedure and issued decision, require, first of
all, a good knowledge of administrative procedure as a necessary assump-
tion. In addition to that, process of investigating is in fact the checking, ex
officio, of existence and carrying out of necessary breach of procedure,
and then, carries on to investigation of quote of possible complaint,
which, in most cases, comprises the checking of the set factual state. Are
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tional source.
cabinets and department heads capable to carry out such work? Or will
they carry out such work ad hoc, i.e. when the need  arises and upon the
order of the competent leaders, employed in the Ministry? We mention
this because the answer to the posed question could not be obtained by
insight into submitted documents in which, after the filed complaint and
possible written letter to the parties that they could plead in regard to the
factual state, follows the resolution of the Ministry being signed by the
minister. It is obvious, that in this way, the conditions for the satisfactory
completion of this job were not established.
(b) Besides that, it is not a minor effect a special kind of conflict of
interest which is direct consequence of introducing the Commission into
the structure of the Ministry. Namely, in the structure of the Federal
Ministry for economy and domestic trade, there is a separate organiza-
tional unit  a sector. Its full title is the Sector for preventing violation of
competition on the single market, and its jurisdiction is to provide condi-
tions for unconstrained development of market competition. Within the
frame of this sector, operates the Department for protection of competi-
tion on the integral market and the Group for monitoring of state and tak-
ing up measurements for protection of consumers rights. Out of titles
itself of these organizational units it is obvious that they have the scope of
work similar to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
It remains an open question if these organizational units act together
with the Commission on the control of monopolistic behaviour and
unfair competition, and what is to be considered mutual activity. In other
words, what relations there are between the Commission, on one side,
and the mentioned departments and groups on the other? The Rule book
on systematisation and internal organization of working places in the
Federal Ministry for economy and domestic trade, prescribes as a
description of employees works in these organizational units, operations
referring to preparation and working out of provisions and supporting
acts referring to control and prevention of violation of competition, i.e.
unfair competition; proposal of measures for advancing of instruments
of free competition and prevention of operations referring to unfair com-
petition on the market and participation in work of inter-resources work-
ing groups and commissions. The quoted formulations are widely set and
could represent basis for participation of these organizational types in the
work of the Commission. However, it is unclear in what relation in such
situation, they would find themselves towards the expert office of the
Commission. However, although formulation preparation of sup-
porting acts,  preventing other speculation operations and  
could be considered as participation in the Commissions work, there are
certain differences due to which that operation could not be equal to
extending expert and technical assistance to the Commission. This due to
the fact that Rule book on Commissions operation is explicit when antic-
ipated that documents for work and decision of the Commission, are
being collected by expert offices of the Commission, and not the Ministry
alone. The question, is it like that also in practice, it is not possible to give
a precise answer.
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3. JUDICIAL BODIES
(a) Considering the nature of the body which issues administrative acts
(represents  the integral part of executive authority), in all countries of
developed legal tradition, it is permitted to control their legislation and
regularity by the third branch of government  the judicial. The judicial
procedure in which such control is carried out has a title: procedure in
contentious administrative matters.
According to the Law on courts which legal validity has ceased with the
issuing of a packet of laws on jurisdiction, the jurisdiction for carrying out
of administrative procedure, has been assigned to district courts. The pro-
cedure was carried out in front of  administrative councils which, from
the functional point of view, were integral part of civil and legal depart-
ments. Such solution enabled, in most cases in smaller courts, that cases
of administrative proceeding are being solved also by judges who were not
closely oriented to documents of administrative proceeding, but were
rented from other councils for that concrete purpose.
After issuing the Law on organization of courts,23 the situation is as fol-
lows: discussing of documents, which are the subject of administrative
proceeding, has been assigned to the jurisdiction of a separate court 
Administrative Court.24
Jurisdiction of the Administrative Court ranges over the entire territory
of Republic of Serbia, and, being directly higher court, responsible for
control of its decisions in cases where in administrative proceeding it is
permitted the appearance of Supreme Court of Serbia. This solution has
several good features. Firstly, by founding a separate administrative court
it was clearly stated that in that matter  there will be advanced training of
personnel from that field which is a great advancement in regard to the
present state. Secondly, not less important, is that such a solution enables
the levelling of court practice to the level of the entire country.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that this solution has been anticipat-
ed for administrative  judicial matters in the Republic of Serbia, and that
for the time being, for the lawsuit in the administrative proceeding against
an administrative act of the federal authority, and there falls second
instance decision in Antimonopoly matters, the Federal Court is the com-
petent one.
(b) Jurisdictional bodies appear in the capacity of competent bodies
even in penal files in which the penal responsibility has been anticipated
by Antimonopoly Law, violations, economic offences and criminal
offences.
Although the number of repressive provisions in Antimonopoly Law is
proportionally great, although they exist in other regulations, which
arrange matters connected to the monopoly and monopolistic behaviour,
the role of Antimonopoly Commission comprises submitting of charges
to the competent offence, i.e. judicial bodies.
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23 Official Gazette RS, No. 63/2001
24 Herewith says specially, contrary to the courts of general jurisdiction, and as such it is
to be understood.
Upon the submission of charges, the plaintiff is the one who decides in
regard to beginning the suit for economic offence, i.e. criminal offence.
For the requirements of this study, it was not specially analysed practice in
these penal proceedings; penal statistics with us do not give precise and
reliable data, and out of practice of Antimonopoly Commission the fol-
lowing is clear: The Commission, obviously, concluded that the most
severe penal measures anticipated by Antimonopoly Law are unexem-
plary, or are not in accord with the entire Antimonopoly legislation, mate-
rial and proceeding as well, so they do not file criminal charges.
(c) Judicial bodies are indirectly in a position that by their decisions
prevent creation and abuse of monopoly. As described above, contracts by
which it is creating or/and abusing monopolistic position, according to
the Law on obligations, are not permitted. The similar prevention is con-
tained even on other regulations, for instance in the Law on system of
social price control. 
According to the rules of civil, i.e. trade law, each interested party can,
by lawsuit, request from the court to establish worthless of such agree-
ment. If in front of the court it appears a case from the contract which has
elements of creating, i.e. using of monopolistic agreement, irrespective
weather one of parties request so, the court shall pronounce such contract
null and void. If there is indication that it is about void contract of this
kind, the court can carry on with probative proceeding, irrespective of the
factual assertion and proofs offered by parties.
Herewith also it was not possible to carry out relevant empiric investi-
gation, but with the insight into publication in which court practice is reg-
ularly published, it could be concluded (except rarely in the function of
protection of consumers) that courts have not been faced with this prob-
lem. The reason does not have to be the absence of sensibility for necessity
of freedom protection and equal competition, although the absence of tra-
dition indicates that this reason also exists. The concept of abuse of
monopolistic, i.e. dominant position and monopolistic agreement in our
law, especially including consequences in that concept, have made that at
the same time it was potentially acquired others, less subtle and demon-
strable reasons of irrelevant legal operation.
(d) Finally, courts appear in the capacity of executive bodies in relation
to some decisions of the Antimonopoly Commission. It is especially inter-
esting the position of the court in carrying out decision regarding preven-
tion of publishing activities. The Law on procedure of entry into the court
registry and regulation on entry into court registry was not specially regu-
lated the jurisdiction of registration court to enter such a prevention,
although for such entry there are many reasons, including also prevention
of third conscientious persons. As per analogy, temporary prevention
could be entered by note.
(e) At the end, if it has to evaluate the role, which judicial bodies really
have in acquiring Antimonopoly principle in our positive law, it has not
been specially pronounced. It would be difficult to expect important
administrative-judicial, thus, control role in proportionally small number
of cases in which there were reactions on appearance of creation and abuse
of monopoly, practice in which, otherwise, meagre, contradictory and
unclear provisions of the Law, have been given a life.
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The economic environment of simulated market in socialist commod-
ity production and regulated market (with emphasized role of the state)
in the analysed period, are not suppositions in which regulation could
develop, and with that institution to carry it on accordingly. It would be
justified that parallel with reforms of normative model, the new competi-
tion policy institutions should be created, including also appropriate
preparation and training of judicial bodies.
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No. Sub-sector Sub-sector Number HH Quoti- 
Code of Com- Index ent
panies K4
1 10101 Production of hydroelectric energy 3 5,341 100.0
2 10102 Production of thermoelectric energy 5 4,596 98.1
3 10104 Transfer of electric energy 1 10,000 100.0
4 10105 Distribution of electric energy 10 1,972 80.0
5 10202 Production of brown coal 2 9,995 100.0
6 10203 Production and dehydrating of lignite 4 7,639 100.0
7 10410 Production of crude oil 1 10,000 100.0
8 10500 Production of oil derivatives 13 2,102 83.7
9 10712 Production of raw steel 5 8,408 99.3
10 10713 Production of milled. pulled and 
hammered steel 29 2,183 79.8
11 10720 Production of ferroalloy 1 10,000 100.0
12 10810 Production of mineral and copper 
concentrates 2 6,037 100.0
13 10820 Production of minerals and lead
and zinc concentrates 3 8,903 100.0
14 10890 Production of bauxite 1 10,000 100.0
15 10910 Production of copper 1 10,000 100.0
16 10920 Production of lead 1 10,000 100.0
17 10930 Production of zinc 1 10,000 100.0
18 10942 Production of aluminium 1 10,000 100.0
19 10999 Production of unmentioned
non-ferrous metals 4 5,055 100.0
20 11010 Processing of aluminium 21 3,584 94.1
21 11091 Processing of copper and copper alloy 12 4,206 99.5
22 11092 Processing of lead 2 6,094 100.0
23 11099 Processing of remaining ferrous metals 15 4,052 94.8
24 11111 Production of asbestos 1 10,000 100.0
25 11112 Production of magnesia and clay 5 4,578 99.9
26 11113 Production of quartz sand 8 2,945 97.5
27 11119 Production of remaining
non-metal minerals 14 8,964 99.3
ANEX
Basic Data of Supply Concentration
Table A1
Supply concentration estimated on the firms’ turnover
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28 11129 Production of remaining salt 5 5,962 99.9
29 11211 Production of plain glass 15 6,182 92.1
30 11212 Production of wrapping glass 2 10,000 100.0
31 11219 Production of remaining glass 29 1,348 67.5
32 11220 Production of fireproof materials 14 6,253 97.9
33 11231 Production of porcelain and ceramic
for household 16 6,725 96.0
34 11232 Production of construction - technical 
ceramic and porcelain 22 2,415 95.4
35 11291 Production of asbestos products 10 4,524 98.8
36 11292 Production of coal-graphite products 7 3,346 93.4
37 11299 Remaining processing of non-metal 19 2,127 72.6
38 11311 Production of cast, hammered and 
pressed products 297 358 29.0
39 11312 Production of metal installation material 140 663 45.6
40 11313 Production of tools 186 1,100 53.4
41 11314 Production of metal wrapping 79 1,355 64.7
42 11315 Production of nails. rollers. rivets
and remaining wire goods 231 490 36.1
43 11316 Production of rolling beds 23 2,969 87.9
44 11319 Production of remaining metal
reproduction material 166 660 40.1
45 11320 Production of metal construction
nd other construction material 290 256 25.1
46 11390 Production of consumer goods 
and remaining metal products 320 616 44.7
47 11411 Production of energy machines
and equipment 41 1,501 64.6
48 11412 Production of construction and coal 
mining machines and equipment 18 4,713 87.7
49 11413 Production of machines for metal and
wood processing 48 820 46.2
50 11419 Production of remaining machines and
equipment (excluding electric and 
agriculture equipment) 191 494 33.5
51 11420 Production of agriculture machines 44 783 46.6
52 11430 Production of equipment for professional 
and scientific purpose. measuring and 
control instruments and equipment for 130 772 48.7
automatic control (except for industry)
53 11511 Production of railway vehicle 9 2,545 96.1
54 11512 Mending of railway vehicle 5 4,694 97.4
55 11521 Production of motors 6 2,351 96.1
56 11522 Production of trucks and special vehicle 17 2,469 86.7
57 11523 Production of passenger cars 7 6,595 100.0
58 11524 Production of tractors
59 11525 Production of motorcycles and mopeds 1 10,000 100.0
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60 11526 Production of bicycle 19 3,099 89.4
61 11527 Production of elements and equipment
or motor vehicle 139 466 32.3
62 11530 Production of aviation means 7 7,987 99.4
63 11590 Production of remaining transport means 2 5,505 100.0
64 11601 Sea shipbuilding 4 9,064 100.0
65 11602 River shipbuilding 22 1,263 61.8
66 11710 Production of electric machines and
equipment 140 542 38.3
67 11721 Production of component parts for
electric apparatus and equipment 130 281 22.4
68 11722 Production of radio and television 
receivers and electric-acoustic 46 1,020 56.0
apparatus and equipment
69 11723 Production of communication apparatus
and equipment 109 689 42.1
70 11724 Production of measuring and regulating
equipment. means for control and- 202 477 35.6
automatic in industry and transportation
71 11729 Production of not mentioned electric 
apparatus and equipment 509 285 26.4
72 11730 Production of cables and conductors 16 2,267 86.3
73 11741 Production of thermal apparatus 37 2,787 79.0
74 11742 Production of cooling apparatus and 
equipment 46 685 42.4
75 11743 Production of apparatus and equipment
for washing and drying 2 9,688 100.0
76 11749 Production of remaining household 
appliances 20 1,534 70.6
77 11791 Production of electric installation material 46 1,899 68.7
78 11792 Production of light bulbs and 
luminescent rods 17 4,115 91.9
79 11793 Production of electric battery and
galvanise elements 27 5,411 85.5
80 11799 Production of not mentioned
electric-technique products 66 1,139 59.1
81 11810 Production of chemicals
(except for agriculture) 69 1,987 69.3
82 11820 Production of chemicals for agriculture 28 1,171 58.2
83 11831 Production of artificial and synthetic fibre 6 5,534 100.0
84 11832 Production of plastic mass 64 3,995 83.7
85 11910 Production of medicines and 
pharmaceutical raw materials 49 1,512 67.8
86 11920 Production of washing equipment and
cosmetic preparation 200 1,371 58.4
87 11930 Production of paint and varnish 109 866 52.7
88 11941 Production of plastic mass wrapping 227 328 25.4
89 11949 Remaining processing of plastic mass 336 436 30.7
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90 11990 Production of remaining chemical 
products 154 422 31.9
91 12001 Stone production and processing 86 862 52.2
92 12002 Production of gravel and sand 47 877 51.6
93 12003 Production of raw gypsum (sadder) 2 5,003 100.0
94 12111 Production of lime 19 2,782 93.7
95 12112 Production of gypsum 1 10,000 100.0
96 12120 Production of cement 9 3,304 99.7
97 12130 Production of brick and tile 96 724 45.7
98 12142 Production of prefabricated construction 
elements 162 475 34.9
99 12143 Production of bitumen material for
roads and roofs 1 10,000 100.0
100 12201 Production of cut construction material 475 208 20.5
101 12202 Production of furniture and plates 14 2,714 92.1
102 12203 Impregnation of wood 3 9,833 100.0
103 12310 Production of wooden furniture 281 225 19.4
104 12321 Production of wooden wrapping material 89 534 36.6
105 12322 Production of construction wood 
elements 230 362 29.7
106 12323 Production of wood and cork 
haberdasher 84 925 52.5
107 12324 Production of rod objects 20 1,435 65.7
108 12410 Production of cellulose and paper 46 1,626 68.3
109 12421 Production of paper wrapping material 275 622 41.2
110 12429 Remaining processing paper material 138 2,170 71.9
111 12511 Production of hemp and linen fibre 2 10,000 100.0
112 12512 Production of yarn and cotton thread 12 8,534 99.4
113 12513 Production of woollen yarn 10 2,029 86.3
114 12514 Production of yarn and hard and bast 
fibber rods 12 3,463 91.9
115 12515 Production of yarn and natural and
artificial silk thread 2 9,989 100.0
116 12516 Production of synthetic crepe yarn and 
thread 4 8,132 100.0
117 12521 Production of cotton textile (cotton type) 26 3,175 85.5
118 12522 Production of woollen textile 
(woollen type) 18 1,309 64.6
119 12523 Production of hard and likastih yarn
fibber textile 8 5,934 98.1
120 12524 Production of silk textile (silk type) 10 2,213 84.5
121 12611 Production of knitted textile 42 946 55.1
122 12612 Production of knitted underwear 27 2,009 72.3
123 12613 Production of knitted garments 120 396 29.7
124 12614 Production of socks 57 1,711 70.9
125 12615 Production of linen 26 2,259 79.1
185Anex: Basic Data of Supply Concentration
No, Sub-sector Sub-sector Number HH Quoti- 
Code of Com- Index ent
panies K4
126 12621 Production of underwear (except knitted) 72 1,934 63.0
127 12622 Production of garments 507 274 24.1
128 12623 Production of household linen 82 765 48.7
129 12624 Production of hard garments 19 2,357 82.1
130 12691 Production of floor covers 19 4,859 98.6
131 12699 Production of not mentioned textile 
products 123 680 44.2
132 12701 Production of bulk leather 20 2,305 83.1
133 12703 Production of petty leather and fur 17 2,857 78.0
134 12810 Production of leather footwear 137 546 40.0
135 12820 Production of leather assessors 61 860 47.4
136 12830 Production of leather and fur 
haberdashery 48 937 53.6
137 12901 Production of tires 25 3,745 97.8
138 12909 Remaining caoutchouc 76 642 39.5
139 13010 Grinding and peeling of grain 146 303 24.7
140 13021 Production of bread and baked goods 183 748 45.1
141 13022 Production of pastries 37 2,322 69.8
142 13030 Processing and conservation of fruit
and vegetables 233 242 21.0
143 13041 Cattle slaughtering 67 980 54.6
144 13042 Processing and conservation of meet 122 1,317 61.8
145 13043 Processing and conservation of fish 10 2,422 83.2
146 13050 Processing and conservation of milk 96 1,676 61.7
147 13060 Production of sugar 19 1,717 76.4
148 13071 Production of cacao products 21 2,052 80.5
149 13072 Production of candies and sweets 23 2,491 88.7
150 13073 Production of biscuits and 
related products 13 3,527 96.9
151 13074 Production of industrial cakes 21 3,419 96.7
152 13080 Production of vegetable oil and lard 14 2,152 83.8
153 13091 Production of starch and processed starch 3 5,320 100.0
154 13099 Production of spices, coffee and  
remaining food 370 659 40.6
155 13111 Production of herbal origin alcohol 7 4,975 100.0
156 13112 Production of beer 19 1,766 71.6
157 13113 Production of vine 44 1,488 66.0
158 13114 Production of vine distillates, whiskey and
grape and vine brandy 16 5,820 97.0
159 13115 Production of fruit brandy 28 5,047 93.2
160 13119 Production of remaining alcoholic 
beverage 14 2,374 85.6
161 13121 Production of refreshments 134 2,051 69.2
162 13122 Production of mineral water 16 4,768 95.0
163 13200 Production of cattle food 210 620 43.1
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164 13310 Production of fermented tobacco 12 1,615 72.2
165 13320 Processing of tobacco 4 6,673 100.0
166 13400 Graphic activity 769 180 20.8
167 13500 Recycling of raw materials 212 338 30.3
168 13901 Production of teaching and physic
education equipment 16 1,724 62.4
169 13902 Production of records and musical 
instruments 11 2,948 90.5
170 13903 Production of matches 4 4,807 100.0
171 13904 Production of jewellery 32 8,569 97.9
172 13909 Remaining not mentioned industry 86 1,048 55.0
173 20110 Farming 1573 77 11.7
174 20121 Production of fruit 166 809 47.8
175 20129 Production of fruit and related material 32 1,025 54.1
176 20131 Production of grapes 31 1,124 58.0
177 20139 Production of vine and related material 9 5,095 95.8
178 20140 Cattle breeding 775 289 27.9
179 20201 Cervices for vegetable production 238 349 29.8
180 20202 Services for cattle breeding 164 209 20.9
181 20301 Fishing at see 2 8,867 100.0
182 20302 Fishing at river 42 1,799 73.1
183 30001 Forestry 5 9,970 100.0
184 30002 Forest use 1 10,000 100.0
185 30003 Hunting and prey breeding 146 413 32.9
186 30004 Forest protection 5 6,748 100.0
187 40001 Use of water 14 7,658 95.3
188 40002 Protection from harmful water effect 36 470 29.5
189 40003 Protection of water from pollution 1 10,000 100.0
190 50100 Architecture 1153 100 12.1
191 50201 Construction of transport objects 121 420 32.2
192 50202 Hydro construction 81 790 49.3
193 50203 Construction of mining objects 23 1,007 54.1
194 50209 Construction of remaining objects 217 275 25.5
195 50301 Construction installation 610 151 18.2
196 50302 Final and craft work 1015 63 9.6
197 60101 Transportation in railway transport 1 10,000 100.0
198 60102 Train pulling 1 10,000 100.0
199 60103 Maintenance and care of cars 2 9,938 100.0
200 60105 Maintenance of equipment 3 8,165 100.0
201 60201 Transportation in sailing transport 2 10,000 100.0
202 60202 Services in sailing transport 1 10,000 100.0
203 60301 Transportation in river transport 18 2,063 83.7
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204 60302 Services in river transport 6 2,434 91.1
205 60401 Transportation in aviation transport 10 9,967 100.0
206 60402 Airport services 5 9,389 100.0
207 60403 Services of aviation economy 4 4,752 100.0
208 60501 Transportation of passengers in 
road transport 287 446 32.5
209 60502 Transportation of goods in road transport 1120 290 25.7
210 60503 Services of road transport 197 821 51.0
211 60601 Transportation of passengers public 
transport 49 1,206 62.1
212 60602 Taxi car transportation 30 1,017 53.0
213 60609 Remaining transport of passengers 3 7,908 100.0
214 60700 Tube transport 2 9,881 100.0
215 60801 Reloading in harbours 1 10,000 100.0
216 60802 Reloading in ports 6 2,640 94.3
217 60803 Reloading in railway stations 28 1,454 63.7
218 60900 Telecom services 39 3,912 99.5
219 70111 Retail of bread 144 391 31.3
220 70112 Retail of fruit and vegetables 71 2,640 69.5
221 70113 Retail of meet and fish 70 2,003 69.7
222 70114 Retail of groceries 931 1,165 59.0
223 70121 Retail of textile 345 528 36.8
224 70122 Retail of leather and rubber 133 1,223 59.1
225 70123 Retail of metal goods 394 823 48.0
226 70124 Retail of combustible material 227 315 24.3
227 70125 Retail of furniture 96 1,828 75.6
228 70126 Retail of glass 21 4,007 76.9
229 70127 Retail of paint and chemicals 124 970 53.9
230 70128 Retail of books 136 4,295 82.9
231 70129 Retail of remaining goods 282 579 38.7
232 70131 Department stores 24 3,466 79.1
233 70132 Retail of remaining mixed goods 1365 175 19.1
234 70140 Retail of cars 336 422 34.6
235 70150 Retail of oil derivatives 151 3,163 71.8
236 70210 1 10,000 100.0
237 70211 Wholesale of granaries 605 169 18.3
238 70212 Wholesale of fruit and vegetables 324 308 27.5
239 70213 Wholesale of alcohol beverages 187 396 31.9
240 70214 Wholesale of cattle 128 364 28.9
241 70219 Wholesale of groceries 1828 239 24.6
242 70221 Wholesale of textile 921 308 26.0
243 70222 Wholesale of raw leather 114 405 30.6
244 70223 Wholesale of metal goods 1827 111 13.0
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245 70224 Wholesale of construction material goods 1202 267 25.0
246 70225 Wholesale of chemical products 567 169 17.4
247 70226 Wholesale of paper 542 569 31.6
248 70227 Wholesale of medicines 243 347 28.5
249 70229 Wholesale of remaining non-food goods 524 554 33.5
250 70230 Wholesale of cars and spare parts 1032 119 15.5
251 70240 Wholesale of oil derivatives 146 352 27.8
252 70250 Wholesale of mixed goods 11490 3 5.1
253 70260 Wholesale of waste 104 2,639 63.6
254 70310 International food trade 161 1,096 60.9
255 70320 International non-food trade 790 807 43.6
256 80111 Hotels motels  seasonal 28 1,274 63.4
257 80112 Hotels motels  remaining 137 266 24.6
258 80113 Retreats 14 1,585 75.5
259 80114 Camps 3 5,104 100.0
260 80119 Remaining accommodation services 8 3,527 98.9
261 80121 Restaurants with attendants 189 319 27.0
262 80122 Self service restaurants 7 7,012 99.9
263 80123 Public food restaurants 38 1,279 58.3
264 80129 Remaining food services 33 2,762 83.9
265 80190 Remaining hotel services 277 552 35.2
266 80201 Tourist agencies 392 445 36.6
267 80202 Tourist bureau 96 952 50.6
268 90110 Production of non-metal objects 32 5,046 89.9
269 90121 Repair of road vehicles 348 707 42.9
270 90122 Repair of precise mechanic products 113 364 28.4
271 90123 Production of metal products 184 314 25.4
272 90124 Services of metalworking craftsmen 24 6,775 94.5
273 90129 Services metalworking craftsmen 166 507 36.9
274 90131 Repair of electric apparatus for household 126 808 46.3
275 90132 Repair of radio and TV apparatus 109 1,149 53.5
276 90133 roduction of electric-technical products 65 919 54.1
277 90139 Repair of remaining electrical apparatus 174 281 25.0
278 90140 Production of wooden objects 93 902 48.7
279 90150 Production of textile objects 116 696 46.5
280 90160 Production of leather objects 39 877 49.8
281 90171 Production of bread and baked goods 28 2,122 77.1
282 90172 Slaughtering cattle and delicatessen 31 2,396 74.8
283 90179 Production of remaining food products 34 1,202 62.1
284 90181 Production of plastic mass products 67 739 45.4
285 90182 Production of orthopaedic appliances 35 1,844 66.9
286 90183 Production of paper objects 23 2,378 73.8
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287 90189 Production of not mentioned various 
objects 85 567 38.8
288 90201 Hairdressers and cosmetic services 78 1,746 57.9
289 90202 Linen washing and garments cleaning 7 3,074 90.1
290 90209 Remaining personal services 321 159 16.0
291 100101 Arranging construction cites 78 1,161 45.2
292 100102 Arranging and maintenance of the streets 18 2,895 86.7
293 100103 Arranging green exterior 22 2,233 78.2
294 100200 Residential activity 6 3,451 97.4
295 100310 Production of and distribution of water 141 452 30.9
296 100320 Drainage of waste water 3 3,662 100.0
297 100330 Production of and distribution of gas 23 1,365 58.2
298 100340 Production of and distribution of heat 43 1,430 65.7
299 100351 Cleaning of public spaces 25 1,340 56.7
300 100352 Taking waste out 29 1,308 55.1
301 100391 Chimney sweeper activity 16 1,581 72.2
302 100392 Funeral services 11 5,195 95.0
303 100399 Not mentioned communal activities 64 1,690 61.6
304 110109 Other financial organisations 2 10,000 100.0
305 110201 Insurance 23 3,462 84.3
306 110202 Lottery and betting 57 1,448 69.3
307 110301 Public storage places 38 860 50.8
308 110302 Advertising services 420 397 33.4
309 110303 Commercial businesses 1508 306 27.5
310 110304 Market services 17 3,727 92.8
311 110309 Not mentioned transport services 1360 194 21.2
312 110401 Space planing 79 588 40.5
313 110402 Planing of construction objects 393 400 33.1
314 110403 Remaining planing 185 429 31.7
315 110404 Engineering 1391 94 14.3
316 110405 Re-measuring of plains 17 9,630 99.6
317 110406 Examination of materials 34 2,792 76.0
318 110500 Geological examinations 34 673 41.4
319 110611 Examination in economy 182 517 37.4
320 110612 Examinations in public activities 10 5,982 97.0
321 110620 Economic services 492 1,186 58.3
322 110901 Services of quality control 58 1,892 72.5
323 110902 Organising of fairs 16 4,176 96.8
324 110903 Book keeping services 822 1,195 57.6
325 110904 Legal and lawyer services 9 4,405 99.3
326 110905 Services for data processing 292 510 37.4
327 110909 Remaining not mentioned services 860 100 3.3
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118100242 Ammonium-nitrate, for artificial fertiliser 2 87,642 88 87,730 0.10% 10,000 9,979 0.2% 8.00 3
124100232 Paper for illustration and magazines 3 1,309 4 1,313 0.30% 10,000 9,940 0.6% 34.00 3
120030012 Raw gypsum 2 46,651 213 46,864 0.45% 10,000 9,909 0.9% 8.00 5
112110022 Plain ornament-glass 3 5,792 59 5,851 1.01% 10,000 9,799 2.0% 18.00 3
117490043 Vacuum cleaners 6 894 10 904 1.09% 10,000 9,782 2.2% 41.25 1
118101122 Propylene 2 43,424 0 43,424 0.00% 9,717 9,717 0.0% 10.00 3
112110032 Plane reinforced glass 3 2,486 60 2,546 2.35% 10,000 9,536 4.6% 25.00 3
117210282 Microphones and loud speakers to build into 3 135 4 139 3.05% 10,000 9,399 6.0% 22.00 1
109300082 Zinc powder 2 602 25 627 4.05% 10,000 9,207 7.9% 15.00 4
110100162 Seam rods from aluminium alloy 3 11 1 12 4.35% 10,000 9,149 8.5% 17.00 3
118100502 Potassium-silicate (K-water glass) 2 161 7 168 4.35% 10,000 9,148 8.5% 3.00 3
118310112 Cord 3 1,325 68 1,393 4.87% 10,000 9,049 9.5% 9.33 2
107131032 Plastified metal 3 1,864 98 1,962 5.02% 10,000 9,021 9.8% 54.00 3
114200131 Plant nursing. seeding, transplant and other 
sowing machines
4 4 0 4 6.91% 10,000 8,665 13.3% 14.00 2
118100562 Sodiumsulphate 2 24 2 26 7.55% 10,000 8,547 14.5% 12.00 3
112120012 Wrapping glass (baloons, bottles, glass and similar) 3 53,609 4,217 57,826 7.29% 9,940 8,543 14.1% 30.90 2
117930012 Lead electric battery for motor cars 6 9,412 143 9,555 1.49% 8,657 8,401 3.0% 32.00 2
105000602 Butane, liquid 1 1,771 180 1,951 9.21% 10,000 8,243 17.6% 5.00 3
115260042 Elements for bicycle and threecycle 1 5 2 17 9.62% 10,000 8,169 18.3% 66.00 2
Table A2.
Supply concentration (domestic production and import)
Product Product Product Pro-- Net Ponuda Import HHI HHI Decrease Protection Significance
Code Type duction import (t) share excluding including HH of transport
(t) (t) import import costs
126990163 Sanitary bandages 5 56 7 63 11.57% 10,000 7,820 21.8% 15.00 1
113150372 Metal electrode for welding 4 493 75 568 13.24% 9,959 7,496 24.7% 36.00 2
113120112 Equipment for use of sun energy 4 51 1 52 1.48% 7,631 7,407 2.9% 5.00 3
130500063 Food for infants and small children 5 62 11 73 15.13% 10,000 7,203 28.0% 69.00 1
119100463 Filters for chemodialysis 5 214 20 234 8.70% 8,509 7,092 16.7% 3.00 1
113130021 Files 4 16 3 19 15.99% 10,000 7,0572 9.4% 20.00 3
113900101 Dentist chairs 6 12 2 14 16.21% 10,000 7,0202 9.8% 34.00 1
111190072 Raw kaolin 2 39,475 8,262 47,737 17.31% 10,000 6,838 31.6% 3.00 5
118320182 Polypropylene 2 21,265 4,658 25,923 17.97% 10,000 6,729 32.7% 6.20 3
130990063 Roast coffee 5 1,397 1 1,398 0.04% 6,707 6,701 0.1% 5.00 2
113900253 Gas stove and heaters 6 71 16 87 18.27% 10,000 6,6793 3.2% 27.00 2
117410073 Electric boilers 6 5,886 970 6,856 14.15% 9,007 6,639 26.3% 54.00 2
112320092 Sanitary ceramic 6 3,242 771 4,013 19.20% 10,000 6,527 34.7% 33.00 2
130710023 Cacao in powder 3 460 99 559 17.71% 9,574 6,483 32.3% 60.00 2
111120052 Raw fireproof clay 2 26,851 57 26,908 0.21% 6,495 6,468 0.4% 3.00 5
115220331 Fire fighting vehicles (produced 
from domestic elements) 4 14 3 17 19.72% 10,000 6,444 35.6% 19.00 2
124100212 Recycled writing paper 5 3,128 903 4,031 22.40% 10,000 6,021 39.8% 34.00 3
112310013 Products from porcelain and ceramic
za pripremu. sluewe i Łuvawe hrane i piæa
5 1,200 165 1,365 12.09% 7,750 5,9892 2.7% 22.67 2
118100102 Phosphor acid. 100% 2 18,987 2,463 21,450 11.48% 7,403 5,800 21.6% 8.33 4
119100153 Serums and vaccines 5 118 2 120 1.50% 5,947 5,770 3.0% 5.00 1
112910052 Asbestos ready-made clothes 6 1 0 1 24.07% 10,000 5,7654 2.3% 20.00 2
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118320332 Synthetic caoutchouc 2 15,193 5,161 20,354 25.36% 10,000 5,571 44.3% 4.05 3
129010072 External tires for trucks and buses. radial 4 5,392 1,902 7,294 26.08% 10,000 5,464 45.4% 38.00 3
112200022 Sinter-magnesite 2 20,124 7,368 27,492 26.80% 10,000 5,357 46.4% 3.00 5
118310102 Rayon 3 568 209 777 26.86% 10,000 5,349 46.5% 11.00 3
105000532 Bitumen 2 12,843 1,989 14,832 13.41% 7,051 5,286 25.0% 8.00 4
113130061 Spiral drills 4 33 2 35 6.70% 6,033 5,251 13.0% 36.67 2
126990093 Medical cotton-wool 5 389 150 539 27.83% 10,000 5,208 47.9% 10.00 1
117300292 Optical cables 4 43 17 60 27.87% 10,000 5,202 48.0% 23.25 2
113130051 Navojne nareznice 4 10 1 11 12.69% 6,800 5,183 23.8% 18.00 3
113130191 Tools for forgery 4 101 11 112 10.18% 6,376 5,144 19.3% 19.00 3
130300413 Pasteurised pepper 5 730 1 731 0.19% 5,054 5,035 0.4% 40.00 1
113120282 Fittings 3 414 15 429 3.45% 5,352 4,990 6.8% 10.00 3
102030022 Lignite, total 1 33,735,232 39 33,735,271 0.00% 4,868 4,868 0.0% 10.00 5
118320632 Polyethylene wrapping 3 1,726 02 2,028 14.89% 6,514 4,719 27.6% 23.00 3
114190011 Machines and equipment for milling in powder 4 981 350 1,331 26.30% 8,478 4,605 45.7% 7.50 2
124290043 Paper wallpaper 6 189 90 279 32.22% 10,000 4,594 54.1% 15.00 2
114200351 RuŁne prskalice 4 34 10 44 22.07% 7,491 4,549 39.3% 10.00 3
130720033 Chewing gums 5 660 326 986 33.05% 10,000 4,482 55.2% 120.00 1
113900391 Fire extinguish apparatus and tools 4 155 35 190 18.44% 6,723 4,472 33.5% 7.75 2
115220022 Body-work for trucks 3 174 65 239 27.20% 8,424 4,464 47.0% 7.00 2
113150162 Barbed wire 4 320 160 480 33.40% 10,000 4,436 55.6% 19.00 3
126990042 Felt 3 1,202 81 1,283 6.34% 5,039 4,420 12.3% 10.00 1
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118100032 Ammoniac 100% 2 70,517 36,076 106,593 33.84% 10,000 4,376 56.2% 8.00 4
107130532 Cold formed profiles 3 2,151 617 2,768 22.28% 7,105 4,291 39.6% 69.00 4
118320702 Polypropylene films and wrapping 3 1,197 632 1,829 34.56% 10,000 4,281 57.2% 3.00 2
110100022 Rolled metal plate from aluminium, 4 mm
and lesser thickness
3 943 320 1,263 25.36% 7,684 4,281 44.3% 10.00 3
110990012 Rolled. pulled and pressed products from thin 3 23 12 36 34.74% 10,000 4,258 57.4% 3.00 3
114200311 Hay overturns 4 280 157 437 36.00% 10,000 4,096 59.0% 14.00 2
111190082 Raw dolomite 2 14,100 7,993 22,093 36.18% 10,000 4,073 59.3% 5.00 5
118100082 Sulphur acid 2 97,808 27,457 125,265 21.92% 6,553 3,995 39.0% 12.50 4
114120141 Concrete mixers 4 475 60 535 11.24% 5,038 3,969 21.2% 14.00 3
118100012 Chlorine 2 2,881 1,708 4,589 37.22% 10,000 3,941 60.6% 10.00 4
117990013 Light for light bulbs with red-hot thread 5 176 20 196 10.07% 4,744 3,837 19.1% 56.67 2
117910052 Plugs 5 75 47 122 38.31% 10,000 3,805 61.9% 5.00 1
118320652 Polyethylene rods 3 2,876 5 2,881 0.18% 3,812 3,799 0.4% 20.00 3
124100222 Recycled paper 5 3,210 575 3,785 15.20% 5,244 3,771 28.1% 34.00 3
111190102 Laporac 2 1,652,096 2,335 1,654,431 0.14% 3,770 3,759 0.3% 8.00 5
117910062 Gullet for lights 5 152 23 175 13.33% 5,000 3,7562 4.9% 17.50 1
113150382 Metal electrodes for welding, coated 4 1,173 757 930 39.22% 10,000 3,694 63.1% 36.00 2
111210013 See salt for human food 5 32,246 14,987 47,233 31.73% 7,899 3,681 53.4% 12.00 3
130300643 Products from potatoes (crisps, french fries)
and similar) 5 859 519 1,378 37.67% 9,258 3,596 61.2% 40.00 1
121200012 Marbles 2 1,686,065 7,877 1,693,942 0.47% 3,620 3,587 0.9% 15.00 5
112910032 Brakes and fastener panelling 3 1,007 226 1,233 18.33% 5,276 3,519 33.3% 5.00 2
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118200272 Fungicide 5 1,414 322 1,736 18.55% 5,127 3,401 33.7% 16.86 2
113140062 Barrels made of black tin 4 1,993 1,211 3,204 37.80% 8,7 713,394 61.3% 13.25 2
113200201 Containers for storing and transport of goods 5 403 43 446 9.59% 4,127 3,374 18.3% 14.00 3
130420182 Meet flour 3 3,855 2 3,857 0.06% 3,294 3,290 0.1% 19.00 3
112320042 Floor ceramic tiles 5 51,729 2,373 54,102 4.39% 3,534 3,231 8.6% 58.00 2
111120012 Magnesium ore, trenched 2 31,477 960 32,437 2.96% 3,411 3,212 5.8% 3.00 5
119900152 Remaining help equipment for leather 5 765 596 1,361 43.81% 10,000 3,157 68.4% 6.29 1
114200071 Levelling machines 4 451 338 789 42.86% 9,566 3,122 67.4% 14.00 2
113130131 Tightening tools 4 55 0 55 0.28% 3,137 3,119 0.6% 10.00 3
130500143 Melted cheese 5 1,626 114 1,740 6.55% 3,408 2,976 12.7% 80.00 1
121200022 Portland cement 3 2,117,450 217,831 2,335,281 9.33% 3,580 2,943 17.8% 16.89 4
113150232 Welded armature nets 3 6,798 2,125 8,923 23.81% 5,000 2,902 42.0% 18.00 3
119100483 Solution for infusion 5 1,483 150 1,633 9.18% 3,512 2,897 17.5% 10.00 2
122010302 Kindling 2 5,686 24 5,710 0.42% 2,849 2,825 0.8% 8.00 5
129090022 Whole rubber rods 3 32 17 49 34.56% 6,582 2,818 57.2% 21.00 3
124290092 Products from carton 5 938 42 980 4.33% 3,016 2,761 8.5% 21.33 3
124290082 Products from paper 5 300 38 338 11.18% 3,434 2,708 21.1% 26.00 2
121430012 Bitumen hydro-isolation material with carboard 2 7,278 2,839 10,117 28.06% 5,219 2,701 48.2% 20.00 4
130500043 Milk in powder, fool fat for human use 5 1,851 512 2,363 21.67% 4,366 2,679 38.6% 23.00 2
118320072 Phenol resin 2 1,063 995 2,058 48.34% 9,648 2,575 73.3% 6.50 3
112320032 Wall ceramic tiles, glazed 5 37,430 6,574 44,004 14.94% 3,517 2,544 27.6% 66.00 3
105000012 Raw petrol for motor petrol 1 134,11 131,873 265,990 49.58% 10,000 2,542 74.6% 3.00 3
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114200251 Mowing machines. self-propelled 4 54 17 71 23.74% 4,341 2,524 41.8% 14.00 2
115220311 Auto-cistern (products from domestic elements) 4 209 93 302 30.79% 5,224 2,502 52.1% 62.40 2
131140023 Natural strong alcohol beverages from 
grape and vine
5 720 266 986 26.98% 4,591 2,447 46.7% 12.00 1
117100681 Transfer case. cupboard and remaining 
transfer equipment 4 437 51 488 10.36% 3,039 2,442 19.6% 27.67 2
119490222 Elements for footwear from plastic mass 3 66 69 135 50.99% 10,000 2,402 76.0% 10.00 1
119200013 Washing soap 5 566 313 879 35.63% 5,714 2,367 58.6% 20.00 1
112190112 Safety laminated glass 6 330 358 688 52.04% 10,000 2,300 77.0% 20.00 3
114200371 Tractor sprinkles, winged 4 50 54 104 52.13% 10,000 2,2917 7.1% 10.00 2
119490202 Syringe for one use 5 165 174 339 51.39% 9,642 2,278 76.4% 14.00 1
119200173 Creme for shaving 5 142 0 142 0.00% 2,276 2,276 0.0% 18.00 1
118200292 Herbicides 5 2,208 327 2,535 12.89% 2,976 2,258 24.1% 13.57 2
102010012 Stone coal, total 1 87,888 29,950 117,838 25.42% 4,014 2,233 44.4% 2.67 5
119200203 Gear for teeth care 5 675 211 885 23.78% 3,753 2,180 41.9% 21.60 1
114190861 Transports, lane 4 169 89 258 34.50% 4,962 2,1285 7.1% 7.50 2
119200223 Sredstva za kupawe 5 396 361 757 47.73% 7,662 2,0937 2.7% 21.50 1
118200252 Rodentycides 5 54 64 118 54.30% 10,000 2,088 79.1% 12.00 2
117430072 Elements for apparatus and equipment for washing
dying and ironing
3 102 41 143 28.68% 4,063 2,067 49.1% 8.33 1
129090202 Rubber block (whole rubber and fortified) 5 94 53 147 35.93% 4,923 2,020 58.9% 20.00 1
125160022 Polyamide 66, textured yarn 3 735 902 1,637 55.10% 10,000 2,016 79.8% 3.00 3
102020012 Dark coal, total 1 398,468 101,509 499,977 20.30% 3,067 1,948 36.5% 10.00 5
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121110032 Hydrated lime 2 168,424 9,529 177,953 5.35% 2,153 1,929 10.4% 30.00 4
114200271 Mow machines, tractors 4 250 326 576 56.57% 10,000 1,886 81.1% 14.00 2
114200151 Dispenser mineral fertilisers 4 157 65 222 29.19% 3,718 1,864 49.9% 28.00 2
132000192 Food for fish 5 678 445 1,123 39.65% 5,076 1,849 63.6% 3.00 1
113900011 Safe-deposit door and safe-deposits 4 16 11 27 41.54% 5,312 1,815 65.8% 21.00 2
130410053 Svee ivinsko meso 5 7,840 5,650 13,490 41.88% 5,267 1,779 66.2% 40.00 2
113130031 Machine knifes for metal. wood and 
remaining material
4 121 58 179 32.37% 3,776 1,727 54.3% 13.10 3
119200213 Gear for hair washing 5 5,015 77 5,092 1.52% 1,730 1,67 83.0% 25.75 1
104100012 Raw petroleum 1 804,768 252,294 1,057,062 23.87% 2,827 1,638 42.0% 1.00 3
134000073 School and similar notebooks 5 1,067 19 1,086 1.72% 1,684 1,627 3.4% 20.00 1
117210092 Potentiometers 3 1 2 3 59.93% 10,000 1,605 83.9% 10.25 1
113150012 Construction nails 5 2,191 866 3,057 28.32% 3,065 1,575 48.6% 20.00 2
118100042 Chloric acid, technical 2 15,438 8,185 23,623 34.65% 3,661 1,563 57.3% 10.00 4
130300093 Fruit juices from continental fruit, clear and turbid 5 11,987 379 12,366 3.06% 1,643 1,544 6.0% 80.00 2
118101092 Coal-disulphide 2 1,610 2,503 4,113 60.85% 10,000 1,532 84.7% 3.00 3
118100312 Sodium-sulphate, crystal (glauber salt) 2 742 1,154 1,896 60.87% 10,000 1,530 84.7% 15.00 3
130300193 Fruit preserve 5 479 55 534 10.29% 1,864 1,500 19.5% 40.00 1
130500183 Milk and yoghurt 5 86,912 689 87,601 0.79% 1,481 1,458 1.5% 40.00 2
130500113 Soft cheese 5 3,345 181 3,526 5.14% 1,568 1,411 10.0% 80.00 1
114190871 Transports, rolled 4 26 44 70 62.95% 10,000 1,372 86.3% 14.00 2
117430043 Ironing machines 6 23 39 62 63.07% 10,000 1,364 86.4% 3.00 1
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125140042 Sisal-yarn 3 5 9 14 64.31% 10,000 1,274 87.3% 1.00 3
130300113 Fruit juices from tropical fruit 5 4,396 1,694 6,090 27.81% 2,436 1,269 47.9% 70.80 2
125130032 Wooden pulled yarn 3 591 43 634 6.79% 1,441 1,252 13.1% 10.00 3
117990092 Elements and tools for lanterns 3 186 360 546 65.93% 10,000 1,160 88.4% 19.43 2
119900663 Antifreeze 5 1,845 2,293 4,138 55.41% 4,987 991 80.1% 15.00 3
130600013 Sugar 5 117,559 29,207 46,766 19.90% 1,522 976 35.8% 49.50 2
119900272 Polyvinyl - chloride (pvc) glue 3 216 475 691 68.76% 9,726 949 90.2% 15.002
130410112 Technical oil animal origin 3 1,708 688 2,396 28.70% 1,756 892 49.2% 3.00 2
119490293 Products from plastic masses for domestic 
consumer goods
5 996 635 1,631 38.94% 2,337 871 62.7% 30.00 1
121430082 Bitumen emulsion 2 1,359 1,784 3,143 56.76% 4,499 841 81.3% 8.00 4
125160062 Synthetic thread 3 114 245 359 68.28% 8,116 816 89.9% 9.67 2
130500133 Hard cheese 5 3,447 1,050 4,497 23.34% 1,323 777 41.2% 80.00 1
130500073 Butter 5 1,694 599 2,293 26.11% 1,406 768 45.4% 80.001
117430013 Washing linen machines for domestic use 6 787 1,667 2,454 67.93% 7,380 758 89.7% 38.72 2
117410043 Closed hot plate for two and more plates 6 15 26 41 63.55% 5,555 738 86.7% 29.00 2
130410033 Deep freezing apparatus for domestic use 5 49,706 3,692 53,398 6.91% 848 734 13.4% 76.73 2
117420023 Sanitary equipment from plastic mass 6 486 1,312 1,798 72.97% 10,000 730 92.7% 21.00 2
119490173 Sanitarna oprema od plastiŁnih masa 6 148 264 412 64.12% 5,556 715 87.1% 20.00 2
119300162 Graphic paint 3 487 1,320 1,807 73.05% 9,564 694 92.7% 10.50 1
117240301 Equipment for filling 4 3 7 10 73.84% 10,000 684 93.2% 32.00 2
105000312 Motor oil 1 6,907 13,368 20,275 65.93% 5,724 664 88.4% 10.00 3
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130430073 Sterilised fish cans 5 407 1,151 1,558 73.88% 9,427 643 93.2% 31.25 1
132000182 Food for pets 5 111 217 328 66.18% 5,555 635 88.6% 40.00 1
117420013 Refrigerators for households 6 717 2,190 2,907 75.33% 10,000 608 93.9% 32.10 2
119300132 Coating equipment based on polyvinyl 3 1,110 3,091 4,201 73.58% 8,057 562 93.0% 8.00 2
118100812 Zinc-oxide 2 287 934 1,221 76.49% 10,000 552 94.5% 10.00 3
119100203 Penicillin, imported 5 21 68 89 76.56% 10,000 549 94.5% 1.00 1
131190013 Liqueur (sweet, bitter and other) 5 162 355 517 68.70% 5,591 547 90.2% 12.00 1
119100133 Vitamins and vitamin preparations 5 165 261 426 61.28% 3,571 535 85.0% 3.00 1
129010262 Protected truck and bus tires 5 243 348 591 58.86% 2,912 492 83.1% 117.00 3
130500052 Powder milk, skimmed 5 789 1,236 2,025 61.03% 3,235 491 84.8% 23.00 2
113900571 Hand iron carriage 6 133 460 593 77.58% 9,703 487 95.0% 15.00 4
113130221 Pressed shovels, spades and hoes 6 12 43 55 78.32% 10,000 470 95.3% 20.00 3
130410083 Intestines (liver, tongue. stomach. brain and other) 3 4,571 995 5,566 17.87% 669 451 32.6% 44.44 2
113150332 Chains for car wheels 6 16 60 76 78.98% 10,000 442 95.6% 18.00 2
117410023 Electric stoves and radiators 6 2 42 54 77.96% 8,472 411 95.1% 12.55 2
124100502 Cellulose cotton-wool 5 116 460 576 79.86% 10,000 405 95.9% 5.00 3
112310023 Art and decorative ceramics 6 28 118 146 80.83% 10,000 367 96.3% 29.80 1
105000172 Diesel-fuel D-2 1 300,209 927,258 1,227,467 75.54% 6,065 362 94.0% 8.00 3
119900592 Adhesive tape 5 120 372 492 75.62% 6,088 361 94.1% 15.00 1
118101102 Acetylene 2 750 1,204 1,954 61.62% 2,399 353 85.3% 8.00 3
117490113 Apparatus for hair drying 6 5 22 27 81.23% 10,000 352 96.5% 29.00 1
118200382 Charbamid (urea 46%N) 5 21,622 80,171 101,793 78.76% 7,819 352 95.5% 15.00 3
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124100202 Recycled printing paper 5 2,887 12,664 15,551 81.43% 10,000 344 96.6% 34.00 3
115240031 Tractor wheelers. from 91 to 150 KW 4 54 245 299 81.95% 10,000 325 96.7% 3.00 2
130210013 Wheat bread 5 202,423 0 202,423 0.00% 322 321 0.4% 40.00 3
119300242 Solvents 3 1,203 2,155 3,358 64.17% 2,492 319 87.2% 12.50 2
130300062 Concentrated fruit juices. from 45% dry substance 3 315 1,447 1,762 82.13% 10,000 319 96.8% 8.00 2
114200421 Machines for cutting cattle food (cutters and other) 4 2 9 11 82.33% 10,000 312 96.9% 14.00 3
131190033 Remaining artificial strong alcohol beverages 5 580 1,111 1,691 65.69% 2,624 308 88.2% 12.00 1
117240201 Signal-safety equipment and system 4 4 16 20 81.45% 8,580 295 96.6% 23.00 1
118100702 Iron sulphate 2 56 274 330 83.03% 10,000 288 97.1% 3.00 3
117300282 Coaxial cables with metal wound 3 62 206 268 76.82% 5,083 273 94.6% 34.00 2
121430022 Bitumen hydroisolation materials with
insole made of metal wrapping
2 153 785 938 83.70% 10,000 265 97.3% 17.00 4
123230172 Remaining cork products 5 8 42 50 83.85% 10,000 260 97.4% 5.20 4
117490083 Kitchen aspirators 6 35 186 221 84.16% 10,000 251 97.5% 24.40 1
117300042 Plain steel cords 3 606 2,909 3,515 82.76% 8,403 249 97.0% 23.33 3
112190052 Remaining hollow lighting glass 3 178 978 1,156 84.60% 10,000 237 97.6% 5.00 2
114190581 Drying devices 4 36 201 237 84.81% 10,000 230 97.7% 13.00 2
129090142 Rubber thread 3 11 62 73 84.99% 10,000 225 97.7% 12.00 3
118100302 Sodium-sulphate waterless 2 1,521 8,442 9,963 84.73% 9,254 215 97.7% 8.00 3
125140032 Jute yarn 3 146 875 1,021 85.70% 10,000 204 98.0% 5.00 3
113150112 Screw-nuts 5 28 125 153 81.70% 5,739 192 96.7% 17.00 2
131130023 Bottled natural wines, after final processing 5 2,975 7,592 10,567 71.85% 2,354 186 92.1% 80.00 2
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117100251 Stationary aggregate, facilities powered by 
internal combustion engines
4 11 70 81 86.44% 10,000 183 98.2% 11.00 2
119900322 Photo-chemicals 3 74 494 568 86.97% 10,000 169 98.3% 5.00 2
115230023 Passenger cars from 1000 cm3 4 140 953 1,093 87.20% 10,000 163 98.4% 9.83 2
119200303 Hair sprays 5 102 290 392 74.02% 2,386 161 93.2% 24.00 1
113130181 Mould for injection and casting 4 48 130 178 73.11% 2,213 160 92.8% 10.00 3
118101002 Hydrogen 2 109 531 640 82.97% 5,353 155 97.1% 8.00 3
115240021 Tractors wheelers. od 51 do 90 kw 4 309 1,771 2,080 85.14% 6,603 145 97.8% 37.00 2
114200331 Combines for silage 4 17 124 141 87.98% 10,000 144 98.6% 15.00 2
118320302 Silicones 2 45 333 378 88.08% 10,000 142 98.6% 8.00 3
129090382 Rubber linen 3 4 30 34 88.10% 10,000 141 98.6% 13.00 2
119490152 Doors and windows made of plastic mass 6 28 222 250 88.80% 10,000 125 98.7% 22.50 2
114120071 Badger 4 136 783 919 85.20% 5,350 117 97.8% 12.32 3
113900233 Cutlery, made of stainless steel 6 2 18 20 89.91% 10,000 101 99.0% 44.00 2
117210132 Diodes for power current 3 0 1 2 86.42% 5,404 99 98.2% 5.00 1
105000072 Airline petrol 1 72 651 723 90.05% 10,000 99 99.0% 5.00 3
130990042 Cattle yeast 3 731 4,943 5,674 87.12% 5,618 93 98.3% 10.00 2
114120021 Machines for coal crushing 4 31 304 335 90.73% 10,000 85 99.1% 10.67 3
118100162 Sodium-hydroxide, electolitictic. 100% 2 7,415 51,624 59,039 87.44% 5,076 80 98.4% 8.20 3
117930072 Electric battery charger plates 3 99 1,011 1,110 91.08% 10,000 79 99.2% 10.00 3
117420031 Coolers (vitrines, cupboards and other) 6 20 206 226 91.17% 10,000 78 99.2% 40.00 2
119200313 Colour shampoos and hair dyes 5 46 337 383 87.99% 5,137 74 98.6% 24.00 1
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119200343 Colognes 5 7 41 47 86.27% 3,922 73 98.1% 24.00 1
129090263 Sporting requisites 5 51 543 594 91.42% 10,000 73 99.3% 15.00 1
119200043 Liquid soaps 5 110 1,182 1,292 91.49% 9,819 71 99.3% 8.00 1
114120031 Deep drilling machines 4 2 22 24 91.65% 10,000 69 99.3% 5.00 3
114191001 Forklift on battery and diesel power 4 196 1,894 2,090 90.62% 7,850 69 99.1% 23.33 2
114130011 Lathes numerically operated 4 3 34 37 91.97% 10,000 64 99.4% 34.00 2
118100442 Aluminium-sulphate 2 577 3,874 4,451 87.04% 3,793 63 98.3% 16.00 3
117290091 Analogue accounting systems 4 1 13 14 93.05% 10,000 48 99.5% 5.00 1
111290023 Stone salt for cattle food 5 4,580 62,879 67,459 93.21% 10,000 46 99.5% 5.00 4
105000122 Jet fuel (kerosene type GM1. GM4) 1 3,104 44,028 47,132 93.41% 10,000 43 99.6% 3.67 3
113900463 Weights for scales. made of cast iron 4 1 15 16 93.63% 10,000 40 99.6% 10.00 3
105000052 Unleaded petrol of premium type  BMB 9 5118,254 295,276 313,530 94.18% 10,000 33 99.7% 8.00 3
114110101 Heat transformers 6 4 69 73 94.48% 10,000 30 99.7% 13.00 3
126150013 Laces 5 1 17 18 94.58% 10,000 29 99.7% 21.00 1
113150272 Technical springs 3 15 267 282 94.67% 10,000 28 99.7% 13.50 2
117210152 Transistors 3 0 3 3 94.44% 8,106 25 99.7% 4.33 1
129010082 Tires for trucks and buses. diagonal 4 200 4,068 4,268 95.31% 10,000 21 99.8% 1.50 3
117490033 Mixers 6 4 85 89 95.52% 10,000 20 99.8% 20.00 1
119200353 Deodorants and antiperspirants 5 44 590 634 93.04% 3,786 18 99.5% 21.50 1
115270042 Remaining parts and kit for motor vehicles 3 11,110 67,631 78,741 85.89% 892 17 98.0% 5.67 2
114190311 Machines and devices for production of leather 
footwear and haberdachery
4 13 231 244 94.68% 5,266 14 99.7% 3.00 2
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113200261 Metal kiosks 4 59 1,187 1,246 95.27% 6,552 14 99.8% 12.00 3
105000102 Remaining special petrol 1 112 2,808 2,920 96.16% 10,000 14 99.9% 5.00 3
113200061 Metal blinds 6 5 142 147 96.60% 10,000 11 99.9% 18.50 3
113130311 Metal hand tools 6 12 349 361 96.68% 10,000 11 99.9% 20.82 2
119200293 Nail polish 5 3 65 67 96.05% 6,612 10 99.8% 27.50 1
107130982 Zinc thin metal plates 3 212 6,311 6,523 96.75% 10,000 10 99.9% 6.60 4
114190951 Personal and load elevators (lifts) 4 11 335 346 96.82% 10,000 10 99.9% 14.25 3
118101432 Organic surface active materials 5 203 6,828 7,031 97.11% 10,000 8 99.9% 7.25 1
112910072 Asbestos linen and tapes 3 11 376 387 97.16% 10,000 8 99.9% 15.00 3
114190111 Machines and equipment for packaging of food 
products
4 12 283 295 95.93% 5,138 8 99.8% 5.00 2
126150043 Shoe laces 5 2 76 78 97.44% 10,000 6 99.9% 33.84 1
117490013 Electrical apparatus for grinding. mixing and 
cutting of food
6 6 218 224 97.32% 5,555 4 99.9% 10.00 1
113150172 Steel wire nets. tapes and yarn 3 100 4,688 4,788 97.91% 8,362 3 100.0% 16.54 3
111110032 Asbestos fibre, III and IV class 3 3 163 166 98.19% 10,000 3 100.0% 9.00 3
119200033 Shaving soaps 5 20 1,327 1,347 98.52% 10,000 2 100.0% 20.00 1
114200181 Combines for grain 4 9 622 631 98.57% 10,000 2 100.0% 45.00 2
117490053 Ventilators 6 5 258 263 98.10% 5,200 1 100.0% 12.06 1
117290101 Complete digital accounting systems 6 2 156 158 98.73% 10,000 1 100.0% 5.00 1
108900182 Concentrate pyrite 2 1,115 99,489 100,604 98.89% 10,000 1 100.0% 0.00 5
131140012 Wine distillates 3 47 1,985 2,032 97.70% 2,527 1 99.9% 60.00 2
112190172 Glass textile 3 20 1,925 1,945 98.97% 10,000 1 100.0% 15.83 3
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105000282 Stoking oil for householdsproduct codeproduct 1 3,004 292,061 295,065 98.98% 10,000 1 100.0% 8.00 3
117430053 Dish washing and drying machines for households 6 2 341 343 99.42% 10,000 0 100.0% 28.89 2
117220272 Antennas 6 2 421 423 99.53% 10,000 0 100.0% 54.13 1
113120082 Aluminium radiators 6 4 895 899 99.55% 10,000 0 100.0% 20.00 3
117410143 Air-conditioners 6 4 1,358 1,362 99.71% 5,000 0 100.0% 22.78 2
111190152 Bentonites 2 56 5,654 5,710 99.02% 10,000 0 100.0% 5.00 5
119200383 Glycerine. natural 2 0 179 179 99.95% 10,000 0 100.0% 3.00 1
11920028 Lipsticks 3 50 32 32 98.63% 2,839 0 100.0% 27.50 1
119200263 Powders 5 4 734 738 99.50% 4,908 0 100.0% 24.00 1
119200333 Perfumes 5 0 28 28 99.80% 10,000 0 100.0% 24.00 1
119100443 Dietetic 5 0 233 233 99.94% 10,000 0 100.0% 21.50 1
118320032 Celluloid 3 2 425 427 99.53% 10,000 0 100.0% 13.00 3
117300032 Pulled wire made from aluminium and 
aluminium alloys
3 8 1,721 1,729 99.54% 10,000 0 100.0% 14.50 3
117210262 Voltage stabilisation 3 0 26 27 99.63% 10,000 0 100.0% 32.00 2
114130271 Hydraulic press 4 11 1,670 1,681 99.35% 10,000 0 100.0% 24.55 2
114190981 Ship cranes winch 4 1 971 972 99.90% 10,000 0 100.0% 6.67 2
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